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SUMMARY 
The ideas of children's rights, children's right to education and 
compulsory education are widely accepted nowadays, if only in general 
terms. This thesis is concerned to explore and offer possible reasons for 
the acceptance of these ideas, and, particularly, to clarify the relation 
between the ideas of "children's right to education" and "compulsory 
education". 
First, however, it is necessary to consider the general features of rights- 
talk, on the grounds that the denotations and connotations of rights-talk 
have some significant bearings on the central issues of the thesis. 
Thereafter, the emphasis is shifted to the question of children's rights. 
Certain writers' theories - namely, Hobbes', Mill's and Hart's - were once 
assumed to be contradictory to the idea of children's rights, but it is 
argued that these writers' theories have been misunderstood. 
Apart from clarifying these writers' theories in relation to children's 
rights, the thrust of this thesis is to offer a convincing. justification for 
the idea of children's rights in general, and children's right. to education 
in particular. It is argued that the idea of children's rights is rationally 
acceptable and practically necessary in maintaining satisfactory 
relationships between children and other parties for people who are 
rational, self-interested, just and benevolent. It is also argued that 
children's right to education is justifiable on the grounds that it is an 
essential good for both children and society as a whole. The issue of 
children's right to education is tackled within the framework of liberal 
democracy; hence the form of education proposed is also geared to the 
cultivation of persons who can play a part in a liberal democracy. The 
issue of compulsory education is discussed. It is argued that compulsory 
education can be justified and that its justification is mainly based on 
paternalism and children's obligation to undertake education. 
In the concluding chapter, it is argued that children's right to education 
can indeed be used to justify compulsory education, but this line of 
reasoning should be based on paternalism, which in turn should be rights- 
based. The thesis finally reaches the conclusion that the option-rights 
tradition and the claim that rights-talk is not self-referring should be 
rejected. 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
It is common for us to hold certain ideas without fully understanding the 
reasons why. It is also not unusual for us to perform certain actions 
without knowing exactly why we do so. Even if we do have reasons for 
holding certain ideas or performing certain actions, they may be 
ambiguously construed, Ideologically biased, internally self-contradictory, 
or logically inconsistent. And even If the reasons for holding certain ideas 
or performing certain actions are clear, rational, reasonable, consistent, 
and free of self-contradiction, there is always a possibility that we may 
find other reasons which are more appealing to us than the reasons we 
currently maintain, 
The ideas that children have rights, that children have a right to education, 
and that children should be compelled to receive education have" for 
sometime been taken for granted by many adults in Western societies. And 
these ideas have also been invoked to support various campaigns or 
demands for children's welfare or children's freedom. Moreover, these 
ideas have actually been embodied in, or manifested by, various practical 
measures. But, as has been suggested by the opening paragraph, it is quite 
possible for people to endorse these ideas or practical, measures without 
fully understanding the reasons why. And even if they can spell out reasons 
for subscribing to these ideas and practical measures, their reasons may be 
ambiguous, inconsistent, unconvincing, or unpersuasive. Further, even if 
their reasons are clear, consistent, convincing and persuasive, it is still 
possible to find other reasons more appealing than the ones currently held. 
One of the principal purposes of this thesis is, given the context just 
described, to enquire into the possible reasons why the idea and practice of 
children's rights is widely accepted and adopted. This enquiry is conducted 
through an investigation of arguments that have been used by a number or 
writers to support the idea and practice of children's rights. After this 
enquiry, we then can decide whether arguments currently used are 
satisfactory or not. If they are not satisfactory it will then be necessary 
to go on to ask whether it is possible to develop a more convincing case. 
It would be possible to carry out an empirical investigation to uncover 
reasons which are commonly used in support of the idea and practice of 
children's rights. And after this investigation we could then proceed with a 
philosophical evaluation to see whether currently held reasons are 
persuasive or not. Nevertheless, an empirical approach is not the only or 
necessarily the best way of proceeding. There are other options. The 
alternative that this thesis takes is, as has been indicated, to reveal and 
analyze arguments that have been used by writers in support of the idea and 
practice of children's rights. The reason for adopting this approach rather 
than an empirical one is that arguments provided or revealed by writers are 
often reflections of deep-rooted ideas or practices in society at large. 
And, most notably, they are usually put in a refined and systematic way, 
which is helpful in clarifying the issues at stake. However, it should be 
noted that arguments provided by writers, as far as the issue of children's 
rights is concerned, do not stop at only reflecting deep-rooted ideas and 
practices. They also strengthen people's convictions supporting the ideas 
and practices concerned. Given this understanding, discovering and 
analyzing what these arguments are is not very different from 
understanding what ordinary people may think regarding the issue. Thus, 
we can take a different approach and still reach the same aim, namely 
uncovering widely held assumptions about children's rights. 
In seeking to understand the possible reasons for endorsing the idea of 
children's rights, the' first obstacle we come across is the notion of 
"rights". People who campaign for children's rights, or who use the term 
"children's rights", may know very little about the characteristics of 
rights-talk. It may be the case that for practical purposes they do not need 
to know. Without knowing the characteristics of rights-talk, they may 
still conduct their campaigns successfully or get their messages across. 
From an intellectual point of view, however, this is not satisfactory. It 
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can be assumed that the term "rights" has its specific connotations and 
denotations. These are by no means fixed. They are subject to change. But 
it can still be suggested that unless the currently understood connotations 
and denotations of the term "rights" are under serious challenge, it would 
be better to utilize this term according to its received usage. If not, it 
would be difficult to make our ideas clear and would hamper our 
communication with other people. In order to make sure what the term 
"children's rights" may imply it is necessary to know in the first place the 
specific connotations and denotations of the term "rights". For it is 
supposed in this thesis that these connotations and denotations have 
significant bearings on the notion of children's rights simply because 
children's rights are a particular case of rights in general. Based on this 
recognition, the preliminary stage of tackling the issue of children's rights 
is to understand what the specific connotations and denotations of "rights" 
are. The principal concern in Chapter One of this thesis is then to explain 
the characteristic of rights-talk. 
Chapters Two and Three of this thesis are concerned with the issue of 
children's rights. Although the idea of children's rights-is now taken as a 
received idea, this was not the case in the past. The reason why, this idea 
was previously not popular is explained briefly at the beginning of Chapter 
Two. The main emphasis of Chapter Two is concerned with several writers' 
theories in relation to the idea of children's rights. The idea of children's 
rights - like other major moral, political and social ideas - are associated 
with influential figures, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and John Stuart 
Mill. Some writers' theories support the idea of children's rights. Others 
can, however, be used to reject children's rights. It is usually assumed that 
there is no place for the idea of children's rights in Hobbes' and Mill's 
theories, and that H. L. A. Hart's will theory of rights (which claims that the 
right-holder's will or choice regarding the duty-bearer's actions is the 
essence of rights) does not recognize the idea of children's rights. It will 
be argued that these three writers' theories are misunderstood. It will be 
argued that the idea of children's rights can indeed be found in Hobbes' and 
Mill's theories; and that this idea is actually not rejected by Hart's will 
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theory of rights. Technically, Chapter Two paves the way for Chapter 
Three, in which the positive arguments supporting children's rights will be 
discussed and developed. 
Chapter Three is about the justification of children's rights. As has been 
suggested above, there can be different reasons for supporting the idea of 
children's rights. In the first two parts, a traditional justification and a 
Rawisian justification for children's rights are presented. But it is argued 
that neither the traditional justification nor the Rawlsian justification is 
satisfactory. Although they are presented as reasons for supporting the 
idea of children's rights, they are not good reasons. Given their failure to 
be persuasive, the final part of Chapter Three is aimed at providing a more 
convincing justification for the idea of children's rights. 
The focal issue of Chapter Four is children's right to education. What 
Chapter Three does is simply to show that the idea of children's rights, can 
be justified. The justification of children's rights in general does not 
justify children's particular right to education. The reason for choosing to 
focus on the issue of children's right to education rather than others is that 
education, given the context of a liberal democracy; is essential not only 
for children but also for other, members of society and indeed society as a 
whole. But as "education" can be expressed in different forms of activity, 
based on different ideologies or theories, and different forms of 
educational activity can have different contents and aims, it is then 
necessary to identify what sort of educational activity is under 
consideration. Thus, the task of this thesis is not limited to the cognitive 
understanding of why we regard the idea of children's rights as a received 
idea; it is also a political or social task in terms of advocating a specific 
form of education that children have a right to. The second half of Chapter 
Four is devoted to the justification of children's right to the specific form 
of education advocated in the previous section. It is argued that it is for 
the good of children, parents, other members of society, and society as a 
whole that children's right to education can be justified. 
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Chapter Five is concerned with whether the education advocated in Chapter 
Four should be compulsorily imposed on children, Mill's ideas are relied on 
in arguing that compulsory education (in its specific form) Is justifiable. 
It is pointed out that compulsory measures are necessary for liberal 
democratic societies, and the imposition of compulsory education is 
compatible with other measures of liberal democracies. Moreover, it is 
argued that the paternalistic argument in general (the doctrine which 
claims that it is for the interest of children that their freedom can be 
interfered with) can justify compulsory. education. Apart from 
paternalistic arguments, the justification of compulsory education can also 
be based on children's obligation to receive education. In the second half of 
this chapter, cultural conservatism and deschooling are considered as two 
doctrines which oppose the idea of compulsory education. In order to 
consolidate the idea that compulsory education is acceptable, objections 
are raised against these two doctrines. 
In the short concluding chapter, the relation between children's right to 
education and compulsory education/schooling will be clarified. It will be 
argued that children's right to education can be taken as a reason for 
compelling children to receive education, on the grounds that children's 
right to education is too essential for children to decide for themselves 
whether they should exercise it or not. Finally, some important 
implications for theories of rights and claims concerning the basic 
characteristics of rights-talk will be pointed out after the acceptance that 
compulsory education can be justifed by the idea of children's right to 
education. 
Taken as a whole, this thesis attempts to accomplish several tasks. 
Firstly, it is hoped that it will clarify what the term "rights" refers to. 
Secondly, it tries to investigate why the idea of children's rights can be 
accepted. Thirdly, it endeavours to work out a justification for children's 
rights. Fourthly, it undertakes to advocate a specific form of education and 
argues that children have a right to this education. Fifthly, it argues that 
children can, and should, be compelled to receive the education advocated, 
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and the reason for compulsory education 1s mainly based on paternalism 
and children's duty to receive education. Admittedly, there are some 
important Issues left untouched. These include a number or important 
practical questions. When should compulsory education start? For how 
long should the compulsory education advocated be imposed? What sort of 
role should the state play concerning compulsory education? These Issues 
are certainly worth tackling. But they can be regarded as "second order" 
questions, once the primary task of conceptual clarification has taken 
place. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF RIGHTS-TALK 
"When ... you employ such a word as right, a cloud, and 
that or black hue overshadows the whole tleld. " 
Bentham 
Securities Against Misrule 
Rights-talk has already become part of our daily discourse. Legislators (or 
rulers) use lt in defining the relationship between the state and the 
individual; social, political and moral theorists invoke it to prescribe 
human relationships and the ideal society; people who care for animals take 
it to regulate the relations of animals and human beings; ordinary people 
employ It to assert their independence or interests; philanthropists wield 
it to initiate charities. ... There is, however, one question which 
frequently crops up given that the word "rights" 1s widely and heavily used 
- what does the word "rights" mean? Or, to what does the word "rights" 
refer when people use It In their discourses? It 1s this question with 
which the first chapter of this thesis is concerned. 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section 'looks at the 
complexity of rights-talk. The second section sketches the various 
attempts to define "rights" in a simple and informative way and points out 
that each is bound to fail in terms of providing a general picture of rights. 
The third section examines the work of several theorists concerning a 
general picture of rights-talk. The final section determines the meaning of 
the word "rights" in this thesis in the light of what has been said in the 
first three sections. 
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1. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 
The single word "rights" is a complicated one for many writers. (1) This 
complexity derives from several sources. Firstly, the term "rights" is not 
ordinarily used with precise meaning. This criticism can be applied not 
only to ordinary people, politicians, and human rights advocates, but also to 
some jurists, judges, and philosophers. In effect, the word "rights" has 
been given different meanings by different persons or different meanings 
by the same person in different contexts. (2) Thus, the same word "right", 
according to the American jurist Hohfeld, can be used in legal contexts to 
indicate "claim", "privilege" (liberty), "power", "immunity", and each of 
them has its specific correlative and opposite. (3) It is no wonder that. the 
use of the word "rights" has become very perplexing. 
The second source of this complexity comes from the fact that rights-talk 
covers both legal rights and moral rights. Originally, the term "rights" was 
used only as a legal notion, but this boundary did not last very long and it 
was soon stretched so as to include certain things that cannot be tackled in 
a legal context but need to be tackled in a moral context: (4) This extension 
from a legal notion to a moral notion complicates the usage and the content 
of the language of rights. It might be worth mentioning here that many 
theorists have been opposed to this extension. Among others, Bentham, 
Austin, Hohfeld, Lamont, Gregory, Young and Frey are especially notable for 
their hostility to the idea of moral rights. (5) However, it cannot be ignored 
that the idea of moral rights, or its sub-division human rights(6), has been 
broadly accepted and utilized by ordinary people, philosophers and jurists. 
And given that moral rights or human rights have been widely regarded as 
integral to discussions about "the morally appropriate way of treating man 
and organizing society"(7), it will not be improper for us to treat moral 
rights as a ramification of "rights" in general. Unfortunately, this 
inclusion has some side-effects. As legal rights and moral rights have 
different grounds and are protected by different sanctions, they therefore 
can be defined in different terms. As a result, as pointed out by Acton, it 
seems to make sense to talk of a legal right that is morally wrong or a 
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moral right being violated by a conscienceless man with the support of 
public opinion. (S) Suffice it to say, this awkward situation results from 
the fact that the same word "rights" has been used to refer to different 
things regarding what ought to be done and what is commanded. (9) 
Thirdly, another factor that complicates the language of rights is that it 
encapsulates some categorically different sets of rights. Leaving the 
entanglement of legal rights and moral rights aside, according to 
Macpherson there are roughly three kinds of rights. They are: civil rights, 
political rights, economic and social rights. Civil rights Include freedom of 
speech and publication, freedom of association, freedom of religion, 
freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment etc. 
Political rights are mainly about the right to have a voice, directly and 
indirectly, in the government of the country. Economic and social rights 
cover the right to work, the right to equal pay, the right to social security, 
the right to an Income consistent with a life of human dignity, the right to 
leisure, the right to education etc. Concerning the relationship between the 
individual and the state, civil rights are rights against the state in the 
sense that there are individual rights or liberties that the state should not 
invade. Political rights are rights to a voice In the control of the state. By 
contrast, economic and social rights are plainly claims for benefits to be 
provided by the state. (i 0) Apart from these differences, civil rights and 
political rights can practically be translated into positive rights which are 
supported by positive law and hence can be actually enjoyed by the rights- 
holder or enforced by the state; in comparison, it will be difficult, If not* 
Impossible, to transform the idea of economic and social rights into 
positive rights by analogous political and legal actions. (11) Evidently, 
although there are great differences between these rights, they are all 
covered by the same name. This conflation inevitably adds to the difficulty 
of identifying the character of "rights". 
Fourthly, the complexity of the language of rights is rooted in the 
historical development of the concept of rights. From a historical point of 
view, there are two traditions which interpret the concept of rights in two 
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different ways. Based on Golding's illustration, one tradition is the 
tradition of natural rights, which started in the middle ages and prevailed 
in the seventeenth century and eighteenth century. In this tradition, the 
concept of rights is set in terms of individual sovereignty, power, faculty, 
capacity and option. To possess rights in this tradition means that the 
right-holder is normally free to act on the basis of his own choices and 
that the right-holder has some kind of rightful control over his own and 
other people's actions. Rights in this tradition can be named "option rights". 
Another tradition, which starts earlier than the natural rights tradition, 
defines "rights" in terms of general goods or justice. This is the welfare 
rights tradition. Rights, in this tradition, are derived from "claims to the 
goods of life which are conferred by the social ideal of a community. " To 
possess rights in this tradition means that the right-holder can have 
entitlements to goods, no matter whether the right-holder is capable of 
getting the goods In question or practically having some kind of rightful 
control over himself as well as other people. (12) It Is clear that these 
two traditions are encapsulated In two different concepts and there is no 
simple way to effect a compromise. From this, it can be said that 
historically the language of rights contains two different elements which 
bring out different connotations and consequences. 
Finally, the complexity of the language of rights rests not only on its 
linguistic and logical ambiguity but also on its contents, which can be 
interpreted differently. This point can be supported by Putnam's 
illustration of the right to life. According to Putnam, there is hardly any 
agreement on the details of this right, even though the right to life has a 
very central role in rights-talk. Thus, for Hobbes, the right to life means 
the right to self-defence and is an inalienable right. For some other 
writers, the right to life means not only that the right-holder has a right to 
life but that other people, whether the state or other individuals, should 
have certain positive duties towards the right-holder. Nevertheless, in 
some writers' schemes the right to life is only a , prima facie right; that is, 
it is a right which can be overridden or forfeited if and only if a proper 
justification can be provided. However, a consensus over what is a proper 
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Justification for taking a human life has not yet been achieved. (13) The 
message from this example is quite clear. Although the idea of a specific 
right can be very simple, its contents can be very complicated. 
From the fact that the word "rights" has different connotations as well as 
different references, and can be used In different contexts, two points can 
be made here. First, it may be wrong for us to ask either "What is a right? " 
or "What are rights? ". The proper questions may be. What is a moral right? 
What is a legal right? What is an option right? What is a welfare right? ' 
Or, what is a right in the sense of claim, privilege (liberty), power, 
immunity? Or, what is a political right? What is a civil right? What is an 
economic right? What is a social right? And so on. Second, since the 
language of rights is so complicated and it may not be sensible to ask 
"What is a right? ", it then can be suggested that it is impossible to search 
for a synonym of "rights" or to define "rights" in a very simple and 
informative way. These attempts are, according to Wringe, at best 
unsatisfactory, and at worst "a most fertile source of confusion and 
conf I ict". (14) 
Given an understanding of the complexity of rights-talk, it is reasonable to 
say that the simple kind of definition (the traditional mode of definition), 
or the attempt to explain "rights" by a single term, cannot reveal a general 
picture of "rights"; It would, however, be wrong to say that those 
definitions which have been given In the simple way count for nothing. On 
the contrary, although these definitions are ultimately bound to fail, each 
of them nevertheless is like an irregularly shaped piece of a jigsaw puzzle. 
A single piece of a jigsaw puzzle can never display the whole picture; 
however, it can be critical in helping us to see the whole picture. It is for 
this reason that a review of those definitions or explanations of "rights" 
will be given in the following section. 
2. A REVIEW OF DEFINITIONS OF RIGHTS 
2.1 Rights and Claims 
It is not uncommon for theorists to explain "rights" in terms of "claims". 
Hill in Utilitarianism says: "When we call anything a person's right, we 
mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession 
of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. "(15) 
Ritchie, for example, defines a "right" (referring to both legal rights and 
moral rights) as "the claim of an individual upon others recognized by 
society, irrespective of its recognition by the state. "(16) Ryan and Boland, 
explaining the Catholic view of rights, state: "A right in the moral sense of 
the term may be defined as an inviolable moral claim to some general 
good. "( 17) Feinberg and Haksar are recent writers who also tend to explain 
rights in terms of claims, or valid claims. (18) 
Feinberg is very clear in his mind that to have a formal definition of rights 
in terms of claims will not get us very far. He therefore declares that he 
would rather use the idea of claims in informal elucidation of the Idea of 
rights. His concrete undertaking is then to "concentrate on the whole 
activity of claiming, which is public, familiar, and open to our observation, 
rather than on its upshot alone. "(19) As a result, by observing the activity 
of claiming, which for Feinberg is a rule-governed activity, he first 
pinpoints the fact that there is a difference between rights and claims. He 
says, "Having a claim to X Is not the same as having a right to X, but is 
rather having a case of at least minimal possibility that one has ä right to 
X, a case that does establish a right, not to X, but to a fair hearing and 
cons ideration. "(20) In this respect, Feinberg suggests that some claims 
can be stronger than others and therefore claims differ in degree. As to 
"rights", they are all justified claims, they are justified within a system of 
rules and hence no one right is more of a right than another. (21) Following 
this, Feinberg suggests that all rights are valid claims. (22) Hence, the 
statement, "A has a legal right", can be interpreted as, "A has a valid claim, 
the official recognition of his claim is called for by the governing rules"; 
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and the statement, "A has a moral right", can then be interpreted as, "A has 
a valid claim, the recognition of which is called for by moral principles, or 
the principles of an enlightened conscience. "(23) Finally, however, 
Feinberg gives a definition of a right: "To have a right is to have a claim 
against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of 
governing rules or moral principles. "(24) 
Haksar's endeavour is in effect similar to Feinbergs., He, like Feinberg, 
indicates first that he does not want to provide a definition of "right"; 
what he would like to do is only to search for the character that rights in 
different areas of the law have in common. (25) The central character that 
rights share is, Haksar says, "demand". In fact, in his work, "demand" is 
another term for "claim". In his own words, he says, "... talk of rights is 
linked with demands, or claims, or complaints, that can validly be made by 
the person who has the right, or by those who speak on his behalf. " And, 
"When a person is not given what he has a right to, he has been wronged. 
And he (or someone acting on his behalf) is entitled to complain and 
censure the guilty party or parties (i. e. the party. that has violated the 
relevant duty). Moreover, he can (validly) demand that he should be given 
what he has a right to have. "(26) 
Several remarks can be made about the relationship between "rights" and 
"claims". Firstly, on the linguistic level, the word "claims" can be used in 
two ways. On the one hand, "claims" in legal contexts as well as in daily 
usage can be used as equivalent to "rights". (27) So, the noun "claim" can be 
replaced by "right" in Feinberg's statement, "One might have a claim 
without even claiming that to which one is entitled, or without even 
knowing that one has the claim, for one might simply be ignorant of the 
fact that one is in a position to claim; or one might be unwilling to exploit 
that position for one reason or another. "(28) It is also the case in Golding's 
statement: 1 may claim what I have a claim to; omit to claim what I have a 
claim to; and I may claim that to which I have no claim. "(29) On the other 
hand, the word "claims" sometimes is not used as equivalent to "rights" but 
as "something that is claimed". In this sense, "claims" are used in the 
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sense of "demands". So, following Golding, it can be said: "I can make 
claims to which I have no rights. " 
Secondly, with regard to the analysis of rights in terms of claims 
(demands), Feinberg is quite correct in pointing out how "rights" can be 
established from "claims" (demands); and when rights are violated, rights- 
holders can "stand up like men", "look others in the eye" and claim that 
something has to be done. (30) Haksar is also correct in echoing Feinberg on 
this issue. However, the weak point of this line of thinking is that neither 
Feinberg nor Haksar spells out how the situation appears when rights are 
functioning. They point out how rights can be formulated and the possible 
actions the rights-holder can take when his rights are violated, but they do 
not specify the circumstances when "rights" are possessed or enjoyed. 
That is why McCloskey argues that the notion of rights is not necessarily 
attached to "claims"; for the rights-holder can enjoy his rights without 
making claims on others at all. For example, McCloskey suggests, it can be 
said that "I may enjoy my club's facilities without claims on others. "(31) 
Melden also says that "claim against others" does not necessarily go with 
the practice of rights. For it is not self-contradictory to say that "I have a 
right to special consideration-from B, but it would be wrong for B to give 
me special consideration at this time. "(32) Even Haksar admits that "when 
a person already has that which he has a right to have, it makes no sense 
for him to demand it. "(33) 
Thirdly, concerning the equation of rights and valid claims, it can be 
suggested that given the fact that "rights" are not necessarily attached to 
"claims" it is therefore not really sensible to identify rights with valid 
claims. Furthermore, the identification of the two can be misleading. For 
some rights are quite controversial - such as, the right to abortion or 
animal rights - and they may be supported by some people but rejected by 
others. So these rights can be valid claims for some; but for others, they 
are not. On the other hand, not all valid claims are rights. For example, in 
the case of "A has an appointment with B", it can be reasonable for A to say 
that "I have a valid claim on B in asking him to turn up at the appointed 
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time. " But it may be too strong to say that "I have a right as regards B in 
asking him to turn up at the appointed time. " 
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To sum up. The word "claims" in legal contexts or even in its daily usage 
can be used as equivalent to "rights". But the understanding of "rights" will 
not be advanced in this case. In the case of "claims" as "demands", the 
relationship between rights and claims is mainly manifested during the 
process of the formulation of rights as well as when rights are violated. 
But when rights are functioning satisfactorily, there can be no place for 
"claims". 
2.2 Rights and Duties (Obligations) 
The most common approach to understanding "rights" is to start from the 
language of duties or obligations. This Is Bentham's and Austin's view. For 
Bentham, rights are established or granted by imposing obligations or by 
abstaining from imposing obligations. All rights, without exception, rest 
upon the idea of obligations as their necessary foundation. From this, 
"rights" can be divided into two categories. They are: rights existing from 
the absence of obligations (these are liberty-rights); and rights established 
by obligations (these are rights to service of others). (34) In all cases, 
Bentham would argue that the concept of rights will not be intelligible 
without an understanding of the concept of duties or obligations. Following 
Bentham, Austin also explains "rights" from the notion of obligations. 
Apart from making a distinction between negative obligation (to say A has 
a negative obligation is to say that A is commanded to forbear or abstain 
from performing'certain actions) and positive obligation (to say A has a 
positive obligation is to say that A Is commanded to do or perform certain 
actions), Austin also makes a distinction between relative obligation and 
absolute obligation. A relative obligation, such as obligation of reparation, 
is incumbent upon one party, and correlates with a right residing in another 
party; It implies, and is implied by, a right. By contrast, an absolute 
*The words "obligation" and "duty" are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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obligation, such as obligation of charity, correlates with no rights; it 
neither implies nor is implied by a right. (35) 
Several things need to be said about Bentham's and Austin's viewpoints. 
Most importantly, it should be kept in mind that Bentham's and Austin's 
viewpoints concern not what a 'right' is but what It is to have a 
right. (36) This approach is notably different from the traditional mode of 
definition such as Ritchie's. It is therefore not true to say that Bentham 
and Austin try to define what a right is. Further, Bentham and Austin do 
not maintain that all obligations imply rights. Austin is quite clear about 
this. He unequivocally asserts that absolute obligations neither imply nor 
are implied by rights. Bentham also clearly maintains that rights are 
conferred only by obligations which generate benefits. Obligations do not 
correspond to rights unless they protect or serve rather than harm or 
threaten those they directly concern. (37) He especially indicates that two 
kinds of duties, self-regarding duties and barren duties (the duties that are 
not useful to anyone), are not related to rights. (38) Moreover, the concept 
of obligations or duties is not an atomistic concept which can be 
independent from other normative concepts in either Bentham's or Austin's 
theory. Bentham, for example, claims that the notion of obligations is 
posterior to the notion of service". (39) Austin plainly puts the notion of 
obligations in a legal context, and connects it with the notion of 
command. (40) Hence, according to the Benthamite -doctrine, in order to 
understand "rights", it is not enough to understand the notion of obligations 
only. It would be better to go further to enquire into the notion of "law", 
"utility", "service", "command", and so on. 
Some writers, such as Brandt, Benn and Peters, go beyond the Benthamite 
doctrine and argue that the relationship between rights and duties is in 
effect closer than Bentham and Austin suppose. Their doctrine is usually 
called the correlativity theory. (41) A classic example can exemplify this 
doctrine: 
When Bernard owes Alvin ten dollars we have equal reason to ascribe 
a right to Alvin (to be paid ten dollars by Bernard) and an obligation 
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to Bernard (to pay Alvin ten dollars), and whatever would falsify one 
description would likewise falsify the other. Neither the right nor 
the obligation can arise without the other. ... Alvin's right and Bernard's obligation necessarily coexist, and a full statement of one 
logically implies a full statement of the other. (42) 
In the light of this example, it is not difficult to understand why Brandt 
maintains that "the concept of right can be defined in terms of moral 
obligation plus certain nonethical concepts", and why Benn and Peters say 
that "the difference between rights and duties is only the difference 
between the active and the passive voice" and "rights and duties refer to 
the same normative relationship". (43) On this doctrine, it can even be 
suggested that all theories about duties are by implication theories about 
rights, and vice versa. (44) 
After this brief exposition of the Benthamite position . and 
the correlativity 
theory, a critique of these two positions can be made. Generally, the 
Benthamite position Is more reasonable than the correlativity theory on the 
Issue of the relationships between rights and duties. The Benthamite 
position is right in suggesting both that duties are not necessarily 
correlative with rights and that rights are not necessarily correlative with 
duties (for example, liberty-rights). But the Benthamite position Is weak 
In claiming that the language of duties is the key to the understanding of 
rights-talk. These points need elaboration. 
As has been shown, the correlativity doctrine can be sustained 
, 
only under 
the condition that rights imply duties and duties Imply rights. If one of 
these two pillars collapses, this doctrine will subsequently rail. 
Unfortunately, neither of these two pillars can be maintained. Duties do 
not necessarily imply rights. Bentham and Austin have already indicated 
that some duties or obligations are not correlative with rights. Feinberg 
also holds the view that not all duties imply rights. In his thorough 
analysis of the relationships between rights and duties, he especially 
singles out three kinds of duties - duties of status, duties of compelling 
appropriateness and duties of obedience - which are not necessarily 
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correlative with other people's rights. (45) Apart from Feinberg, Plamenatz, 
Acton, Mabbot, Campbell, and MacCormick also take a similar line. (46) 
However, it should be borne in mind that the collapse of the correlativity 
doctrine should not blind us to the fact that-in some cases rights and duties 
do correlate; and hence the understanding of the concept of duties is very 
important in those cases. 
However, as has been shown, rights do not necessarily imply duties. 
Bentham is quite clear in indicating that there are no corresponding duties 
to liberty-rights. On this point, Hohfeld also shows that some rights are 
not correlative with duties. In his scheme, the correlatives of privilege 
(liberty), power, and immunity are no-right, liability and disability 
respectively. (47) From this, It can therefore be suggested that some rights 
can be explained by notions other than duties. Lyons also provides an 
actual case that can be used to support Hohfeld's standpoint. Given the 
American context, Lyons points out, the constitutional right of free speech, 
as an immunity-right, correlates not with an obligation but a "disability". 
The assertion of this right only says that Congress is not empowered to 
enact certain laws that will violate this right. in Lyons` words: 
There may be some point in speaking of a Congressional. "obligation" 
not to exceed one's legislative powers.... But this "obligation" 
would be a queer one, for the members of Congress are not subject to 
civil or criminal actions against them if they "breach" it by enacting 
unconstitutional laws. If they do this their actions could be 
described as "illegal" or "unlawful" only in the sense of "invalid". (48) 
In fact, Lyons is not the only recent writer who explicitly indicates the 
point that some rights are not necessarily correlative with duties. 
Wollheim, MacCormick and Dworkin also provide some examples to 
strengthen this view. Wollheim asks the reader to imagine a legal context 
in which anyone has a right to keep what he finds. Supposing A and B come 
across a coin on the pavement at the same time. In this case, both A and B 
have a right to pick it up and keep it, though only one can do so. Hence, 
although A and B both have a right to pick the coin up, A has no duty to 
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allow B to get it, nor the other way round. (49) MacCormick cites Scottish 
legislation concerning intestate succession to demonstrate that the 
general principle "rights imply duties" is false. According to Section 2(1) 
of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 "(a) Where an intestate is survived 
by children, they shall have right to the whole of the intestate estate. " 
McCormick points out, "... whereas the right rests at the moment of the 
intestate's death, there is not at that moment an executor to bear a 
correlative duty. "(50) In Dworkin's plan, there are two kinds of rights, 
namely, the strong sense of rights and the weak sense of rights. In the 
strong sense of rights, when someone has a right to do something it implies 
that it would be wrong for others to interfere with his doing it; in other 
words, there is always a duty corresponding to this right. In the weak sense 
of rights, we may say that someone has a right to do something yet it 
would not be wrong for someone else to interfere. In this sense, "rights" do 
not correlate with other people's duties. The example-Dworkin gives is: "If 
our army capture an enemy soldier, we might say that the right thing for 
him to do is to try to escape, but it would not follow that it is wrong to try 
to stop him. "(51) This statement can be translated into the language of 
rights and duties like this: a war prisoner has a right to escape, but it 
would not follow that his enemies have a duty correlative to his right to 
escape. 
Apart from the point that rights are not necessarily correlative with other 
people's duties, some theorists, such as Raz, go further to argue that rights 
are logically prior to duties. In Raz's own words, "A right of one person is 
not a duty on another. It is the ground of a duty, a ground which.. . 
Justifies holding that other person to have the duty. "(52) It implies that to 
understand the concept of duties is not enough, for rights are something 
prior to duties. The understanding of the suprastructure of an entity does 
not suggest that the understanding of the infrastructure can automatically 
be achieved. 
From the cases shown above, what emerges is that the relationships 
between rights and duties are more complex than might be first supposed. 
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It is very hard to deduce a simple and general formula to signify their 
relation such as the correlativists have tried to do. The implication of this 
failure, however, is that "rights" cannot be fully understood or defined in 
terms of duties; furthermore, some rights are better explained by language 
other than the language of duties or obligations. 
Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile pointing out that even if 
the language of rights can be fully illuminated in terms of duties, this does 
not really take us very far. For it could still be argued that the language of 
duties is no less complicated than the language of rights. It is often 
assumed that the concept of duties is clearer or less difficult than the 
concept of rights. This assumption, however, is arguable. (53) The language 
of duties does emerge historically much earlier than the language of rights, 
but that is not a reason to say that the concept of duties is easier to tackle 
than "rights". As Waldron says, "Even in positive law, the concept of a duty 
Is far from a straightforward concept. 154) However, for the sake of 
clarity, it is assumed here that the notion of "duty" or "obligation" refers to 
two things. First, it refers to some standard of behaviour which is 
regulated by either legal or moral principle, breach of which is wrong, 
either legally or morally. Second, it concerns something that one owes to 
others, whether it be person or any political institution like the state; 
duties in this context directly correlate with rights. (55) 
To conclude. The whole enterprise of defining rights in terms of duties is 
notably different from the work that defines rights in terms of claims. The 
latter puts its emphasis on the analysis of the activity of the right-holder; 
the former pays attention to the relationship between the rights-holder and 
other people. From another angle, the latter tries to identify the essence 
of rights, the former is more concerned with describing what it is like to 
have "rights". With regard to the relationships between rights and duties, 
some rights, such as claim-rights, are directly and firmly correlated with 
other people's duties. Without a proper understanding of the concept of 
duties, these rights cannot be easily understood. However, some rights are 
not directly correlative with duties; they are correlative with other 
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normative concepts. Therefore, in order to understand these rights, 
normative concepts other than duties should also be introduced. 
2.3 Rights and Entitlements 
Another term which has often been used to identify the language of rights 
is "entitlement". McCloskey and Marshall are two exponents. McCloskey 
perceives the weakness of accounts of rights in terms of claims, powers, 
expectations, liberties; he therefore uses "entitlements" to explain 
rights". In his view, moral rights, legal rights, social rights, institutional 
rights, and rights that figure in games are essentially entitlements of 
some sort. This conviction is mainly based on the assumption that the 
essential character of rights is right to rather than right against. 
Therefore, "I have a legal right to marry" can be translated as "I have a 
legal entitlement to marry" or "According to the law, I am entitled to 
marry. " By parity of reasoning, there is no reason that other "rights" cannot 
be transformed into "entitlements". (56) Marshall, paralleling McCloskey, 
also sees the difficulty of explaining rights in terms of powers, claims, 
duties, and therefore asserts that, "A right, it would be safe to say, is 
obviously a foam of entitlement arising out of moral, social, political, or 
legal rules. " However, not as confident as McCloskey, Marshall immediately 
admits that this formulation conceals notorious difficulties about the 
relationship of entitlements to duties and rules. (57) 
One of the criticisms of this position is that "entitlement" is at most a 
verbal synonym of "right" and as such the notion is not particularly 
illuminating or informative. (58) From this, it can also be suggested that 
the attempt to use entitlements to illuminate "rights" sheds little light 
over the whole issue of "rights". For even if we can translate a statement 
of rights into a statement of entitlements, it can still be asked: what does 
entitlement mean? This involves no more than shifting the issue of rights 
to the issue of entitlements. In fact, McCloskey is not unaware of this 
criticism, but his reply is not satisfactory. He does not directly confront 
it. All he says is: "My reply is that the whole discussion of this paper 
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spells out what is meant by an entitlement, and in such a way as to make 
this account of rights illuminating and informative. "(59) It seems that 
McCloskey's definition is a combination of essential definition and 
contextual definition, which leaves a great space for the reader to exercise 
his imagination. Moreover, Wasserstrom suggests that "rights" are 
constitutive of the domain of entitlements. (60) In other words, rights are 
the ground on which entitlements can be claimed, not the synonym. 
To sum up, the attempt to define rights in terms of entitlements is not a 
successful endeavour. It sheds little light on the issue of rights. If this 
approach is counted as a piece of the whole jigsaw puzzle of the general 
picture of rights, it at best constitutes blank background for the main 
picture. 
2.4 Rights and Powers 
Some writers define rights in terms of powers. This approach can be 
traced back to Hobbes and Spinoza. (61) Green's and Plamenatz's definitions 
can be taken as examples. Green's definition is: "A right is a power of 
acting for his own ends, - for what he conceives to be his good, - secured 
to an Individual by the community, on the supposition that its exercise 
contributes to the good of the community. "(62) One of Plamenatz's 
definitions of "rights" is: "A right 1s a power in the existence of which all 
rational beings ought to protect a creature, either because that exercise is 
itself good or else a means to what is good. "(63) 
It should be noted -firstly that Green actually does not identify 
"rights" 
with "powers". What he tries to do is to explicate rights in terms of 
powers. For him, a right is not a brute power; a right is a power only under 
the condition that the right is supposed to be contributory, to the good of 
the community. In other words, a right is a qualified power; the notion of 
"the common good" should always be tnvtnimi to the exptttattun Or "it' 
as "powers". As to Plamenatz's definition, he in his later work makes a 
self-criticism saying this definition is far from satisfactory. He points 
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out three weaknesses. Firstly, not all rights are powers; a person's right 
to the services of others can by no means be counted as a power. Secondly, 
not all powers are rights, the fact that a man can do something he wants 
does not mean he has the right to do the thing he wants. Thirdly, the word 
"power" is highly ambiguous as well. Plamenatz says that it is not 
because it-has several meanings but because it is not habitually so used by 
philosophers discussing rights that its meaning on any particular occasion 
is clear. "(64) Besides Plamenatz's self-criticism, Benn and Peters claim 
that the language of rights expresses a normative relationship ý and 
prescribes how one person should behave. in relation to another; by 
contrast, the language of powers is mainly a description of facts. To 
identify "powers" with "rights" is no different from identifying "is" with 
"ought", and this is fallacious. (65) Moreover, referring to Plamenatz's 
definition, McCloskey says, "A right is a moral authority which creates the 
right to the power which the creature ought to possess, rather than the 
power which the creature ought to possess, as Plamenatz's definition 
implies. "(66) To be sure, McCloskey's explanation is not without problems, 
but he at least suggests that rights in general are the ground of powers and 
the two cannot be identified. (67) 
Although the view that rights are powers cannot be sustained, the 
relationship between rights and powers is worth discussing. First of all, 
the notion that rights in general are the basis of powers has some - 
important implications. It can imply that the language of rights is a kind 
of compass by which the direction of powers should be guided. For 
example, the statement "British children have a right to proper medical 
care" suggests in which direction and in which area children's parents or 
the community as a whole should exercise their powers. In other words, 
"powers" are like a dog that should be kept on a lead by its master "rights". 
On the other hand, rights are supposed to be supported by powers; if not, 
rights-talk will become merely empty rhetoric. For example, it would not 
be sensible to claim a right to a materially decent livelihood by Western 
standards In a materially poor country. From this, it can be suggested that 
rights-talk should be made relevant to the institutional and economic 
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structure of society. Actually, this view directly echoes Spinoza's 
position, summarized by Benn and Peters, that " there is no right where 
there is no power to secure the object of the right, the power arising from 
the exercise of a coercive sanction to enforce the correlative duty. "(68) 
On the whole, the attempt to define rights in terms of powers does not 
stand up to close scrutiny. "Power" Is not the essence of "rights". But the 
language of rights will not be practically meaningful if it is not supported 
by power. 
2.5 Rights and Liberties (Freedoms)* -- 
One can hardly deny that "liberties" can be reckoned as "rights". (69) Some 
natural rights theorists claim that natural rights are in fact another term 
for "liberties". Hobbes says, for example, "The right-of nature ... Is the 
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the 
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and 
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, 
hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. " And, TO lay dowse 
a mans RIy/ht to any thing, is to devest himself of the Liberty.... "(70) 
From another direction, it can also be suggested that the language of rights 
can be translated into liberties or freedoms. This translation applies not 
only to active rights, such as the right to free speech, but to passive 
rights, such as the right to education. Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four 
Freedoms" are a good example. Freedom of speech and worship can be 
treated as the right to free speech and the right to religion; freedom from 
want and fear are terms for welfare rights in general. Along this line, any 
specific right can be encapsulated in the language of liberty or freedom. 
Right to education can be translated roughly as freedom from ignorance and 
Illiteracy; right to proper medical care can be translated as freedom from 
disease, and so on. 
The words "liberty" and "freedom" are treated synonymously in this thesis. 
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Although the attempt to define "rights" in terms of liberties and freedoms 
is not without foundation, it is, however, problematic. Two points can be 
noted here. Firstly, as has been pointed out, there are two different 
traditions of the concept of rights. One is the natural rights tradition in 
which the choice or liberty of the rights-holder is the essential character 
of rights. The other explains "rights" in terms of general goods or justice in 
which rights have little to do with liberty. It is therefore clear that the 
attempt to define rights in terms of liberties can only cover one tradition. 
If we stick to this approach, we then will fail to recognize the fact that 
some rights are closely connected with the idea of general goods, which are 
formulated by or through the community, and hence are not related to the 
right-holder's liberties. Assuming that the two traditions of the concept 
of rights should not be ignored, we then can reject the definition which 
tries to define rights solely in terms of liberties. Secondly, there is the 
question of the translation from the language of rights to freedoms or 
liberties. In some cases, the human relationships projected by the language 
of rights can be different from the human relationships implied by the 
language of liberties or freedoms. - For example, the claim of "a right to 
education" implies that education should be provided, or-at least available 
to some extent, for the claimant; however, the claim of "a freedom from 
ignorance and illiteracy" only suggests that the claimant is entitled to 
achieve the state of being free from ignorance and illiteracy. Whether 
education should be provided is not entailed. In short, the language of 
liberties or freedoms does not exactly match the language of rights. It is 
therefore problematic to translate rights into liberties or freedoms. 
However, on the other hand, the close connection between rights and 
liberties cannot be ignored. Historically, the language of rights plays an 
important role in the protection of freedom. This point can be seen in the 
Declaration of Rights which was made by the French National Assembly in 
1791, and by the fact that so called civil rights are in fact various sorts of 
liberty. Furthermore, Raz argues that we may derive all kinds of individual 
liberty from the point that individuals have a right to personal 
autonomy. (71) Apart from that, the word "liberty" in its legal sense can be 
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used as "right". This can be seen in Bentham and Hohfeld's classification of 
rights which will be discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter. 
Finally, there is a subtle and somewhat paradoxical relationship between 
rights and liberties. Bentham indirectly points out that the language of 
rights is to some extent established at the expense of liberty. (72) In some 
cases, rights-holders or their representative(s) have rightful control over 
the actions of other people; they will thus subsequently limit other 
people's liberty and eventually, as Dworkin has suggested, the consequence 
of the prevalence of the language of rights would lead to a decrease of 
personal l iberties. (73) 
2.6 Rights and Interests 
The word "interests" Is another term that has been used to define "rights". 
Salmond, for example, says that "a right is an interest recognised and 
protected by a rule of right". (74) MacCormick also holds the view that 
"having a right is having one's interests protected in certain ways by the 
imposition of (legal or moral) normative constraints on the acts and 
activities of other people with respect to the - object of one's 
interests. "(75) 
The weakness of this attempt is that the relationship between "rights" and 
"interests" is not as tidy and straightforward as it is assumed to be; it is 
hence problematic to use "interests" to define "rights". It can be pointed 
out firstly that some rights are actually not in the interest of the right- 
holder. Raz and Haksar make this point fairly clear. Haksar gives an 
example. He says, "Take a system which gives the monarch a right to 
advise, and warn the prime minister. This right is set up for the common 
good, not for the good of the monarch; it is even conceivable that the 
monarch is worse off (from his personal point of view) with this right, 
since this right might bring him into political controversy. "(76) Raz also 
says: "Though rights are based on the interests of the right-holders, an 
individual may have rights which it is against his interest to have. A 
person may have property which is more trouble than it is worth. "(77) 
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Moreover, Raz indicates that some rights may exist because they serve the 
interests of other people rather than the right-holder. (78) 
To deny the proposition that rights can be defined in terms of interests is, 
however, not to deny the possibly close relationship between rights-talk 
and the notion of "interests". What should be noted is that some interests 
of the individual are so essential and necessary that they should be 
encapsulated in the language of rights. For example, "the interest of being 
alive" is solid enough as a basis on which "the right to life" can be claimed. 
Even if some interests are not so important, they nevertheless can be 
relevant to the decision whether a right *should be granted. (79) 
Nevertheless, the relationship between "rights" and "interests" still 
remains problematic. The notion of interests is highly controversial -a 
consensus over "what is an essential interest" has not been achieved yet. 
Further, the notion of interests in general is contingent upon changing 
conditions, which in turn make the language of rights unsettled. This may 
also be the reason why some rights can go against the rights-holder's 
interests. 
3. TOWARDS A*GENERAL PICTURE OF RIGHTS 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the traditional mode of 
definition of rights or the attempt to explain rights by a single term is by 
no means wholly successful. In order to have a better idea about "rights", 
It is then necessary to move away from this approach and try other 
alternatives. 
One alternative is to give a "better" definition of right, which is different 
from the traditional mode of definition. Plamenatz, for example, offers a 
new definition of rights, "A man (or an animal) has a right whenever other 
men ought not to prevent him doing what he wants or refuse him some 
service he asks for or needs. "(80) However, this definition does not avoid 
the weakness that the traditional mode of definition suffers from; that is: 
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It cannot cover all kinds of rights. For example, it does not cover liberty- 
rights in competitive contexts like a war prisoner's right to escape. It can 
also be pointed out that Plamenatz's definition is not a strict sense of 
definition at all; it is at most a description. Apparently, what Plamenatz 
has done is not to identify the "essence" of rights but to describe what it 
is, or should be, to have a right. 
Brandt also tries to avoid the traditional mode of definition and provides a 
"deep" definition of a moral right. He 'clearly sees the fundamental 
difference between legal rights and moral rights and maintains that a 
surface definition (another-term for the traditional mode of definition) in 
terms of legal duties can be used to define legal rights, but a definition of 
a moral right must be put in the form of a deep definition. Brandt's "deep" 
definition - expressed in cumbersome prose - goes as follows: 
"X has a right to Y" Is to mean: "It is 
, 
justified for people in X's 
society to be strongly motivated, overridingly so normally and 
always when in conflict with concern for merely marginal benefits 
in a given case, and to disapprove others who are not so motivated, 
to enable X- always by refraining from interference, but when 
necessary, also by cooperating substantially to bring about the 
opportunity, when appropriate by legal means - to do, have, or enjoy 
Y primarily because of the importance to people in X's situation of 
being able to do, have, or enjoy things like Y; and it is justified for 
X to feel resentment if he is hurt or deprived because of the failure 
of others to. have this motivation, and for him to feel unashamed to 
protest, and, for him to take reasonable steps to protest, calculated 
to encourage others to have the motivation to enable anyone in a 
similar situation to do, have, or enjoy things like Y. "(81) 
This definition seems to espouse the view that moral rights must be 
recognized by the society in question; if not, they cannot be counted as 
rights at all. As a matter of fact, from a historical point of view, some 
moral rights, such as the Jews' right to life in Nazi Germany, were not 
recognized by the majority of the society in question but could still be 
counted as moral rights. This suggests that some moral rights may be 
dependent upon moral principles which go beyond the boundary of a specific 
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society and. are not restricted by the society in question. What is more, 
like Plamenatz's definition, it can be said that Brandt's deep definition is 
really*a description of what it means for a man to have a moral right, 
rather than a definition in the strict sense. However, Brandt's merit is 
that he at least sees the need to define different rights separately. In this 
respect, his approach is praiseworthy. 
The implication of Plamenatz's and Brandt's failure in defining "rights" or 
"moral rights" may lead to uncertainty about whether, it is possible to give 
a definition of a "right" at all. On this issue, Wittgenstein's theory of 
language may provide some inspiration. 
Wittgenstein does not directly tackle issues about rights. But the way he 
handles the idea of "games", "language-games", "reading", and "tools" 
clearly suggests that it is impossible for us to have a definition of a 
"right". To be more specific, in the case of "games"; Wittgenstein claims 
explicitly that we cannot in fact provide a clear-cut definition of "games". 
Even if someone offers a clear-cut definition, Wittgenstein says that he 
will not accept it, for we cannot really find out anything. that is common to 
all games. (82) But it can still be asked, why do we still have a general 
name "games" to cover so many characteristically different kinds of 
activity? Does it not mean that activities covered by the same name must 
have something in common and hence can be defined? -Wittgenstein replies: 
if we examine all kinds of games, what we can find out is a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. (83) From this, it can be 
inferred that it is the similarities (precisely, family resemblances) rather 
than the common character of all games that sustain the general name 
"games". By parity of reasoning, Wittgenstein's message is: different kinds 
of rights have certain similarities but do not share the same character; 
hence we have no certain way of defining "rights". If we try to develop one, 
we are bound to fail. 
In the light of Wittgenstein's argument, it seems that what should be done 
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is to give up the idea of defining a "right" or "rights", and try to find some 
other approaches that can give us a better idea of rights. In the following 
discussion, the theories of Bentham, Hohfeld, Wittgenstein and Hart will be 
briefly discussed. Although their theories are differently characterized 
and have different aims, they nevertheless can give us some inspiration 
concerning a general picture of rights-talk. 
3.1 Jeremy Bentham 
Bentham's handling of the notion of rights is worth mentioning here. 
Apparently, he does not try to define rights. What he does is to map out the 
relationships between rights and other legal concepts, and delineate what 
kinds of rights there can be in legal contexts.. it is of course not necessary 
to agree with him on the issue of whether there are any natural rights or 
whether the notion of rights must be confined to legal contexts. What 
should concern us here Is his methodology. Putting Bentham's methodology 
crudely, he does not think that it is proper to tackle the word "rights" 
alone. If we want to understand the notion of rights, Bentham suggests, we 
must take whole sentences in which "right" plays a role; and not only that, 
we must also examine the characteristic role that the. whole sentences 
play in a larger context. (84) Bentham says, "The common method of 
defining ... will in many cases not at all answer the purpose. "(85) 
Based 
on this conviction, he starts his analysis from the general framework of 
law. "In a code of laws", Bentham points out, "everything turns upon 
offences, rights, obligations, services. "(86) How then can we understand 
the nature and the meaning of these terms? Bentham's method is to show 
their mode of generatlon. (87) He asks readers to imagine firstly a society 
In which men exist without laws, obligations, crimes and rights. This 
society originally Is constituted only by persons, things, and actions. 
Unfortunately, Bentham says, some actions will produce great evils, and 
the experience of these evils will give birth to the first moral and 
legislative Idea ; eventually, a law is enacted In order to stop evil-actions, 
that Is, crimes. He states: 
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Hence, to declare by a law that a certain act is prohlbltec, is to erect 
such act into icrime. To assure to Individuals the possession of a 
certain good is to confer a right upon them. To direct men to 
abstain from all acts which may disturb the enjoyment of certain 
others, is to impose an obligation on them. To make them liable to 
contribute by a certain act to the enjoyment of their fellows, is to 
subject them to a service . 
(88) 
From which, Bentham concludes: "The Ideas of law, offence, r/glt, 
o //gatlon, service, are therefore ideas which are born together, which 
exist together, and which are inseparably connected. "(89) Two concrete 
examples Bentham gives can go further to exemplify their relations: 
The law directs me to. support you - it imposes upon me the 
obligation of supporting you - It grants you the right of being 
supported by me - it converts into an offence the negative act by 
which I omit to support you - it obliges me to render you the 
services of supporting you. The law prohibits me from killing you - 
it imposes upon me the obligation not to kill you - lt grants you the 
sight not to be killed by me - It converts into an offence the 
positive act of killing you - lt requires of me the negative service 
of abstaining from killing you. (90) 
After the, demonstration, of the relationships between "rights" and other 
legal concepts, Bentham then classifies rights into two groups according 
to their relationship with obligations. They are: rights existing from the 
absence of obligations and rights established by obligations. (91) A right 
existing from the absence of obligation is in fact a liberty: when a person 
holds this kind of right, no duty is laid on him either to perform or not to 
perform, and no duty is laid on other people either to assist or not to 
prevent the act in question. Hart gives an example of this: a man has a 
right to look over his garden fence at his neighbour; he is under no 
obligation not to look at his neighbour and under no duty to look at him, and 
this right does not entail that the neighbour has a correlative obligation to 
let him be looked at or not to interfere with the exercise of this right. (92) 
Rights established by obligations can be divided into two sub-divisions. 
The first category covers rights correlative to negative obligation. When a 
man has this kind of right, the duty-bearer has an obligation not to 
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Interfere with the rights-holder. The right to property, some liberties 
(such as the right not to be assaulted) and the right to life can be counted 
as this kind of right. The second category covers rights correlative to 
positive obligation. When a man has this kind of right, the duty-bearer has 
an obligation to render the rights-holder positive assistance. A right to 
proper medical care is an example of this kind of right. Apart from those 
two kinds of rights mentioned above, Bentham also recognizes "legal 
power" as another kind of right. Legal powers as rights have two sub- 
divisions as well. One is power of contrectation; the other, Investitive and 
divestitive power. When a man has a power of contrectation it means the 
right-holder (power-holder) is allowed by law to interfere with or 
physically control things or the bodies of persons or animals. A 
policeman's power of arrest is a case of this kind of rights. With regard to 
investitive and divestitive powers, when a man has this kind of right, the 
right-holder is enabled by the law to change the legal positions of others or 
of himself and others. A man having by law a legal power to make a will or 
contract is a case of investitive and divestitive power. (93) 
After a rough understanding of Bentham's theory, a question can be asked 
here. Does Bentham identify the essence, or the common feature of all 
rights during the process of analyzing the relationships between rights and 
other legal concepts? From Bentham's statement: "To assure to individuals 
the possession of a certain good is to confer a right to them", one thing can 
be certain. Bentham does say that to have a right is to possess a certain 
good. And this expression is not a single case. Similar expressions can 
also be found in other places. (94) If this understanding is right, it seems 
Bentham can define a right as an "interest" recognized and protected by 
legal law, as given by Salmond. Indeed, Bentham can define "rights" in 
terms of the essence he identifies. But it would not be really meaningful 
for Bentham. For, to define "rights" in terms of legal interest is to isolate 
"rights" from other legal concepts, and hence may fail to reveal the generic 
relationships that "rights" have with other legal concepts, which, Bentham 
assumes, constitutes the nature of "rights". 
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To sum up. Bentham identifies the weakness of the traditional mode of 
definition and is not satisfied with the confusion of the daily use of the 
word "rights". *His method of making clear what rights are is to reveal the 
generic relationships between rights and other legal concepts and delineate 
what kinds of rights there are in the legal context, so that the idea of 
rights will not only be clear but the feature of each kind of right can be 
exposed. 
To be sure, Bentham's analysis is not without difficulties. Some of his 
basic assumptions can be challenged. For example, must rights be some 
sorts of interests for the right-holder? Again, are rights and obligations 
the children of law? Some specific points can also be raised. Can rights 
that exist from the absence of obligations be meaningful in legal contexts? 
Are all kinds of rights covered in his analysis? (95) However, as far as the 
methodology is concerned, Bentham's approach at least has avoided the 
main weakness of the traditional mode of definition, and gives a better 
picture of the language of rights. 
3.2 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld 
In addition to Bentham, Hohfeld's enterprise also deserves mention here. 
Like Bentham, Hohfeld also adopts the analytic approach and refuses to give 
a definition of a "right". However, it should be noted that Hohfeld actually 
does not intend to provide a general picture of "rights". What he really 
tries to do is to clarify and regulate the usage of basic legal terms in 
general and the word "rights" in particular. A general picture of rights is 
an incidental outcome unveiled from his attempt at prescribing the usage 
of basic legal -terms. 
Specifically, Hohfeld regrets that the-word "rights" is used loosely to refer 
to four different legal concepts. Apart from the strictest sense of "rights" 
(claims), the word "rights" is also used to indicate "privileges" (liberties), 
"powers", and "immunities". In Hohfeld's view, it is wrong to use the single 
word "rights" to cover these four characteristically different legal 
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concepts. It is more sensible, for the sake of judicial clarity, to distinguish 
these four different concepts and not to lump them together under the 
single name "rights". In his scheme, he suggests using the word "right" to 
refer to what he regards as the strictest sense of rights, i. e. claim; and the 
other three legal concepts, namely, privilege (liberty), power and immunity 
should be disentangled from the muddy word "rights". It should be noted 
that Hohfeld's attempt at regulating the usage of the woad "rights" is not 
successful in the sense that his regulation is not followed by other 
writers. This unsuccessful endeavour, however, reveals the fact that the 
word "rights" can be, and has been, used to specify four different legal 
concepts, each of which has its own jural opposite and jural correlative. 
To put it simply. The word "right" can firstly be used in its strictest sense. 
The synonym of this strictest sense of "right" is "claim". In this sense, 
"right" is the correlative of "duty" and the opposite of "no-right". To have a 
"right" (claim) is to have "one's affirmative claim against another". In 
Hohfeld's own example: if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off X's 
land, then it means that Y is under a duty to stay off X's land. (96) 
Secondly, the word "right" can also be taken to indicate "privilege" 
(liberty). "Privilege" (liberty) is the correlative of "no-right" and the 
opposite of "duty". To have a right in this sense is to have "one's freedom 
from the right or claim of another". In Hohfeld's case above, "whereas X has 
a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he himself 
has the privilege of entering on the land.... " At the same time, Y has no 
right in relation to X that X shall not enter his own land. In other words, X 
does not have a duty, to stay off his own land. (97) 
Thirdly, the word "right" can be used to denote "power". "Right" In the sense 
of "power" is the correlative of "liability" and the opposite of "disability". 
To have a right in the sense of power is to have "one's affirmative 'control' 
over a given legal relation as against another". For example, X, a 
landowner, can grant his legal power over his land to Y, the principal, and 
hence creates a correlative liability in Y. To express it differently, in the 
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case of granting his power to Y over his own land, X does not have a 
disability in taking action. (98) 
Fourthly, the word "right" can be reckoned as "immunity". "Immunity" is the 
correlative of "disability" and the opposite of "liability". To have a right in 
the sense of immunity is to have "one's freedom from the legal power or 
'control' of another as regards some legal relation". In Hohfeld's example: 
"X, a landowner, has ... power to alienate to Y.... On the other hand, X has 
also various immunities as against Y.... For Y is under a disability so far 
as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to a third party is 
concerned...... (99) 
Like Bentham's work, Hohfeld's analysis is not entirely satisfactory. 
Criticisms have been given from several directions. Generally, Kamba 
claims that Hohfeld's analysis suffers from a basic, weakness in that it 
lacks a synthesis of all the conceptions it embraces. (l00) Specifically, 
there are many things that can be said. In particular, some critics state 
that it is wrong for Hohfeld to insist on the doctrine of correlativity, for 
Bentham and Austin have already pointed out that there are some legal 
duties to which there are no correlative rights. Then, regarding the jural 
opposites, there are also some arguable points. For example, G. Williams 
suggests that the opposite of duty is not privilege but "liberty-not". 
Moreover, some writers are not happy about the legal terms that Hohfeld 
uses. They complain that Hohfeld has departed from our ordinary usage; for 
example, "liability" sounds odd and "liberty" might be preferable to 
privilege. The most notable accusation, however, is directed to the point 
that Hohfeld fails to investigate the essence of these concepts, 
particularly that of a "right". (101) 
Taking Bentham and Hohfeld's work together, it can be seen that both of 
them try to avoid the traditional way of defining "right", and try to find an 
alternative to make the language of rights clear. They similarly adopt the 
analytic method: locating the language of rights in a broader context, 
demonstrating the relationships between the language of rights and other 
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legal terms, demarcating the scope and the boundary of each kind of rights, 
recognizing that the word "rights" can have different connotations in 
different contexts. Suffice it to say, their works are not exempt from 
weaknesses. But in terms of providing a general picture of rights, their 
work has certain advantages over the traditional definition of a "right". 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the picture they provide can really 
cover all kinds of rights and whether it can serve to prescribe the use of 
the language of rights. 
3.3 Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
. 
Another alternative that can provide a general picture of "rights" Is 
suggested by Wittgenstein. As has been shown, Wittgenstein does not think 
that it is either possible or necessary to identify the common character of 
"games", "language games", "tools" and so on. And this can lead to the 
supposition that Wittgenstein will not accept a definition of a "right". How 
then can we know or have an idea about what "games", "language games", 
and "tools" are? With regard to this question, Wittgenstein suggests that 
what we can do is simply to collect cases about "games", "language games", 
"tools" or whatever before us and not try to explain or deduce anything from 
our collection. (102) In fact, Wittgenstein's suggestion is grounded on the 
assumption that, for a large class of cases, the meaning of a word is its 
use in the language". ( 103) Therefore, if we want to understand the meaning 
of, say, "games", the only way is to see all kinds of games and nothing else. 
A question will emerge here at once. Does Wittgenstein mean that there is 
no criterion to tell this is a game and that is not? Is it possible to have a 
game that is characteristically different from another game and both of 
them still meriting the same name "game"? Wittgenstein's reply, 
apparently, is: Yes. As has been explained, the reason that different kinds 
of activity share the same name is that they have, in one way or another, 
some family resemblances between them, and these family resemblances 
are sufficient to let these different activities have the same name. 
Wittgenstein's suggestion is closely related to the question of how we use 
our language. In our daily language, Wittgenstein says, when we employ a 
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word, for example "number", we will not regard it as a rigidly limited 
concept; on the contrary, we usually use the word "number" In a very open 
way. And this is also the way we use the word "game" and other terms. 
From this, Wittgenstein claims that the use of words is in effect 
unregulated. (104) 
Let us now go back to the issue of the language of rights. In the face of the 
various and confusing uses of the word "rights", Wittgenstein's suggestion 
would be: accept them. There is nothing wrong, for Wittgenstein, in the 
fact that the word "rights" can be employed in different contexts and used 
to signify somewhat different connotations. it is futile to attempt to 
regulate and prescribe the use of "rights"; and most of all, it is wrong to 
set up a fixed boundary for the use of the word "rights". The most effective 
way of revealing the meaning, and hence the general picture of rights, is to 
present all kinds of uses of the language of rights, no matter whether those 
uses are contradictory or not. It can be reasoned that the hope behind this 
presentation is that observers can comprehend how the word "rights" can be 
used in different contexts; and ideally, the observers can employ the word 
"rights" in accord with what they learn and even can extend the use of the 
word "rights" to new territory. 
Concerning the weakness of the traditional way of definition and the 
limited success of Bentham's and Hohfeld's attempts to regulate and 
prescribe the use of the language of rights, the Wittgensteinian offer 
seems not'a bad alternative. However, whether this approach can fulfil our 
practical needs in terms of having a feasible communicating framework 
remains in question. The attitude of "Let it bel" is not usually the attitude 
that philosophers or ordinary people hold when they are facing ambiguous 
and contentious use of some words. Mill in A System of Logic demonstrates 
succinctly the need for identifying the common character of a word or name 
and clarifying and regulating the use of word or name. Mill first supports 
the claim that "language is not made, but grows". He then goes on to the 
issue of "name". He says, "a name is not imposed at once and by previous 
purpose upon a class of objects, but is first applled to one thing, and then 
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extended by a series of transitions to another and another". Finally, this 
name may be used to denote "a confused huddle of objects, having nothing 
whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a vague and general 
resemblance. " When a name has achieved this stage, Mill says, "it has 
become unfit for the purposes either of thought or of the communication of 
thought; and can only be made serviceable by stripping it of some part of 
its multifarious denotations, and confining it to objects possessed of some 
attributes in common, which it may be made to connote. " To make his 
remark clearer, Mill takes an analogy: "... it may be compared to a road 
which is not made, but has made itself: it requires continual mending in 
order to be passable. "(105) Strictly speaking, the difference between Mill's 
and Wittgenstein's theories might not be so great as we imagine, The key 
issue lies in the ideas of "family resemblances" and "attributes in common". 
Mill holds the view that it is intolerable to see a name being used to denote 
different things which have no attributes in common; Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, suggests that it is tolerable to have a name being used to 
denote different things which have no essential attributes in common but 
have family resemblances. Their views can lead to the question whether 
there is any essential difference between the ideas of "family 
resemblances" and "common attributes". If there is a difference, - for 
Wittgenstein it seems there is - it is then quite tolerable to see a name 
signifying different things which have no common attributes but have 
family resemblances, no matter how ambiguous and unclear these family 
resemblances may bei If there is no difference - for Mill it seems there is 
no difference - then any name that is being used to signify different things 
which have no common attributes is intolerable and needs clarifying. The 
problem, however, is: what will Wittgenstein do when a name denotes 
several things which do not even have family resemblances? Is it a 
situation in which language goes on holiday? Or is it a bewitchment of 
human intelligence that needs the confrontation of philosophy? 
In effect, Wittgenstein does not reject the necessity of prescription in 
some cases. At least, he suggests, in some "normal" cases prescription is 
needed; prescription will only become controversial or not necessary when 
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we are handling "abnormal" cases, such as "games", "language games"(1Ö6), ` 
or in this place, "rights". In some other places, Wittgenstein maintains 
that it is perfectly possible for us to improve our terminology so that 
misunderstandings can be prevented, but - he changes his tone here - "these 
are not the cases we have to do with", for "the confusions which occupy us 
arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing 
work". (107) The question we have to face is whether the word "rights" 
needs clarifying and prescribing? If we follow Wittgenstein, it can be said 
that the word "rights" is by no means a "normal" word like the word "horse", 
hence we cannot and need not clarify and, regulate its use. From the fact 
that Bentham and Hohfeld fail to persuade other writers to follow their 
regulation, it seems that this suggestion is quite sensible. But from the 
viewpoint of practical needs, it should be borne in mind that the word 
"rights" is not just an abstract term but also a cönnotative term which can 
have far-reaching practical effects on human relationships. Based on this 
viewpoint, the confusing use of the language of rights is unacceptable and 
needs remedying. It is therefore quite right for Bentham and Hohfeld to try 
to regulate the use of the word "rights". Their limited success, however, 
only reinforces the idea that the work of clarification and prescription 
should be constantly renewed. 
3.4 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart 
Apart from the Benthamite doctrine and the Wittgensteinian approach, yet 
another alternative that may avoid the traditional way of definition and 
may provide a general picture of rights is offered by Hart. Hart points out 
that the traditional mode of definition cannot apply to legal terms and 
hence tries to explain legal terms, such as "rights", from a different 
direction. Like Bentham and Hohfeld, Hart's account of rights-talk is 
mainly concerned with legal rights. But his account of legal rights, just 
like the Benthamite accounts, can be a reference framework by which moral 
rights can also be enlightened. What makes Hart distinctive from his 
predecessors is that Hart does not adopt an analytic approach; his approach 
is that of "nominal essences". (108) In Hart's view, if we want to 
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understand the concept of rights we had better have a clear idea about "the 
law" in advance. And the best way to understand the law is not to tackle it 
directly. The best way, Hart suggests, is to "look away from the law to 
simpler cases". (109) Inspired by the model theory, Hart suggests using a 
simple model to understand the law. The simple model he chooses is the 
rules of a game. Under the assistance of the model of the rules of a game, 
Hart then goes on to examine the general character of legal terms, and 
hence "rights". Several points can be noted here. Firstly, he emphasizes 
that a statement of rights or any other legal statement assumes a special 
and very complicated setting. The important thing, however, is that the 
statement of rights cannot, and should not, be assumed to be a statement 
that refers to some existent facts, no matter. whether real or fictitious; 
rather, It is like the statement "He is out" In cricket. Hart says, " 'He is 
out' is an expression used to appeal to rules, to make claims, or give 
decisions under them; it is not a statement about the rules to the effect 
that they will be enforced or acted on in a given case nor any other kind of 
statement about them. " Similarly, a statement of rights is at most an 
expression used to appeal to rules, to make claims or give decisions under 
rules; it is not a prediction about what is going to happen. Secondly, Hart 
says, a statement of rights not only presupposes the existence of a legal 
system, but also has a special connection with a particular rule of the 
system. But the relationship between the statement of rights and the 
particular rule is not that the statement of rights expresses the relevant 
rule of law but that the statement of rights is a legal conclusion of the 
relevant rule. "He is out"ýin cricket is only a simple legal conclusion and 
nothing else. Thirdly, though judges' decisions concerning rights are very 
important in legal contexts, they cannot tempt us to define laws, and hence 
rights, in terms of what courts do. For judges' decisions can be wrong and 
there may be some cases which judges have to decide with little help from 
the rules. (110) 
In the light of these general points about legal concepts, Hart explains the 
general connotations of "a legal right". In his view: 
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A statement of the form 'X has a right' Is true if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(a) There is in existence a legal system. 
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some other person Y is ... obliged to do or abstain from some action. 
(c) This obligation Is made by law dependent on the choice either of 
X or some other person authorised to act on his behalf so that either 
Y is bound to do or abstain from some action only if X (or some 
authorised person) so chooses or alternatively only until X (or such 
person) chooses otherwise. (111) 
Hart's proposal is not wholly satisfactory. To start with, it is quite 
evident that on the one hand he makes a logical connection between the 
language of rights and legal rules; on the other hand, he indicates that some 
decisions about rights may be made by judges with little help from the 
rules. This provides a basis on which it can be asked whether rights are 
really logically connected with the law. Moreover, the most controversial 
point is that he assumes that the choice of right-holders or some 
authorized person over the duty-bearer(s) constitutes the main character 
of the language of rights. This, apparently, ignores one of the two 
traditions of the concept of rights in which rights have little to do with 
the right-holder's choice but have a strong connection with the idea of 
general goods and justice. 
On the whole, judging Hart's proposal by Wittgenstein's theory, Hart's 
proposal Is evidently not enough to provide a general picture of rights. But 
the reason why Hart's proposal is highlighted here is that his "model 
approach" may throw some light on the complex Issue of rights in general. 
It can be useful to employ a simple model to explain a complex phenomenon. 
The problem, nevertheless, is how we can find a satisfactory model.. The 
model Hart chooses, namely, the rules of a game, can no doubt partly 
explicate rights, though not completely. But there is no reason why we 
cannot use this or another model and add some provisos so that the 
language of rights can be more clearly described. For example, it can be 
argued that rights in some places are not necessarily connected with rules 
but may be connected with principles or policies(112); or the concept of 
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rights may be the raw material for the regulation of rules and hence rights 
are not necessarily the conclusions of the rules; ' or it can be added, as 
suggested by Srzednicki, that the idea of unrecognized rights is not totally 
meaningless(1 13); or, the scope of rules is not confined to legal rules and 
can cover moral rules as well, etc. 
4. CONCLUSION 
After the discussion of the complexity of the language of rights, of the 
relationships between rights and other legal as well as moral concepts, and 
theorists' attempts concerning a general picture of rights, the views that 
will be adopted in later discussion should be spelt out. 
1>. Should the language of rights be confined to legal contexts? It is true 
that if rights-talk can be confined to legal contexts, things will be easier; 
but we may also be led to ignore the delicate relation between legal rights 
and moral principles or ideas in general. Some moral principles or ideas, in 
some cases, are sources for the formulation of legal rights. For example, it 
seems few can deny that the idea of equality has paved the way for the 
struggle for the rights of minorities, such as black people, women, 
children; and few, can deny that the idea of natural law, and hence natural 
rights, underlies the foundation of the American Constitution and so 
affects the daily lives of all Americans. The regulation of legal rights, on 
the other hand, reflects more or less the main moral principles or ideas 
which the society in question adopts. If the delicate relationship between 
legal rights and moral principles or moral ideas can be recognized, then the 
idea of moral rights, which can serve as a bridge between legal rights and 
moral principles or ideas, can also be acknowledged. To put it briefly, as 
suggested by David Lyons, legal rights and moral rights are analogous. (114) 
The main difference between them is, as pointed out by Acton, that they 
have different grounds and sanctions. Legal rights are grounded on legal 
rules or cases which are enacted through a public procedure and are 
recognized by the public; the violation of legal rights is requited by 
punishment. By contrast, moral rights are based on moral rules or ideas 
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which may or may not be recognized by the public, and the violation of 
moral rights can only be requited by opinion (as suggested by Mill), or by 
the frowns and avoidances of neighbours". (115) 
But a question can be raised. If a moral right can be based on some moral 
principles or ideas that may not even be recognized by the public, how can 
we be sure that the moral right in question is not a heresy? What can be 
said is that it is difficult indeed to tell the difference between a moral 
right which is not recognized by the public and a heresy. It needs the test 
of time. Looking back, the claims of rights for women, blacks, etc. were all 
once treated as heresies. With the help of hindsight, we then can suggest 
that moral rights which are not recognized by the public are by no means 
sheer nonsense; some of them might stand the test and could subsequently 
be considered as moral rights recognized by the public. 
In short, the language of rights is not confined to legal contexts in this 
thesis; the idea of moral rights is acceptable. 
2>. Is there an essence of rights? As has been shown, legal advantage is, 
for Bentham, the essence of legal rights. After the language of rights is 
broadened to cover moral rights, some writers also take interests as the 
essence of rights, such as MacCormick. On the other hand, Hart, Lamont and 
Wellman reckon the choice or the will of the right-holder or some other 
authorized person to be the essence of rights. (l 16) But Golding points out 
that the concept of rights in fact covers both elements, so neither 
interests nor the rights-holder's choice can be counted as the essence of 
all rights. Based on Golding's analysis and the fact that rights are not 
always in the rights-holder's interests as well as the fact that some 
rights-talk does not necessarily involve the rights-holder's choice, 
essentialism is not adopted here. In other words, it will be reckoned that 
the essence of rights in general is not existent. 
3>. What is the function of rights? Given the fact that the essence of 
rights cannot be found, it would then be sensible to enquire the function of 
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rights. For, from the understanding of the function of rights-talk, a better 
position can be found in appreciating what "rights" can be. In short, the 
language of rights, as an evaluative device in general and a normative 
device in particular, is mainly addressed to the issue of human 
relationships. (Admittedly, some rights-talk is not merely concerned with 
human beings, such as animal rights-talk. But it should be noted that this 
sort of rights-talk is not the main concern here. ) It can be suggested that 
rights-talk can be directed at describing and prescribing human 
relationships; and not only that, rights-talk can also be used to formulate 
new human relationships. In other words, rights-talk is not only concerned 
ought with human relationships, but also with what human relationships 
to be. A simple example can illustrate this point. 
It can be assumed that some conception of an ideal marital relationship 
exists in most societies. But how can we know, in the first place, that 
there is an ideal marital relationship? Or, to put it another way, in what 
way does this ideal relationship manifest itself? Or, what does this ideal 
relationship consist of so that it can be known? A very informative way to 
answer these questions is to describe what husband or wife "ought to" do in 
relation to each other. But apart, from this, this ideal relationship can also 
be described by what husband and wife can, or indeed are entitled to, do in 
relation to each other. In the first case, it is the language of duties that is 
used to describe the ideal marital relationship; it is described as husband 
or wife "ought to" do X, Y, Z, and so on. But, in the second case, it is the 
language of rights; the ideal relationship is described as "husband or wife 
is entitled to do X, Y, Z, and so on. " Of course, there are other ways that can 
be used to describe this ideal relationship. But the point that is being made 
here is that: rights-talk is a way of describing ideal human relationships; 
from the use of rights-talk, an ideal marital relationship can be sketched 
and known. 
More generally, it can be suggested that rights-talk is also a way of 
prescribing and of maintaining ideal human relationships. In the case above, 
if the established ideal human relationship is spoiled by either husband or 
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wife or obstructed by some external conditions, then the wife or husband 
concerned can in effect invoke rights that belong to her or him with a view 
to restoring the ideal relationship. Moreover, if the established ideal 
relationship cannot be maintained due to the changing social circumstances 
or any other reasons, then a new ideal relationship should be developed. 
But how? It can be suggested that a new human relationship can be 
formulated by virtue of rights-talk. Thus, in the example above, the husband 
or the wife can claim: considering the newly-emerged situations, I have a 
right to do A, B, C, etc., and you have a duty corresponding to my right to do 
A, B, C, etc. Whether or not this new right-claim could be translated into a 
moral right or a legal right is not certain; it involves all sorts of 
considerations that cannot be discussed here. But the point being made is 
that rights-talk can be used to modify or initiate a new conception of an 
ideal human relationship. 
4>. What does the word "rights" refer to? It is intended to reveal a general 
picture of rights in this chapter. The task is to be achieved through the 
demonstration of the relations of "rights" to other legal or moral concepts 
as well as the description of various attempts at displaying a general 
picture of rights. What should be noted here is that-a general picture of 
rights is only helpful in assisting us to understand rights-talk in general, 
which is generally vague. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to narrow 
down the scope of rights-talk when the word "rights" is invoked. Briefly, 
the word "rights" in this thesis will mainly be used to refer to claim- 
rights, on the grounds that claim-rights are the main thrust of rights in 
general. In the domain of claim-rights, two categories of claim-rights are 
especially relevant to the following discussions. They are: welfare-rights 
and claim-rights of freedom. (117) The distinction between these --two 
categories of claim-rights is geared to the different obligation that the 
duty-bearer has and the different characteristic of the object of rights. 
The general structure of welfare-rights can be made clear by using 
Gewirth's statement, "A has a right to X against B by virtue of Y. "(1 18) in 
this statement, A is the right-holder, the subject of the right; X is the 
object of the right and is essential for "a decent minimum level of 
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subsistence"(119); B is the respondent of the right, the duty-bearer who 
has obligation to take concrete and practical measures so as to fulfil As 
right in relation to X; Y Is the justifying basis or ground of the right. 
British citizens' right to medical care is an example of welfare-rights. 
Claim-rights of freedom can also be made clear by following Gewirth's 
statement. The difference is, however, that B's obligation in relation to As 
right to X is a negative obligation and that X Is not essential for "a decent 
minimum level of subsistence". B is only obligated not to interfere with 
As action in relation to X, he does not have an obligation to take positive 
measures to fulfil A's demand in relation to X. British citizens' right to 
free movement is an example of claim-rights. 
5>. In short, a simple image can be provided here to make the notion of 
rights clearer. A right can be imagined as a standing ground, or in some 
cases a potential standing ground, on which the right-holder (or people on 
the right-holder's behalf) can ask for other people's action or forbearance 
by virtue of legal rules, moral principles or moral ideas which sometimes 
are not recognized by the public. And If other people do not abide by the 
regulation that the statement of rights prescribes, the right-holder (or 
other people on his behalf) can openly demand some sort of compensation or 
correction without feeling embarrassed. 
After the general discussion of rights-talk presented here, it is the issue 
of children's rights that we now turn to. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
After having made a general review of rights-talk, attention will be paid to 
the Issue of children's rights in this chapter and Chapter Three. The 
emphasis of this chapter will be put on the exploration of why the notion of 
children's rights was not popular in the past, and the interpretation of 
several theorists' accounts with regard to the idea of children's rights. It 
is hoped that through this elaboration a historical perspective of the notion 
of children's rights can be revealed and we should be able to understand 
that arguments employed to oppose the idea of children's rights are 
misconceived. 
1. WHY THE NOTION OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS WAS NOT POPULAR IN 
THE PAST 
In the first chapter it was suggested that rights-talk is mainly concerned 
with human relationships: it can be used to describe and prescribe human 
relationships; and more importantly, it can be used to initiate new human 
relationships. With this understanding, two ensuing questions can then be 
asked. First, can the language of rights be invoked to describe and 
prescribe the relationships that children have with their parents, adults 
and political institutions (for example, the state)? Second, if the language 
of rights is not used to describe and prescribe children's relationships with 
other people or political institutions, can the language of rights be 
employed to initiate new human relationships in which "rights" can be 
granted to children? In effect, these two questions seem to be obsolete. 
For the term and the notion of "children's rights" already have a place in our 
daily discourse concerning the relationships between children and other 
people and political institutions; therefore, a positive answer can be given 
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to the first question and the second question will not arise at all. 
It can, however, be suggested that the term "children's rights", or the idea 
of granting rights to children so as to regulate the relationships between 
children and other people or political institutions was not so widely 
accepted as it is nowadays. This suggestion can be supported by two 
points. 
Firstly, rights-talk, as recognized by John Stuart Mill, finds its natural 
home in a politico-legal context. (1) Unfortunately, it seems that children 
were not often given a proper place in a politico-legal context. For 
example, children in the Puritan or Victorian eras were not yet considered 
as "persons" and they were legally the "property" of their parents. (2) It is 
therefore not surprising to see that the notion of children's rights was not 
broadly accepted given the case that children were treated as "things" and 
"the property of their parents". As far as political contexts are concerned, 
Rousseau in his influential treatise The Social Contract does declare that 
children ought to have a right to liberty. In his own words, he says: 
Even it each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his 
children: they are born men and free; their liberty belongs to them, 
and no one but they has the right to dispose of it. (3) 
The significance of this statement is twofold. One is that the language of 
rights is at least nominally used concerning children; the other is that 
children are, or should be, granted a place like men (they are born men and 
free). If Rousseau is consistent, a reasonable position following this 
statement may be that: the constitution and operation of any level of 
political 'institution, such as the legislative assembly or government, 
should give proper consideration to children. In other words, children 
should have a place in practical political contexts. After declaring that 
children are born men and free, Rousseau, however, fails to explain how 
children can be fitted into practical political activities. He even, 
incidentally, suggests in a later part of The Social Contract that children 
are not citizens. (4) He hence gives a ground on which it can be claimed that 
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since children are not citizens who contribute to the state, children should 
not be reckoned as members of the state and should not be involved in 
practical political activities; even if they can be involved, their 
involvement is, nevertheless, negligible. That is to say, although Rousseau 
does use the word "right" to regulate the relationships between children 
and other people or political institutions, he does not put "children's rights" 
into a practical political context. This may have led to the consequence 
that the idea of children's rights was soon neglected. It took more than two 
centuries for the adult-world to rediscover, by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, that children, like adults, are also protected by the 
constitution and possess constitutional rights. (5)- - 
Secondly, it was assumed that the relationships between children and other 
people or political institutions can mainly be described and regulated by 
other types of normative language, such as the language of duties or 
obligations, rather than rights-talk; so there was little need to employ the 
idea of children's rights, even though this idea may be encapsulated in the 
language of duties. Locke's political theory concerning children is helpful 
in making this point clear. (6) 11 
The status of children is not neglected in Locke's political scheme. (7) His 
Two Treatises of Government properly gives a place to children's status 
concerning their relationships with their parents and the state. - And he 
does grant "rights" to children, although belatedly and without much 
publicity. The main normative device used to regulate 'children's 
relationships with their parents and the state is, however, the language of 
duties or obligations. It Is the parents' obligation, Locke claims, "to 
preserve, nourish and educate the children they had begotten. ... "(8) What 
then is the basis of this parental obligation? Locke's answer is: the law of 
Nature and the law of reason, which are God's laws and therefore are 
ornnipresent and indispensable. But, it can be asked: are children the 
subject of the law of reason? Locke's answer is: No. He says: 
For nobody can be under a law that is not promulgated to him; and 
this law being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is 
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not come to the use of his reason cannot be said to be under this law 
.... (9) 
If children are not under the law of reason, what sort of arrangements 
should be made so that children can reach the age of reason, and be under 
the governance of the law of reason and the law of Nature so as to fulfil 
God's will? Apart from the parental obligation of nourishment, 
preservation and education towards children, Locke also suggests that 
children are not subjects of the law of reason and they should be guided by 
their parents, who are "to understand" for them. Under all circumstances, 
children must be under the governance of parents until they reach a state of 
reason. Following this general account concerning the relationship between 
parents and children, Locke claims that this account also holds in civil 
society, in which the state is obligated to look after children if their 
parents or guardian fall to fulfil their obligations. (10) 
So far, rights-talk is not yet invoked. The picture Locke sketches 
concerning children, adults and the state is that parents or the state have 
obligations to children. Whether children have an obligation to be guided by 
their parents or the state, and whether children have, an obligation to, be 
preserved, nourished and educated, Locke does not tackle directly. It seems 
that these questions are not worth asking, for it appears to be taken for 
granted that children "want" to be preserved, nourished and educated; and in 
order to be preserved, nourished and educated children have to be under the 
governance of their parents or the state. But Locke does say something 
about children's obligation. What he says is that children have "a perpetual 
obligation of honouring their parents" in response to the benefits given by 
their parents. (1 1) Rights-talk is not invoked until Locke tries to justify 
and delimit parental power, authority, and rights over their children. What 
he clearly says is that parents have power, authority, and rights over their 
children in virtue of their duty towards their children. (12) But how about 
children's rights? Can we not derive children's rights to preservation, 
nourishment, education and the guidance of their parents or the state from 
either the obligations of parents and the state or the law of Nature? In 
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regard to this question, Locke does not give a direct answer. Although he 
does recognize that children have rights to life, property, education, and so 
on, this recognition comes rather belatedly and is not given prominent 
treatment. (13) 
The Implication of Locke's arrangement regarding the relationships between 
children and parents as well as the state seems to be that the notion of 
children's rights does not play a significant role; it is rather the language 
of duties which performs a dominant role. It follows that the notion of 
children's rights is peripheral in Locke's scheme, and this may lead to the 
neglect of the notion of children's rights. 
To summarize. The language of rights 1s now commonly used to describe 
and prescribe the relationships between children and adults or the state; 
but it was not the case in the past. There are mainly two reasons for this. 
One is that the word "rights" was often used in a politico-legal context, and 
as children were not taken seriously in a politico-legal context so the idea 
of children's rights was not common and the word "rights" was not often 
used to regulate the relationships between children and-adults or political 
institutions. The other is that relationships between children and parents 
or political institutions were principally regulated by normative devices 
other than the language of rights; and this resulted in the insignificance 
and obscurity of the notion of children's rights. 
Apart from the two reasons stated above, the fact that some distinguished 
theorists' works were reckoned as opposing the idea of children's rights 
also contributed to the unpopularity of this idea. In -the following 
discussions, attention will be paid to Hobbes' and Mill's theories concerning 
children and Hart's will theory of rights. Hobbes' and Mill's theories 
concerning children were regarded as doctrines that oppose the concept of 
children's rights. Hart's will theory of rights was taken as a doctrine 
advocating that the notion of "rights" should be associated with the right- 
holder's will or capacity of making choice over the duty-bearer and 
therefore undermining the claim of children's rights. it will be shown that 
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Hobbes' and Mill's theories were misunderstood and Hart's will theory of 
rights does not really reject the idea of children's rights. But before they 
are tackled it should be made clear what is meant by a child. This 
clarification is intended to remove the ambiguity surrounding the concept 
of childhood and hence to specify the subjects that will be under 
discussion. 
2. WHAT IS A CHILD ? 
To decide what a child is is not easy. With the advent of modern 
developmental psychology, it is now widely accepted that the development 
of human beings, in terms of mental development, is a gradual and 
continuous process. It is therefore hard to make a clear-cut distinction 
between children and adults. However, the fact that it is hard to draw a 
clear-cut line between children and adults does not mean that a line should 
not be drawn. It rather follows that a line should be more cautiously and 
properly drawn. 
The importance of the adult/child distinction lies in the consequence that 
persons who are classified as adults usually enjoy full political rights and 
some other legal rights, such as buying alcohol and cigarettes; and hence in 
some sense can have a say over their own destiny. In comparison, persons 
who are classified as children are supposed to be immature and hence 
should be under parental domination In various respects, and it implies that 
they cannot decide their own destiny. In other words, adults are given an 
independent status and children do not have an independent status of the 
kind that is highly valued in a liberal-democratic society. Traditionally, 
the criterion of the adult/child distinction is "age". In the British context, 
from the thirteenth century to 1970 the age of majority has been twenty- 
one. (14) Under the present law "child" means someone below the age of 
18. (15) Briefly, the main advantage of the age-criterion is its fairness. 
That is, it provides an impartial criterion regardless of sex, race, social 
class and so on; as long as children reach the age of majority they can at 
once possess rights or privileges adults are supposed to have. (16) The 
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disadvantage of the age-criterion, however, is: on the one hand, although 
some people have not reached the age of majority they have actually 
matured earlier and are more qualified than some who are above the age- 
limit; on the other hand, although some people have reached the age of 
majority they nevertheless are incapable of acting in their own right and 
are poorly equipped with the capacities which are essential in exercising 
" their responsibilities and rights. The age-criterion may therefore be guilty 
of violating the principle of justice - that is, "Treat equals equally, 
unequals unequally. " 
With the aim of fulfilling the principle of justice, the competence- 
criterion of the adult/child distinction purports to replace the age- 
criterion. The idea of taking the competence-criterion as the yardstick of 
classifying adults and children is that as long as people pass the test of 
competence, no matter how it is construed, they can immediately possess 
the status of adulthood and enjoy full political rights and some other 
privileges. However, It can be asked: what does "competence" stand for? 
Apart from some traditional ideas, such as "reason" or "rationality", Schrag 
tentatively suggests two criteria that compose competence; they are 
experience and understanding. (17) 
Unfortunately, although the competence-criterion can idealistically fulfil 
the principle of justice, it still shares one of the weaknesses of the age- 
criterion. That is: to set up an artificial limit - either age or competence - 
by which some basic rights and duties are distributed is simply arbitrary 
on the grounds that the development of human beings is a gradual and 
continuous process, even though this weakness applies less to competence- 
criterion than to age-criterion. Moreover, there are some other thorny 
problems embedded in the competence-criterion. As pointed out by 
Graham, since human action is highly complicated there can be no perfect 
competence-testing system. In other words, the competence-criterion is 
problematic in practical terms. To be more specific, Graham suggests that 
the competence-criterion can only be adopted after several questions can 
be satisfactorily answered, such as: is it certain that competence is 
60 
testable over a wide range of human activities? in what would the test 
consist? who can be a competent and impartial tester? will political 
power not be seized by a small elite who are responsible for the test of 
competence? (18) Unfortunately, it seems that no satisfactory answer has 
been found yet. The most serious problem for the competence-criterion, 
however, as pointed out by Schrag, is that it provides "the possibility of an 
extension of paternalism beyond childhood, a possibility which could 
provide a basis for the kind of hierarchical society we abhor. "() 9) 
In the light of the advantages and disadvantages of the age-criterion and 
competence-criterion, there are several options we can choose concerning 
the adult/child distinction. First, it can be suggested that as human 
development is gradual and continuous and a clear-cut distinction between 
children and adults is bound to be arbitrary, the adult/child distinction 
should not be made at all. This view is actually suggested by Herbert 
Spencer, and more recently, by Holt and Farson. (20) This suggestion can 
without doubt avoid the problems that the age-criterion and the 
competence-criterion present, but it is actually against our daily practice 
which is based on the fact that children and adults have different needs and 
that children to some extent rely on adults. This position also opposes the 
common sense view that although children and adults are similar in degree 
there are significant differences between them and hence the adult/child 
distinction can still be made. Second, we can choose either, the age- 
criterion or the competence-criterion. However, considering the side- 
effects that the competence-criterion may have, to opt for the age- 
criterion seems to be the only choice left. (21) In effect, the present 
adult/child distinction in the British context is basically age-oriented. But 
it manifests itself in a complicated form. For, instance, the age of majority 
in politics is 18, in education 16, etc. (22) In other words, the primitive 
form of the adult/child distinction can be remedied. The age-limit can be 
flexibly set according to the capacity-requirements of the specific activity 
concerned; it should be different from context to context. 
In the following discussions, as the issue of children's right to education is 
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the main concern, the word "children" is used to describe persons under the 
age of sixteen. The main features of children concerned here, following 
Wringe, are, imperfect rationality (not lack of rationality), need for 
guidance and protection, and material dependence. (23) 
3. THOMAS HOBBES AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
Hobbes' theory concerning children is taken by Freeman and Worsfold as a 
doctrine that totally rejects the idea of children's rights, whether 
children's natural rights or rights by social contract. (24) The task of this 
section is aimed at showing that Hobbes' theory is misunderstood and it is 
not too difficult to find a place in Hobbes' theory for-children's rights. 
The reason why Hobbes is often assumed to hold that children have no 
rights is based on several statements in Leviathan and De Cive In Cive, 
Hobbes says: 
We must therefore return to the state of nature. ... By the right therefore of nature, the dominion over the infant first belongs to 
him who first hath him in his power. But lt is manifest that he who 
is newly born, is in the mother's power before any others; Insomuch 
as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up or 
adventure him to fortune. ... And thus In the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a mother and a lord. (25) 
In via na similar statement can also be found: 
Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she 
may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to 
the Mother; and Is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any 
others; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she 
expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him 
that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; 
because preservation of life being the end, for which one man 
becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise 
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him. (26) 
From these statements, it then can be proposed, at least by Freeman and 
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Worsfold, that since the parent or guardian has the power of life and death 
over his (her) children and since children are supposed to promise their 
obedience to their parent or guardian children hence have no rights. 
As distinct from the state of nature, in the state of civil society the civil 
sovereign has the supreme power over his subordinates; the parent or the 
guardian of the child henceforth cannot be the sovereign over the child. (27) 
Both the parent and the child are subjects of the civil sovereign. But one 
thing, it may be supposed, does not change in the civil society; that is, 
children still have no rights. For Hobbes makes a statement as follows: 
... that the Command of the Common-wealth, 1s Law onely to those, that have means to take notice of It. Over naturalt fooles, children, 
or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are 
they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never 
power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences 
thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the 
actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves -a 
Comm on-wealth, (28) 
From this statement, it is inferred by Freeman and Worsfold that children 
in Hobbes' theoryýdo not have rights by social contract, because they are not 
capable of either making covenants with other people or understanding the 
consequence of such contracts. Conceivably, from the statement that 
children are incapable of the title of just and unjust, the conclusion 
"Children have no rights" can then easily be drawn. 
To be sure, there are some elements in the quotations above which may lead 
to the conclusion that children have no rights. But it can be argued that the 
inferences from Hobbes' original texts to the conclusion that children have 
no rights are problematic. It should be noted that although the parent or 
guardian in the state of nature has dominion over his (her) children to the 
extent that children's lives are at the mercy of the parent or guardian, it 
does not follow that children have no rights at all. What Hobbes indicates 
is only the "fact" that the parent or guardian of children is at liberty to do 
what he (she) likes in respect of his (her) children. Hobbes in fact does not 
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say: since the parent or guardian has ultimate right or power over his (her) 
children so children have no rights against their parent or guardian, or 
children have no right of self-preservation. This point can be supported by 
an analogous case made by Hobbes. 
With regard to the relationships between slaves and their masters, and 
between war prisoners and their captors, Hobbes argues that although 
slaves or war prisoners are totally subjected to the right or power of their 
masters or captors, slaves or war prisoners may still have absolute liberty 
to escape by any means whatever. (29) In other words, even though slaves 
or war prisoners are under the absolute dominion of their masters or 
captors and hence the masters or captors have the actual right or power of 
life and death over them, it does not imply that slaves or war prisoners 
have no rights at all. However, two objections can be raised against this 
analogy. 
First, it can be suggested that the dominion masters or captors have over 
slaves or war prisoners is an oppressive one, and this oppressive dominion 
is characteristically different from the natural dominion the parent has 
over his (her) children. This can then lead to the objection that it is not 
relevant to adopt either the case of masters and slaves or the case of 
captors and war prisoners and argue that children, like slaves or war 
prisoners, also have rights. (30) In reply to this objection, it can be argued 
that insofar as the parent or guardian has a power (right) of life and death 
over his (her) children, the relationship between the parent or guardian and 
his (her) children is not different from the relationship between either 
captors and war prisoners or masters and slaves, and hence the analogy 
adopted here should be reckoned as reasonable. 
Second, it can be suggested that this analogy is not really meaningful, for 
war prisoners or slaves can be supposed to be rational beings who are 
physically and mentally fit for gaining liberty, and hence can have a right to 
escape; by contrast, children, especially infants, are so immature that they 
are just incapable of having power or liberty, and hence right, to avoid the 
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disposal of their parents or guardian. (31) This objection is not without 
some force, but it arises from a misunderstanding of the concept of rights 
held by Hobbes. 
Hobbes construes the right of nature as "liberty", and he In turn defines 
"liberty" as "the absence of external] impediments". (32) But as Hobbes does 
not explicate what kinds of external impediments he has in mind, this 
therefore leaves space for speculation and debate. It can be claimed that 
the external impediments concerned are physical external impediments. 
This is, however, contradictory to what Hobbes has suggested: he argues 
that even though slaves or war prisoners are physically bound in relation to 
their masters or captors, they still have a right to escape if their lives are 
threatened. It is therefore wrong to suggest that it is "physical external 
impediments" that Hobbes has in mind in referring to "liberty". A more 
acceptable interpretation is that "the external impediments" should refer 
to "moral impediments" or "bonds of obligation". (33) In this sense, the 
right of nature can be defined as "the absence of obligation". And "rights" in 
Hobbes' theory can therefore be reckoned as a permission regarding what 
the individual may do. (34) The main focus here is whether children have 
"the absence of obligation" in the case of self-preservation. It seems there 
is no reason why children, even infants, cannot have the right of nature to 
preserve their lives. In order to support this position, it will be useful to 
quote, once again, one of the famous passages in Leviathan. Hobbes says: 
The Right of Nature ... Is the Liberty each man hath, 
to use his own 
power, as he'will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; 
that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, 
which In his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the 
aptest means thereunto. (35) 
According to this statement, it can be maintained that apart from the fact 
that children have "the absence of obligation" in preserving their lives, they 
can, to put it more positively, also use their own power for the 
preservation of their own lives; they can do anything which 1s appropriate 
in their own Judgement and reason as long as they conceive what is the 
aptest means of preserving their lives. For instance, a child can run away 
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If he feels his life is endangered; a little boy can cry when he needs help 
from others to preserve his life. Following this, it can be said that the 
right of nature in Hobbes' plan is like, as suggested by Carmichael, a 
"definite enabling capacity"(36); or, in Macpherson's terms, a kind of innate 
compulsion to preserve one's life(37); or, to put it plainly, a kind of 
Instinct that cannot be disposed of. (38) Hobbes, in effect, does not tackle 
the issue of children's rights, but what can be certain is that he does not 
declare that children have no capacity for preserving themselves, even 
though he must be clear that children's capacity in preserving themselves 
is fairly limited. It 1s therefore reasonable to claim that there 1s a space 
for the notion of children's rights in Hobbes' theory of natural rights, 
albeit a limited place. 
In the case of civil society, it seems the point that children do not have 
rights can be supported by saying that the law does not apply to children 
and that children are not capable of "the title of just or unjust". But. this 
inference may go too far. For, Hobbes is quite clear in saying that the right 
of self-preservation is inalienable(39); thus, there is no reason to say that 
children's natural right of self-preservation will disappear in the state of 
civil society. And more than that, Hobbes, while discussing the liberty of 
subjects in the state of civil society, seems to imply that even children can 
have liberty against their parents or the civil sovereign if their lives are 
threatened by their parents or the sovereign. In Hobbes' own terms: - 
The Obligation, and Liberty of the subject, is to be derived, either 
from those Words, (or others equivalent) or else from the End of the 
Institution of Soveraignty.... First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by 
Institution, Is by Covenant of every one to every one; and Soveraignty 
by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child 
to the Parent. It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all 
those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be 
transferred. (40) 
A self-contradictory point in Hobbes' theory can be detected here. On the 
one hand, Hobbes claims that children have no power to make covenants 
whatsoever; but, on the other hand, he assumes that the relationship 
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between children and their parents is not based on generation but contract, 
and therefore the relationship between children and the sovereign is also 
contractual. (41) How, then, can this contradiction be clarified? One 
plausible clarification may go as follows. 
When Hobbes suggests that over children there is no law and that children 
are Incapable of "the title of just or unjust" because they have no power to 
make any covenants, he uses the word "covenant" in a different way from 
saying that the parent has dominion over his (her) children based on a kind 
of contractual relationship. In the former case, "covenant" should be 
viewed in the context of civil society in which children are incapable of 
making civil covenants and incapable of "the title of just or unjust". But in 
the latter case, the contractual relationship between the parent and 
children should be examined in the context of the state of nature. Children 
may have no power to make civil covenants but they can still be supposed to 
be capable of making a "natural", inevitably hypothetical, covenant with 
their parent for the reason of self-preservation. They hence can be 
assumed capable of enjoying the title of natural justice. In response to 
this account, one objection may arise here. It can be suggested that the 
"natural covenant" actually has no place in civil society and that no 
covenants in civil society can be "natural" at all. It can be replied that the 
whole foundation of civil society is based on the natural covenant - with a 
view of avoiding the state of nature or war - between people and people, 
the vanquished and the victor, or children and parents. These natural 
covenants can never be categorically changed into civil covenants and hence 
cannot be renounced. Under all circumstances, judging from the purpose of 
civil society, the natural covenant will always remain untouched. 
To sum up. Hobbes' theory concerning children has been taken as a doctrine 
against the notion of children's rights. This is, as has been shown, a 
misunderstanding of Hobbes' theory of natural rights. As "the right of 
nature" indicates an instinctive enabling capacity - which is indisposable 
and inalienable - directed to self-preservation there is no reason to 
suggest that children do not have that sort of capacity and hence do not 
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have rights. Hobbes clearly does not use the term of "children's rights", but 
considering his theory of natural rights in general children should not be 
excluded from the subjects that can enjoy "rights". 
4. JOHN STUART MILL AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
Mill's attitude against paternalism, or more accurately the strong version 
of paternalism, is well-known, (Mill opposes the strong version of 
paternalism; he, however, supports the weak version of paternalism. 
According to Ten, strong-paternalism is the doctrine that maintains "we 
are justified in interfering to prevent a person from harming himself even 
when his decision is fully voluntary or totally unimpaired. " Weak- 
paternalism is the doctrine "that we are justified in interfering to prevent 
a person from harming himself only when there is a defect in his decision 
to engage in the self-harming activity. "). (42) In his monumental work Qn. 
Liberty, Mill declares one "very simple principle" which is primarily 
directed to the relationship of the individual and society. According to this 
principle, namely the principle of liberty: 
... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be 
wise or even right.... In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign. (43) 
However, this anti-paternalistic principle of liberty is meant to apply only 
to human beings "in the maturity of their faculties"; children or "young 
persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood" are not under the cover of the principle of liberty. (44) Based 
on this declaration as weil as Mill's view that "[T]he existing generation is 
master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation 
to come"(45), it is not difficult for Freeman and Worsfold to reach the 
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conclusion that Mill does not subscribe to the idea of children's rights. (46) 
In On-Liberty and Utilitarianism Mill does not explicitly accord "rights" to 
children. But it would be wrong to say either that because Mill excludes 
children from the subjects to whom the principle of liberty applies he 
therefore rejects the idea of children's rights altogether, or that Mill's 
theory does not have "any hints of children's rights". (47) On the contrary, it 
is possible to pick out evidence from Mill's work by which it can be argued 
that Mill has implicitly accorded three kinds of rights to children. They 
are: the right to life or security, the right to education and the right to 
development. It is the aim of this section to show that the claim made here 
is well -founded. 
The reasoning from the fact that Mill refuses to extend the principle of 
liberty to children to the conclusion that children have no rights Is based on 
a misjudgement that the principle of liberty is the sole yardstick for 
judging whether children can have rights. The question of whether a person 
or a child can have rights is not the main concern of Mill's principle of 
liberty. The Issue of children's rights should be examined from Mill's views 
on the notion of "justice", "duty", "right" and "the principle of general 
utility". 
To start with, the notion of a "right" in Mill's theory is to be Interpreted as 
a valid claim. In his own words: 
When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid 
claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the 
force of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has what we 
consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something 
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it. (48) 
Clearly, this passage neither shows "who" can possess rights nor indicates 
whether rights can only be possessed if and only if they are claimed 
personally by the right-holder. In fact, as Mill does not systematically 
tackle the Issue of rights in On liberty and Utilitariansim. straightforward 
answers to these questions cannot be easily found. But that is not to say 
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that Mill gives no suggestion with regard to these questions. Miil's position 
can be worked out by examining his view on the idea of general utility and 
its connection with "rights". He says: 
To have a right, then, 1s, I conceive, to have something which society 
ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to 
ask, why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general 
utility. (49) 
At this point, this statement is not helpful enough. But Mill's following 
explanation of the notion of general utility can develop a fruitful line from 
which some substantial points can be made. Mill first points out that the 
notion of general utility is closely connected with a special kind of 
sentiment - the sentiment, "not a rational only, but also an animal element, 
the thirst for retaliation. .. ." After this, he then claims that this 
sentiment is derived from the concern for security. (50) For "no human 
being can possibly do without". To be more specific, Mill says: 
Now this most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical 
nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is 
kept unintermittedly In active play. Our notion, therefore, of the 
claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us 
the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feeling around it so 
much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common 
cases of utility, that the difference in degree becomes a real 
difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness 
that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other 
consideration.... The feelings concerned are so powerful, and we 
count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others, that 
ourght and should grow into must, and recognised indispensability 
becomes a moral necessity, analogous to physical, and often not 
inferior to it in binding force. (51) 
One point can be made about Mill's statement here. It seems that Mill's 
reply to why "rights" ought to be protected by society is related to the 
issue of security in particular. The reason why security is so important is 
that it is a necessary good or interest for all human beings, and most of all, 
this importance is generally recognized. Personal security is regarded as 
so important that some kind of device must be set up to protect it. 
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Manifestly, the mechanism that is established to warrant personal security 
is finally encapsulated in the language of rights; specifically, the right to 
life or security. As long as the need for security and the strong sentiment 
about it has been put Into the language of rights, the right to life or 
security then becomes a moral necessity and has binding force. 
Now, based on this interpretation, a better position can be gained to answer 
two questions. Who can possess the right to life or security? And, can this 
right only be possessed under the condition that the individual can make a 
claim about it? It can be pointed out that when Mill was talking about the 
need for security, he did not have the slightest intention of excluding 
children or any person who is not capable of rational thinking; -if he had 
such an intention, he would not suggest that security is a thing that no 
human being can possibly do without". So it can be inferred that when the 
need for security is transformed into the language of rights, the right to 
life or security should also cover children or any human being without the 
full sense of rationality. Further, with regard to the question of whether 
the right to life or security should only be effected after the act of claim, 
it seems Mill's reply would be negative. Since the right-to life or security 
is, or. Is supposed to be, recognized by all members of society and has 
become a moral necessity shared by all members, the condition that it must 
be claimed cannot be a necessary condition of getting this right. In other 
words, the right to life or security is a kind of universal right; the act of 
claim will not affect its status as a right. 
If the interpretation provided above is not persuasive enough, Mill's support 
of weak paternalism can be introduced at this point. Kleinig is quite clear 
in pointing out that the fact that the principle of liberty does not cover 
children only suggests that Mill denies the child's right to liberty from 
interference concerning self-regarding behaviour; Mill, at the same time, 
implies that this does not leave others to interfere with children as they 
desire. Weak paternalism is justifiable, as far as children are concerned, 
only in so far as it is designed to promote children's welfare. (52) In other 
words, children's welfare rights have been recognized by Mil] in his weak 
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paternalism. However, an objection might emerge here. It can be argued 
that Mill does not really grant welfare rights to children, for what he really 
says is that society or parents should protect children from harm, just as 
society should protect its cultural heritage from damage. The fact that we 
should protect cultural heritage from damage does not imply that cultural 
heritage has a right to be protected. There is still a possible gap between 
the statement, "Children should be protected", and the statement, "Children 
have a right to protection". That is why it can be suggested that Mill would 
not go further to say that children have welfare rights against society or 
their parents or guardians. This objection is not totally wrong in the sense 
that there is indeed a gap between the statement, "Children should be 
protected", and the statement, "Children have a right to protection"(53), but 
it is wrong in the sense that lt neglects the possibility that the gap can be 
bridged by Mill's concept of justice. It has been argued that from Mill's 
notion of "rights" and their connection with the principle of general utility, 
children's rights to life or security can be traced. In addition, the notion of 
children's rights to life or security can also be generated from Mill's notion 
of justice. 
In Mill's theory, the notion of rights is an essential part of the notion of 
justice. In his words: 
Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern 
the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of 
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of 
life; and the notion which we have found to be the essence of the idea 
of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and 
testifies to this more binding obligation. (54) 
From this, it is not surprising to see that the two essential ingredients in 
the idea of justice when justice is abused are similar to the two elements 
in the situation when a right is violated. They are: a harm to some specific 
individual or individuals, and the desire to punish those who have done 
harm. (55) Now, it can be asked: what exactly is meant by justice? In fact, 
this question can be rephrased as, what are those moral rules which 
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constitute justice? In general, the quotation above has shown that these 
rules are mainly concerned with the essentials of human well-being. To be 
more specific, Mill suggests that these moral rules are mainly devised for 
preventing the Individual from being hurt by others "either directly or by 
being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good". (56) Clearly, 
children are not fully capable of pursuing or knowing their own good in 
Mill's theory and hence there is no sense in saying that children can have 
freedom to pursue their own good. But this should not blind us to another 
aspect that children are also Mill's "individuals" and therefore should be 
protected by moral rules so that other people are not allowed to hurt them 
directly or Indirectly. This is not very different from saying, based on the 
reason that the notion of rights is the essence of the idea of justice, that 
children have a right not to be hurt, or a right to life or security. 
If the 1 ine of inference given above is not accepted, there is another source 
in Mill's work which can be used to support the view that children have 
some fundamental human rights. In one passage, Mill says: 
To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of 
conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be 
supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The 
other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by 
those who infringe the rule. (57) 
The statement, "Children have rights", is, in fact, not very difficult to 
derive from the passage above. If Mill is not inconsistent, he would have no 
objection to the statement: The idea of fundamental rights supposes two 
things: a rule of conduct, and sentiment which sanctions the rule. The rule 
must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good; the 
sentiment is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who 
infringe the rule. The reason why Mill would not object to this statement 
is clear. It is simply because the notion of a "right" residing in the 
individual is the essence of the idea of justice. If there is no sufficient 
reason to suppose that children are not part of human kind, children should 
also be protected and covered by the rule of conduct and hence have rights. 
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Asa matter of fact, children may have not only the right to life or security 
but also a special right of their own; that is, the right to education. Mill, 
as in the case of the right to life or security, does not directly grant the 
right of education to children, but evidence is not hard to find to suggest 
that Mill has Implicitly granted this right to children. A starting point is 
Mill's idea of "duty". Mill generally accepts the distinction between "duties 
of perfect obligation" and "duties of imperfect obligation". In his own 
words, duties of imperfect obligation are "those in which, though the act is 
obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice; 
as In the case of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to 
practice, but not towards any definite person, nor at any prescribed time. " 
And, duties of perfect obligation are "those duties in virtue of which a 
correlative right resides in some person or persons. "(58) Mill neither 
expounds the idea of "duties of perfect obligation" in detail nor provides 
any concrete example of them in Utilitarianism. Yet, taking "duties of 
imperfect obligation" as reference, it can be assumed that the occasions of 
performing duties of perfect obligation are not left to the choice of the 
duty-bearer. That is, the duty-bearer Is not only bound to fulfil his duties 
but to do so towards a definite person or persons at a prescribed time. 
Following from the notion of "duties of perfect obligation", it is then 
appropriate to enquire whether parents in Mill's mind have a duty to provide 
education for their children, and whether the state has a duty to provide 
education for children. It the answers are positive, it then can be asked 
whether the duty of parents and the state towards, children in regard to 
education is a duty of perfect obligation. If the answer is still positive, 
then it will not be too bold to say that children have a right to education in 
relation to their parents and the state. 
First of all, with regard to the question whether parents have a duty to 
provide education for their children, it seems Mill would not be hesitant to 
say that parents should have a duty to provide education for their children, 
and he would also regret it if this duty were actually ignored. In Q[j 
Liberty, he says: 
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Hardly anyone, indeed, will deny that it is one of the most sacred 
duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), 
after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being 
an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards 
others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared 
to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to 
hear of obliging him to perform it. (59) 
Then, does the state have a duty to provide education for children? Mill at 
first only says that it is almost "a self-evident axiom that the State should 
require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human 
being who is born its citizen. "(60) But it seems unclear whether this 
statement implies that the state has a duty to provide education for 
children. However, that the state does have a duty to provide education for 
children becomes clear when Mill suggests that if the parent does not 
fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled at the charge, as 
far as possible, of the parent. "(61) It implies that Mill has suggested that 
it is a duty of the state to provide education for children. 
However, one point should be noted here. Although Mill reckons that both 
parents and the state have duties to provide education-for children, their 
duties are different. The duty of the state in providing education for 
children is rather a second-order duty. This duty does not immediately 
provide a ground on which the state can take actions to manage children's 
education. The state can fulfil its duty only if parents fall to fulfil. their 
duty towards their children or when children under their parents' patronage 
fail to achieve a certain standard. (62) It is of course a complicated issue 
to judge whether parents fulfil their duty or not with regard to their 
children's education or what kind of criteria should be set up (and by 
whom? ) so that the state can properly intervene without violating parents' 
rights. However, these questions are not the main concern here. What is 
certain is that both parents and the state have duties, albeit different, to 
provide education for their children and future citizens. 
But, it can be asked, has this duty provided a solid ground on which 
children's right to education can be granted? As has been mentioned above, 
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it depends on whether the duty of parents and the state in question are 
duties of perfect obligation. If the duty to provide education for children 1s 
a duty of perfect obligation, it should at least satisfy two conditions: first, 
this duty cannot be at the duty-bearer's discretion; second, this duty should 
be fulfilled towards a definite person or definite persons at a prescribed 
time. The first of these two conditions is especially important in deciding 
whether a duty can be a duty of perfect obligation. If a duty is at the 
discretion of the duty-bearer, It then subsequently fails to satisfy the 
second condition. Mill's attitude concerning whether the duty to provide 
education for children fulfils these two conditions can be examined at two 
levels. Mill admitted and regretted that even though parents' duty to 
provide education for their children . had been recognized in his time, 
parents still had discretion over whether to provide education for their 
children or not. (63) As to the state's duty towards children's education, it 
seems clear that the state was not legally responsible for children's 
education if parents failed to make educational provision for their children. 
This was the case at least before 1870 In England and 1872 In 
Scotland. (64) So, from a legal viewpoint, the duties of the state and 
parents concerning children's education were by no means duties of perfect 
obligation; in other words, children did not have the legal right to education 
in Mill's time. 
However, in On Liberty. Mill has no intention of simply putting this issue in 
a legal context. He, in fact, regards this issue as a moral one. That is why 
he remarks: 
It still remains unrecognized that to bring a child into existence 
without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for Its 
body, but instruction and training for its mind is a moral crime, both 
against the unfortunate offspring and against society .... 
(65) 
In other words, parents' duty of providing education for their children is 
morally not at their discretion; failing to fulfil this duty is analogously 
compared with breaking a moral law and hence should be subject to moral 
sanctions. Moreover, the passage above also implicitly reveals that 
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parents' duty of providing education should be realized towards definite 
persons at a prescribed time. To this extent, the duty of parents' providing 
education to their children can be counted as a duty of perfect obligation 
and hence gives rise to the children's moral right to education. (66) 
In regard to whether the state's duty to provide education for children is a 
duty of perfect obligation, Mill does not directly tackle this issue either. 
But from his position on state education - namely, the state is obligated to 
provide education to a certain extent but the state is not entitled to direct 
the education it provides, much less the education initiated by parents or 
other institutions - and his view that the state is under an obligation to 
supplement parents' enterprise regarding children's education, it would not 
be unreasonable to assume that the state's duty should not be dependent 
upon its own deliberation and that the duty should be fulfilled towards 
definite persons at a prescribed time. From this, children's moral right to 
education can also be derived from the state's duty to provide education for 
children. 
However, one thing still needs mentioning. Children's rights to education in 
relation to parents and the state are different in some sense. The key point 
relates to the idea of punishment. As has been mentioned above, when a 
right is violated it will involve two elements, namely, a harm to some 
specific individual or individuals and the desire to punish those who have 
done harm. Now, supposing that children's right to education in relation to 
their parents is not respected, it would then be easy to detect the two 
elements that are supposed to be involved. (67) But it is not the case when 
children's right to education in relation to the state is violated, for it 
seems that no punishment can be directly and immediately inflicted on the 
state by its citizens. Does this therefore undermine the status of 
children's right to education in relation to the state? Not quite. For it can 
be suggested that the state - defined as "a particular and special 
association, existing for the special purpose of maintaining a compulsory 
scheme of legal order"(68) - can be challenged, hence humiliated, on 
various occasions, such as in the general elections that western 
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democracies have. Given this view, It can be claimed that the element of 
punishment, although put in a different form, can still be involved in 
children's right to education in relation to the state. And, therefore, the 
status of children's right to education in relation to the state will not be 
undermined. 
If the reasoning above is correct, it is possible now to go further to 
suggest that children's right to education is, in effect, underpinned by 
children's right to develop individuality, or right to development. (69) It is 
not appropriate to dwell on how important the idea of 
-"Individuality" 
Is In 
Mill's theory. (70) The main concern here is on the connection between 
"education" and "individuality". 
In Mill's scheme, education has a close connection with individuality-(71) 
Education, in Mill's view, is mainly a device through which individuality can 
be properly developed; and not only that, the free development of 
individuality is a necessary part as well as a necessary condition of 
education. (72) Granted this relation, it can be said that children's right to 
education has already presupposed children's right to the free development 
of individuality, although these two rights cannot be identified (for 
education is only one way of developing individuality). What is more, in 
discussing the application of the principle of liberty, Mill not only 
emphasizes that "development" should be a part of national education but 
also perceives the issue of liberty and the issue of individual development 
as different, although liberty is the chief ingredient of individuality. (73) 
The former point confirms that education is meant for the development of 
individuality and hence children's right to education is a substantive form 
of children's right to develop individuality. The implication of the latter 
point is that although the principle of liberty does not apply to children and 
hence excludes the possibility that children have the right to liberty 
concerning self-regarding behaviour, it does not negate the possibility that 
children can have a right to development. 
If children's right to development can be confirmed, one point should be 
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added here. Although it can be argued that children's right to development 
has been presupposed by children's right to education, children's right to 
development is, however, a kind of general right. Specifically, when 
children's right to education is violated it can be quite easy to detect. But 
it is not the case when children's right to development is violated. The 
reason for this is that the concepts of "development" and "individuality" are 
highly abstract and ambiguous, or at least they are not as plain as the tree- 
growing metaphor that Mill gives. (74) But even so, 'the importance of 
developing individuality still deserves to be encapsulated in the language 
of rights. 
To conclude. The understanding that Mill rejects the idea -of children's 
rights is inaccurate. From Mill's accounts concerning "utility", "justice", 
"duty", and "Individuality", the idea of children's rights to life or security, 
education, and development can certainly be deduced. , 
5. HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
As a theory of rights, the will theory of rights (or its other term, the 
choice theory of rights) advocated by Hart Is reckoned by MacCormick, 
Campbell and Kleinig as a doctrine that rejects the idea that children (or 
young children) have, or can have, rights. (75) The first purpose of this 
section is to illustrate that Hart's will theory of rights can actually have 
two versions, namely the early version and the modified version; and 
neither of the two versions of the will theory can be invoked to deny the 
idea of children's rights in general. What can at most be claimed is that 
Hart in his early version of the will theory does deny children's moral 
rights; he does not at the same time deny the possibility of children's 
legal rights. Children's legal rights are explicitly confirmed in Hart's 
modified version of the will theory, and Hart Implicitly accepts that 
children's moral rights are also compatible with the modified version of 
the will theory. The second purpose of this section, therefore, is to argue 
that the reasoning for holding the view that children do not have moral 
rights In Hart's early version of the will theory is problematic and hence 
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should be rejected. More generally, it is hoped to provide an accurate 
picture of Hart's will theory and its bearings on the Issue of children's 
rights. 
Hart's will theory of rights can be perceived as: 
... the theory which says that having a right of some 
kind is to do 
with the legal or moral recognition of some individual's choice as 
being pre-eminent over the will of others as to a given subject- 
matter In a given relationshlp. (76) 
Following this position concerning the nature of rights, it then can be 
inferred that since children (or infants, animals and adults incapable of 
choice) lack the capacity of making their own choice over the will of others 
as to a given subject matter in a given relationship children hence do not 
have either moral rights or legal rights. This inferential viewpoint is now 
widely associated with Hart's will theory. But it should be pointed out that 
Hart would probably only approve part of this inference if he still held his 
early version of the will theory; and Hart would even totally repudiate this 
inferential viewpoint on his modified version of the will theory. A further 
elaboration is needed here. 
To start with Hart's modified version of the will theory. In Hart's later 
work Bentham on Legal Rights and Legal Rights(77), he seems to hold a 
rather similar viewpoint on the nature of rights as he does In his early 
work Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence and Are there Any Natural 
Rights? But the significant difference between these two versions of the 
will theory Is that the application of the will theory has been consciously 
confined to the level of "ordinary law" - viz., criminal law and civil law - 
in his modified version of the will theory. In other words, Hart admits In 
his later work that the will theory is not an all-embracing comprehensive 
theory of rights at all. There are some rights In which the right-holder's 
capacity of making choice over the duty-bearer does not count. These 
rights, Hart says, are related to freedoms and benefits essential for "the 
maintenance of the life, the security, the development, and the dignity of 
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the individual. "(78) The essential Idea of these rights - which are mainly 
of concern to constitutional lawyers, serious critics of the law and social 
theorists - 1s neither the individual's choice nor the individual's benefits 
(as claimed by a competing theory of rights, the interest theory) but the 
Individual's fundamental needs. (79) The retreat from the will theory as an 
all-embracing theory of rights to the modified version of the will theory 
applicable only to the ordinary law hence paves the way for the idea of 
children's rights, on the grounds that children basically share the 
fundamental needs of all other human beings and therefore the concern for 
their lives, security, development and dignity can then be encapsulated In 
the language of rights. Given the recognition that the right-holder's choice 
over the duty-bearer is not the essence of rights and that human basic 
needs can also be the grounds of some rights, it seems that Hart's modified 
version of the will theory has accommodated itself with the idea of 
children's constitutional rights and moral rights. 
Most notably, the retreat from a general comprehensive theory to a 
parochial theory also goes with an important concession to which Hart does 
not give prominent publicity. That is, persons with limited capacity who 
cannot in a strict sense make their own choice over the duty-bearer in a 
given o'rd'inary legal relationship can still have rights. Infants and persons 
not sui juris, for example, can have rights. In other words, children, like 
adults, can also have legal rights. (80) But how can infants, children and 
persons not sui juris exercise their rights? Hart suggests that, their 
rights are actually not exercised by themselves but by appointed 
representatives on their behalf. But the exercise of the rights of infants, 
children or persons not sui furls by appointed representatives has three 
qualifications. Firstly, appointed representatives' exercise of rights for 
infants, children, or persons not sui jur/s may be subject to approval by a 
court. Secondly, the exercise of rights by appointed representatives is 
determined by "what those whom they represent could have done if sui 
furls, " Thirdly, when persons not sui juris become sui juris they can 
exercise their rights "without any transfer or fresh assignment. "(81) On 
the whole, Hart maintains that although it is appointed representatives 
81 
who exercise the rights for persons not sui jurisduring the period of their 
disability, the rights should be regarded not as belonging to the appointed 
representatives but to the persons not sui juris. (82) Following this, it can 
be certain that children's legal rights are actually recognized by the 
modified version of the will theory. 
Two problems, however, may be discovered here. Firstly, it can be asked: 
are children's legal rights really meaningful given the framework of the 
modified version of the will theory of rights? For it can be suggested that 
as children do not have full rationality in deciding whether they should 
claim or enforce their rights over the legal duty-bearer or ask for 
compensation when their rights are violated, their rights, exercised by 
appointed representatives, are at best nominal and at worst empty. 
Secondly, it can be asked: if infants, children or persons not Sulfur-i-,; can 
be legally represented and can have legal rights, why cannot animals be 
legally represented and hence have legal rights as well? Further, if 
animals cannot be legally represented and cannot have legal rights in the 
will theory of rights why is it that infants, children or persons not sui 
Jui'ls can? For some animals (like chimpanzees) also have limited 
rationality and hence they are only different from infants in degree not 
kind; and It is simply inconsistent for the modified will theory to 
accommodate the idea of children's rights and to reject the idea of animals 
rights. 
On the face of it, it seems that Hart does not directly respond to these two 
problems. But from the position he constantly holds in his work, Hart's 
modified version of the will theory can be defended as follows. With 
regard to the first problem, Hart surely insists that the individual's choice 
or will over the duty-bearer is the essence of rights at the level of 
ordinary law, but he does not maintain that the right-holder must be the 
person who can actually and personally claim, enforce his rights or ask for 
compensation if his rights are violated. The notion of the individual's 
choice or will over the duty-bearer" should not be understood only as the 
individual's personal choice over the duty-bearer; It can also be 
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understood as the individual's discretionary legal choice or will over the 
duty-bearer, which can be exercised by appointed representatives on the 
right-holder's behalf under the supervision of court. As the exercise of the 
rights of persons not suijuris by appointed representatives is subject to 
the qualifications mentioned and to the supervision of court, there is no 
need to worry that children's rights would only be nominal or even empty. 
As to the view that the idea of animals' rights should be treated 
analogously to the idea of children's rights or infants' rights, it can be 
pointed out that Hart's views are underpinned by the assumption that 
animals are categorically different from human beings, and, therefore, 
there should be a different legal device for protecting them. For animals, 
legal protection is embodied in the language of duties; but for human 
beings, legal protection can be phrased both in the language of duties and 
the language of rights. That is why although infants or children cannot 
personally exercise their rights they can still be the rights-holders. 
Given the understanding that the modified version of the will theory does 
not in any sense deny the idea of children's moral rights or legal rights, the 
emphasis should now be put on Hart's early version of the will theory. It 
has been mentioned that Hart's early version of the will theory does not 
really renounce the possibility that children can have legal rights; and 
therefore it is problematic to invoke the early version of the will theory to 
deny the idea of children's rights. This point can be supported by Hart's 
account given in Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. In this article, 
Hart also holds the view that the essence of rights is the right-holder's 
choice over the duty-bearer. But the essential point is that Hart does not 
actually declare that it must be the right-holder's own choice that counts. 
What he really claims is that the duty-bearer's action or absence of action 
is made by law dependent on the choice either of the right-holder or some 
other person authorised to act on behalf of the right-holder. (83) It may 
suggest that Hart does not really deny the possibility of children's legal 
rights (or the legal rights of persons not sui juris ). From the fact that 
Hart explicitly recognizes the legal rights of infants and persons not sui 
jur/sin his modified version of the will theory and that the reason for his 
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recognition is very much in line with his early version, it may be 
reasonable to suggest that children's legal rights are not denied in Hart's 
early version of the will theory. 
However, it is clear that children's moral rights are completely rejected 
in Hart's early version of the will theory. In Are There Any Natural Rights? 
Hart firstly gives a conditional assertion that if there are any moral rights 
at all then there must be a natural right - "the equal right of all men to be 
free". The equal right of all men to be free in Hart's theory, however, is 
qualified in one significant way. That is, the subjects of this right are 
restricted to "adult human beings capable of choice". (84) It implies that 
infants, children, the insane and the senile (let alone animals) do not have 
an equal right to be free. 
It nevertheless can be suggested that even if children (leaving other 
special cases aside) are denied the equal right to be free, Hart possibly 
does not claim that children cannot have other sorts of moral rights, such 
as a moral right to development; and hence the idea of children's moral 
rights is not totally renounced in Hart's early version of the will theory. 
This possibility, unfortunately, is closed by Hart In two ways. 
Firstly, moral rights in general are classified into two categories by Hart, 
viz., general rights and special rights. General moral rights are rights 
against anyone, such as "I have the right to say what I think" or "I have the 
right to worship as I please". (85) By contrast, special rights are rights 
which "arise out of special transactions between individuals or out of some 
special relationship in which they stand to each other, " such as "I have a 
right to be paid what you promised for my service" or "parents' right to 
obedience from their children". (86) After this classification, Hart claims 
that the assertion of general moral rights directly invokes the principle 
"that all men equally have the right to be free" and that the assertion of 
special moral rights invokes this principle indirectly. (87) The Implication 
of Hart's claim can then be that children do not have any moral rights, on 
the grounds that all moral rights are directly or indirectly based on the 
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principle, "All men equally have the right to be free", which does not cover 
children, 
Secondly, Hart simply asserts that children do not have moral rights. 
Children of course should not be ill-treated and adults of course have a 
duty to treat children properly, but this moral provision cannot be the 
grounds for claiming, "Children have a right to be treated properly. "(88) 
The reason for Hart's confining the subjects of moral rights to adults 
capable of choice is mainly related to his conviction that the language of 
rights, as a distinctive form of moral language, should play a pivotal role in 
"regulating the proper distribution of human freedom". (89) To be more 
specific, Hart assumes that the language of rights must have its own 
distinctive character which makes it different from other moral concepts. 
And the distinctive character of rights-talk, along with the notion of 
justice, fairness and obligation (Hart uses this term in a specific way), is 
its legitimacy in the use of force or the threat of force to secure that 
what is just or fair or someone's right to have done shall in fact be 
done. ... "(90) And not only that, but in order to fulfil its role in regulating 
the proper distribution of human freedom, the right-holder should be given 
a special ground on which he can decide whether to exercise or enforce his 
rights, or to ask for compensation if the rights concerned are violated. 
Only through the employment of the language of rights, Hart seems to 
assume, can human freedom be guaranteed and distributed in a satisfactory 
way. 
Given the distinctive character, or function, of the language of rights, we 
are now in a better position to understand why Hart does not want to 
translate the statement of duties (such as, we have a duty not to ill-treat 
children) into the statement of rights (such as, children have a right not to 
be 111-treated). If this sort of translation can be done then the language of 
rights will soon lose its identity; for it seems this translation will make 
the distinctive character of the language of rights incomprehensible. It 
would be ridiculous for children or their appointed representatives to 
waive "children's rights not to be ill-treated". So, in order to keep the 
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Identity of the language of rights, rights-talk must have its own 
distinctive character or function that cannot be replaced by other moral 
concepts. The recognition of this distinctive character of rights-talk can, 
on the one hand, disentangle the language of rights from other moral 
concepts and make the translation from the language of duties into the 
language of rights impossible ; on the other hand, it becomes an obstacle to 
the idea of children's moral rights by reason of the imcompetency of 
children in making their own choice over the duty-bearer. 
The main reason why only adults capable of choice can have moral rights is 
also related to the specific function that the language of rights is supposed 
to perform; that is, to distribute human freedom properly and 
satisfactorily. Presumably, it is Hart's view that only adults capable of 
choice are able to participate in the activity of the distribution of human 
freedom. Hart does not make clear what he means by "human freedom" in 
Are There Any Natural Rights? But it should be pointed out that "freedom" 
in Hart's plan should not simply be reckoned as "negative freedom" - the 
absence of moral or physical external impediments. What Hart is really 
driving at is that the freedom should be gained through the operation of 
deliberate capacity manifested in making rational decisions after various 
relevant factors (such as, moral rules, moral ideas and changing 
circumstances) have been taken into account. In this sense, animals, 
infants, children, or some special adults who are not capable of making this 
sort of decision are undoubtedly not suitable for involving in the activity of 
the distribution of human freedom, and hence have no rights. 
If the understanding about Hart's early version of the will theory above is 
correct, it now can be concluded that the reason why children do not have 
moral rights is that moral rights are solely concerned with the activity of 
the distribution of human freedom which children are unable to participate 
In. It is worth examining this assumption further. 
The problem of Hart's assumption is, as can be seen in Hart's modified 
version of the will theory, that it tries to delimit the possible boundary of 
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the language of moral rights. The language of moral rights does have a 
close connection with the distribution of human freedom, but it is not true 
to say that all moral rights should be concerned with freedom based on the 
deliberation of the right-holder's choice. Some rights, as suggested by Hart 
is his later. work, can be concerned with fundamental human needs. They 
are no less rights than the moral rights that concern human freedom. 
But it may be asked: does the diffuse use of the concept of moral rights 
undermine the concept of moral rights as a distinctive form of moral 
language?. In a way the answer is "Yes. " As has been shown in Chapter One, 
the language of rights can be associated with so many other moral and legal 
concepts,. such as liberty, duty, interest, entitlement, power, immunity and 
so on; therefore, the whole picture of the use of the language of rights does 
appear confusing, and the character of rights-talk not clear. But it can be 
suggested that the diffuse use of the language of moral rights is exactly 
the distinctive character of the language of moral rights. It seems there is 
no moral concept that can be related to so many other moral concepts as 
the concept of moral rights. From this angle, Hart's intentional attempt to 
confine the boundary of the concept of rights is bound to be futile. 
What Hart tries to do in his early version of the will theory is to prescribe 
the use of the language of rights. In his plan, moral rights can only be 
ascribed to adults capable of choice. Hart's moral scheme is very much in 
line with Kant's moral scheme developed from the principle of respect for 
persons, in which, as interpreted by Downie and Telfer, children are not 
supposed to be respected on the grounds that children are not rational 
beings. (91) Whether Hart is successful in establishing his moral scheme 
and regulating the use of the language of rights can be tested by the case of 
children's rights. With the advantage of hindsight, from the fact that the 
idea of children's moral rights is widely accepted and employed in ordinary 
usage it can be claimed that Hart's moral scheme is unworkable and his 
attempt to regulate the use of the language of rights unsuccessful. 
To summarize. Hart's version of the will theory is taken as a doctrine that 
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rejects the idea of children's rights in general. This, however, is a 
misunderstanding. Hart has two versions of the will theory. His early 
version does straightforwardly deny children's moral rights; but this 
version does not renounce the possibility of children's legal rights. Hence 
it is problematic to suggest that Hart's early version of the will theory 
completely rejects children's rights in general. Most remarkably, the 
modified version of the will theory is not only a theory that explicitly 
recognizes children's legal rights at the level of ordinary law but also a 
theory that accommodates itself to the idea of children's moral rights. 
Taken as ,a whole, it is wrong to suggest that Hart denies the _ 
idea of 
children's rights. Hart's early version of the will theory concerning moral 
rights can indeed be developed into a general theory of rights in which the 
idea of children's rights would have no place, but it should be noted that 
Hart did not do this. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARGUMENTS FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
In the preceding chapter, it was firstly pointed out that the language of 
rights was not normally employed in children's relationships with adults 
and political institutions in the past. Following that, attention was given 
principally to the theories of Hobbes, Mill and Hart. Their theories have 
often been reckoned as theories that exclude the idea of children's rights 
from the domain of rights-talk.. It, was argued that this reckoning was 
unsound. Owing to the requirement of theoretical consistency, the concept 
of children's rights should be given a place in Hobbes' and Mill's theories, 
even though the terminology of "children's rights" is not used explicitly in 
their writings. Hart's will theory of rights is complicated. But it was 
shown that Hart's modified version of the will theory accommodates itself 
to the idea of children's rights; and, as the exercise of legal rights can be 
undertaken by the representative of the right-holder in Hart's early version 
of the will theory, Hart's early version of , the will theory should not be 
regarded as a theory that denies the idea of children's rights. 
It should be noted, however, that the elucidation of the theories of Hobbes, 
Mill and Hart concerning children in Chapter Two does not in any sense- 
amount to a justification for children's rights. It was only meant to convey 
the message that the idea of children's rights can be found in, or 
accommodated with, those writers' theories. In other words, even though 
the idea of children's rights can be found in some writers' theories the idea 
itself is still not justified in a literal sense. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to advance a justification for the idea of children's rights. 
Actually, several justifications for children's rights have already been 
tendered. These justifications are, however, not entirely satisfactory. In 
one way or another, they suffer from various weaknesses. A more 
satisfactory justification is thus needed. In the following three sections, 
95 
two sorts of justification that have been advanced for children's rights 
will be examined in the first two sections; based on dissatisfaction with 
these justifications, an alternative justification for children's rights will 
then be developed in the final section. 
1. THE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
The traditional justification for children's rights is to try to demonstrate 
that children are part of a class that is the subjects of rights. This sort of 
justification can be illustrated in a syllogistic form: X are the-sort-of 
beings that (can) have rights (major premise), children are part of X (minor 
premise), therefore children also (can) have rights (conclusion). There are 
several things that can be said in respect of this sort of justification. 
Firstly, the issue of children's rights in this traditional justification does 
not occupy a central place. The statement that "Children have rights" or 
"Children can have rights" is only a derivative from a general statement 
which needs justification. Thus the main emphasis of the traditional 
justification will be put on the major premise rather than on the issue of 
children's, rights itself. Secondly, the traditional justification has 
presupposed that there must be one (or some) common characteristic(s) 
that children share with the subjects of the class that children belong to. 
Without this presupposition, the minor premise will not be valid. But the 
problem Is. what is this characteristic? And, what is the ground for 
identifying this common characteristic? The answers to these questions 
are contingent on the major premise and on the argument aimed at 
supporting the major premise. Thirdly, the traditional justification also 
implies a formal principle of justice; that is, treat equals equally, unequals 
unequally. (1) Following this formal principle, it then can be reasoned that 
if children are part of a class that is the subjects of rights then children 
also have the rights that other members of the class have on the grounds 
that they should be treated equally. 
In this section, two examples of the traditional justification for children's 
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rights will be presented and examined. Without exception, both examples 
have the three features mentioned above and hence are subject to the 
difficulties attached to these features. First of all, it can be suggested 
that since the question of children's rights is the central issue, any 
justification of children's rights had better start from the concept of 
childhood, children's relationships with adults or political . institutions, and 
the framework (whether moral, social, political or cultural) to which 
children can be referred, rather than from a remote logical connection 
between children and a class of beings that children belong to. (2) Second, 
it is hard to single out a common characteristic or a group of common 
characteristics that children share with other beings who are the subjects 
of rights. The common characteristic that has been identified is also the 
criterion by which we can judge what sort of beings can have rights, such 
as, rationality, the liability to pain and suffering, transcendental 
properties like "an intrinsic dignity", or physical attributes like features 
that human beings have. Unfortunately, these characteristics are often 
reckoned to be ambiguous, mysterious, or assertive and hence 
unsatisfactory. (3) Apart from this, the characteristic singled out may be 
too strict and thus exclude some important classes of beings (if the strict 
sense of rationality is taken as the criterion, only rational adults can have 
rights) or too loose and thus include too many beings (if the capacity of 
suffering is taken as the criterion, then all kinds of animals can have 
rights). (4) Third, most seriously, the traditional justification for children's 
rights often fails to furnish an adequate justification for the major 
premise. For example, if the claim "All human beings (can) have human 
rights" is to be taken as the major premise, then it must be asked: on what 
ground does this premise stand? With regard to this question, what is 
really needed is not an "assertion" that all human beings (can) have human 
rights but an "argument" (or a set of arguments) which can convince us that 
human beings (can) have human rights. But, unfortunately, as Young 
indicates: 
The biggest problem for the theory of human rights is the problem or 
finding an adequate justification. The characteristics usually 
offered in support of the theory ... seem either to be 
too weak to 
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sustain the whole apparatus or human rights, or to Introduce new 
mysteries that only compound worries about the justifiability of 
rights-talk. (5) 
Young's criticism of the theory of human rights seems to be applicable to 
other arguments that support a major premise from which the idea of 
children's rights can be derived. This difficulty will be further revealed in 
the following two traditional justifications for children's rights. 
1.1 Human Rights and Children's Rights 
The first traditional justification for children's rights starts from a 
statement concerning human rights. It Is Gewirth's proposition that "All 
persons can equally have human rights simply insofar as they are human. "(6) 
Based on this proposition, the justification of children's rights can be 
developed as. 1>. All persons can equally have human rights on the grounds 
that they are human beings (major premise); 2>. Children are human beings 
(minor premise); 3>. Children can have equal human rights (conclusion). 
Before going on to consider the arguments for Gewirth's main proposition, 
attention should be paid to the concepts of "persons" and "humans" embodied 
in the main proposition. 
It can be pointed out that Gewirth's proposition blurs the -concept of 
"persons" and "human beings". Briefly, the term "human beings" Is a 
descriptive term. It is a term for describing animated beings with human 
form. By contrast, the term "persons" arises in a legal context; it is an 
evaluative rather than a descriptive term. A "person" is an entity 
recognized in law. It can be a natural person or an artificial person, such 
as a corporation. (7) Most importantly, as it is a legal concept, it can then 
be subject to change owing to the possible changes of legal framework. 
This point can be further exemplified by the fact that the Idea of "persons" 
has varied. On the one hand, gods, idols, unborn and dead human beings, 
animals or even inanimate things have been classified as persons in the 
law(8); on the other hand, some natural persons such as children were once 
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treated as "property" rather than "persons", (9) Given this understanding of 
the concepts of "persons" and "human beings", the statement, "All persons 
can have equal human rights insofar as they are human", actually can be 
read in two ways. First, it may be read as saying that under the category of 
"persons" only persons with human form can have human rights, persons 
without human form (e. g. corporations) cannot have human rights; and some 
human beings who are not recognized as persons (possibly, foetuses, 
children or even women) cannot have human rights even though they have 
human form. Second, it may be reckoned that all human beings are persons 
and it is impossible to be a human being without also being a person; hence 
Gewirth's statement can be read as saying, "All human beings can have 
equal human rights. " The question we are now facing is: between these two 
readings, which reading is more in line with Gewirth's intention? Judging 
from the fact that Gewirth does not pay attention to the distinction 
between "persons" and "human beings" and his later statement "The Subject 
of the human rights are all human beings equally"(10), it seems more likely 
that the second reading is in tune with Gewirth. 
We now turn to examine Gewirth's justification for the proposition that 
"All human beings can have equal human rights. " Gewirth's justification for 
human rights arises from his dissatisfaction with other theories which 
have been used to justify equal human rights. (1 1) In his view, all these 
other theories, in one way or another, have some difficulties. He hence sets 
up twelve conditions on which a successful justification for equal human 
rights depends. These conditions are: providing an argument, determinancy, 
sufficiency, adequate egalitarian premises, logical derivability of "ought" 
from "is", rational justification of the criterion of relevance, rationally 
necessary acceptability to all rational persons, adequate account of the 
objects of rights, justified premises, truth, non-circulation and empirical 
reference. (12) Bearing these conditions in mind, Gewirth then proceeds 
with his own justification for equal human rights. 
To put it simply, Gewirth starts from the assumption that any action of a 
prospective purposive agent contains two elements; viz., voluntariness (or, 
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freedom) and purposiveness (or, intentionality). Based on this assumption, 
Gewirth argues that when a prospective purposive agent performs an action 
he must aim for an end or purpose E, and E is something that the agent 
freely chooses to attain; this implies that E is good. Generally, freedom 
and well-being are necessary goods for attaining E. From this, it can be 
claimed that the agent has rights to freedom and well-being given the 
sense that rights are justif led claims or entitlements. This claim cannot 
be denied, for if it is denied then it suggests that it would not be wrong for 
other people to interfere with any prospective purposive agent's rights to 
freedom and well-being; however, no prospective purposive- agent will. 
accept the case that his rights to freedom and well-being can be interfered 
with by other persons. If it is the case that any prospective purposive 
agent wants to have rights to freedom and well-being and his rights should 
not be interfered with, then each agent is bound to respect other agents' 
rights; If not, his own rights to freedom and well-being will also be 
endangered. Up to this stage, it then can be concluded that "Ail prospective 
purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being and all agents 
should act accordingly. " And, to move a step forward, Gewirth says: "Since 
all humans are actual, prospective, or potential agents, the rights in 
question belong equally to al i humans. "( 13) 
Bearing the issue of children's rights in mind, we can now scrutinize 
Gewirth's argument. The focus of this scrutiny is neither on, whether 
Gewirth's argument is consistently and logically developed(14), nor on. 
whether his twelve conditions of a satisfactory argument for equal human 
rights are plausible. (15) The main focus is rather on whether Gewirth's 
argument is solid enough to support the claim that all human beings can 
have equal human rights. If Gewirth's argument cannot support this claim, 
the deductive statement that children also can have equal human rights will 
then be undermined. Unfortunately, it seems that Gewirth's argument for 
equal human rights is too weak to support his claim, For Gewirth seemingly 
omits those people who can be counted as human beings but who cannot be 
regarded as "prospective purposive agents", such as foetuses, new-born 
babies, very young children, the severely mentally-handicapped and the like. 
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These people, for different reasons, cannot do facto undertake prudential 
reasoning (which leads the prospective purposive agent to claim and pursue 
freedom and well-being, and to recognize other agents' rights to freedom 
and well-being on the grounds that if he does not respect other agents' 
rights his own rights will not be respected by others), let alone moral 
reasoning (which leads to the agent's unconditional respect for other 
agents' rights). So, it can be suggested that as Gewirth's arguments for 
equal human rights are based on the reasoning and undertaking of the 
prospective purposive agent, so the equal human rights justified in this 
way can apply to the prospective purposive agent, but-not other agents. 
Actually, Gewirth is aware of this problem. And he admits that the term of 
"prospective purposive agents" only refers to "normal humans"; that is, 
persons who can control their behaviour freely and purposively. From this, 
he acknowledges that human beings who are not prospective and purposive 
do not enjoy the same equal human rights as normal humans. (16) 
In the light of Gewirth's own admission, it then can be suggested that his 
arguments can at most justify the equal human rights of normal humans. 
The discrepancy between Gewirth's arguments and his proposition that all 
human beings can have equal human rights can be rectified in two ways. 
One can either modify his main proposition or strengthen his arguments. 
This, however, is not a task to be undertaken here. 
To conclude. As far as children's rights are concerned, Gewirth's arguments 
for equal human rights fail to provide a solid ground on which children's 
human rights can be claimed. The failure to justify the major premise that 
all human beings can have equal human rights subsequently makes the minor 
premise and the conclusion unconvincing. Without a persuasive and coherent 
argument for the major premise on which the idea of children's rights can 
depend, the traditional justification for children's rights is bound to fail. 
1.2 The Interest Principle and Children's Rights 
Another general statement that may give grounds for claiming, "Children 
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have rights", is provided by Feinberg. On the issue of animal rights, 
Feinberg maintains that as long as beings can have interests they can have 
rights and beings incapable of having interests are incapable of having 
rights. In other words, to have interests is a logically necessary and 
sufficient condition for beings to be the subjects of rights. (17) Given 
Feinberg's proposition, it then can be said that since children can have 
interests, they can have rights. Following this syllogism, it can be 
suggested that since children can have rights there is no reason not to 
accord rights to them given the condition that other agents (such as adults) 
who can have rights do have rights. 
One thing should be done before we can examine whether Feinberg provides 
a satisfactory argument for his proposition. As the concept of "interests" 
plays a key role in Feinberg's proposition it is therefore worthwhile paying 
attention to this concept in the first place. Generally, the concept of 
"interests" can be meaningful in two contexts. In the first, when we say 
that "A has an interest in X" it means that "A is interested in X". In the 
second, when we say that "A has an interest in X" it means that "X Is in As 
interest". (18) In the former case, the connection between A and X is built 
on the condition that A possesses some kind of psychological propensity 
which makes A feel interested in X. In other words, A must be a conative 
being. It is not so, however, in the latter case. In the latter case, A may or 
may not be a conative being. For example, it is quite common for us to say 
that unleaded petrol is in the interests of our natural environment. Thus, 
the connection between A and X can be either a psychological one or a 
purely instrumental one. 
Between these two senses of "interests", which does Feinberg adopt? 
According to Regan's analysis, Feinberg's use of "interests" Is in the first 
sense; that is, "interests" in the sense of psychological propensity of 
conative beings. (19) Hence, in Feinberg's scheme, beings who can have 
rights are exactly those beings who can be psychologically interested in 
things. It is in this context that Feinberg argues that since animals can 
have interests they can have rights and that since mere things cannot have 
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Interests they cannot have rights. It is also in this context that we can 
assume that children can have rights on the grounds that children are 
conative beings and are capable of being interested in things. 
After the clarification of Feinberg's position, we are better placed to 
examine his argument for the proposition that only beings who can be 
interested in things can have rights. In effect, Feinberg does not labour the 
point. He provides two reasons for it. In the first place, he claims that "a 
right-holder must be capable of being represented and it is impossible to 
represent a being that has no interests. " Second, "a right-holder must be 
capable of being a beneficiary in his own person, and a being without 
interests is a being that is incapable of being harmed or benefited, having 
no good or'sake' of its own. "(20) 
We now can ask: can Feinberg's two reasons supporting the proposition that 
"beings who can have rights are those who can have interests" constitute a 
satisfactory justification for his proposition? It seems the answer is 
negative. Feinberg's first reason for-supporting his proposition is rather an 
assertion. He does not make clear why, a being without psychological 
propensity cannot be represented. Even it' he made it clear, it can still be 
suggested that this judgement is not sound. For it is not difficult to come 
across some counter-evidence which goes against Feinberg's position. For 
example, a dead person, who cannot have psychological propensity, can still 
be represented and hence can have rights. To propose that the right-holder 
must be the being who can have psychological propensity is to oppose the 
legal practice that is commonly accepted. As to the suggestion that a 
right-holder must be capable of being a beneficiary in his own person, it 
seems that, this judgement, too, cannot stand the test of legal practice in 
which even though a dead man cannot have benefit in his own person he can 
still have rights. (21) Taken together, it is dubious whether Feinberg 
provides a satisfactory justification for his proposition on which the idea 
of children's rights can be based. 
Further, even if Felnberg's two judgements could be taken as non- 
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problematic, it can still be argued that his concept of interests would make 
the justification for children's rights mentioned above unsatisfactory. As 
has been mentioned, the concept of interests in Feinberg's theory is based 
on psychological propensity in relation to the object of rights. However, it 
is worth going further to point out that this psychological propensity is by 
no means a primitive propensity; on the contrary, it is a highly 
sophisticated psychological capacity of which some human beings may be 
incapable. In Feinberg's own words: 
Interests are compounded out of desires and ahns;: both of which - 
presuppose something like belief, or cognitive awareness. A 
desiring creature may want X because he seeks anything that is 0, 
and X appears to be 0 to him; or he may be seeking Y, ana he believes, 
or expects, or hopes that X will be a means to Y. If he desires X In 
order to get Y, this implies that he believes that X will bring Y about, 
or at least that he has some sort of brute expectation that Is a 
primitive correlate of be]lef. (22) 
Based on this statement, it can be suggested that the relation between the 
agent's desires (or aims) and the agent's interests is a highly Instrumental 
one. A being who can have interests must be a being . who Is capable of 
believing that for the sake of satisfying his desire Y or achieving his aim Z 
he must take action X. By this standard as argued by Regan, some beings 
who can have beliefs, desires and interests - such as the severely 
disoriented, retarded but sentient offspring of human parents - but cannot 
have the particular kind of beliefs or interests specified by Feinberg are 
excluded from the subjects that can have rights. And it is against the 
widely accepted judgement that those human beings can, and should, have 
rights. So, to put it plainly, what Feinberg's arguments can achieve 
concerning animal rights is that only animals of the higher orders rather 
than all animals can have rights. This criticism is also relevant to the 
Issue of children's rights. It can be suggested that Feinberg's position can 
only justify the rights of some children who can have the sort of interests 
he describes. The very young child or foetus who does not have Interests in 
Feinberg's sense cannot have rights. 
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To conclude. Feinberg's position in regard to the subjects of rights does 
pave the way to a justification for children's rights. However, his 
arguments are not convincing and are at most assertions. More importantly, 
his concept of interest is too narrow to grant universal rights to all 
children; children who are incapable of having interests in his sense cannot 
have rights. 
2. JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
With a view to avoiding some of the difficulties from which the traditional 
justification for children's rights suffers, a justification of children's 
rights has been developed by Worsfold, using Rawls' theory of Justice. In 
this section, Rawls' theory of justice will firstly be sketched; after the 
sketching of Rawls' theory, Worsfold's justification of children's rights 
based on Rawls' theory will then be summarized. Against the background of 
Rawls' theory and Worsfold's Rawlsian justification of children's rights, it 
is hoped to demonstrate that Worsfold's Rawlsian arguments are flawed in 
several respects and hence can hardly constitute a satisfactory 
justification for children's rights. Finally, it will be shown that Rawlsian 
arguments for children's rights would be more appropriately based on 
Rawls' concepts of "considered judgements" and "Justification". (23) 
However, it will be argued that Rawls' concepts of considered judgements 
and justification are not free from difficulties. On the whole, this section 
is aimed at showing that the Rawlsian justification for children's rights is 
problematic and therefore unworkable. 
Rawls' theory of justice emerges against the background that "society is a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage". Even though society is 
characterized by cooperation for pursuing each member's interests 
(benefits, or advantages), it is also marked by the fact that each member of 
society has conflicting interests. Thus society has two distinct 
characteristics. First of all, cooperation is a "must" on the grounds that 
without cooperation a better life for each member of society is impossible 
to achieve. This implies that there is an identity of interests in society. 
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Second, the identity of interests in society does not disguise the fact that 
there is also a conflict of interests. For each member of society has 
different viewpoints over how interests resulting from cooperation should 
be distributed given that each member tends to claim a larger share for 
himself. A set of principles is therefore required to regulate conduct so as 
to protect each member's interests and to guarantee that interests 
generated from cooperative undertakings can be satisfactorily distributed. 
In Rawls' own words, these principles, as social principles of justice, 
"provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of 
society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation. "(24) 
But how can the principles of social justice be satisfactorily drawn up, 
unobjectionably accepted, and wholeheartedly endorsed by each member of 
society? In Rawls' theory, this question is sorted out by his concept of 
"justice as fairness". To put it briefly, the essential point of "justice as 
fairness" is that "the principles of justice are the result of a fair 
agreement or bargain". (25) The key question, then, is: how can the 
substantive principles of justice be the result of a -fair agreement or 
bargain? In order to give an answer, Rawls sets up the device of "the 
original position". Rawls' original position is another version of "the state 
of nature" described by Hobbes. (26) One of the main differences between 
the original position and the state of nature is, however, that participants 
in the original position are required to live under "the veil of ignorance". 
The veil of ignorance deters the participants in the original position from 
knowing particular knowledge about themselves. They know neither their 
social status, natural assets or abilities, intelligence, strength, and the 
like, nor their own particular life plans and their own psychological 
propensities. (27) But significantly, they retain their rationality in the 
sense that they are capable of taking the most effective means to ends. 
They are also capable of having a conception of the good (the capacity of 
knowing the constituent goods for any life plan) and a sense of justice (the 
capacity to understand and to act upon the principles of justice); their 
capacities are equal. Moreover, they are self-interested and mutually- 
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disinterested. (28) 
The main task of the participants in the original position, as has been 
mentioned, is to choose, through the process of deliberation, basic social 
principles which are supposed to regulate their own lives and any political, 
economic, or social institutions that are fundamental in their society. In 
Rawls' scheme, two principles of- justice are eventually chosen by all 
participants. The first principle is that "each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty 
for others. " The second principle is that "social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. " 
Between these two principles, Rawls gives priority to the first principle; 
that is, that equal liberties cannot, in any case, be violated on the grounds 
that violations can bring forward greater social and economic advantages. 
Within the second principle, part (b) has priority over part (a). (29) 
What, then, is the connection between Rawls' two principles of justice and 
rights? It is worth noting that Rawls' main concern is social justice rather 
than rights. This, however, does not mean that Rawls' theory of justice 
cannot be a theory of rights as well. (30) Most evidently, the first principle 
of justice is actually a principle of equal right to liberties., The liberties 
specified by Rawls are: "political liberty (the right to vote and the right to 
be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and 
assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the 
person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of 
law. "(31) With regard to the second principle, it seems that the principle is 
not closely relevant to the language of rights, but this need not be the case. 
It may not be unreasonable to claim that according to the second principle 
of justice everyone has a right to equal opportunity to political or social 
positions or offices. And, based on part (a) of the second principle, It might 
be said that everyone has a right to benefit from any social or economic 
inequalities. This interpretation may incur the criticism that the language 
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of rights is too heavily favoured. Nevertheless, it can be argued that it at 
least sounds reasonable, and is not incompatible with our widely used 
linguistic expressions. 
If the connection between basic rights and Rawls' theory can be established 
as described above, a viable approach to justifying children's rights will 
not be too difficult to find in the context of Rawls' theory of justice. 
Worsfold has demonstrated this approach. 
To begin ' with, Worsfold suggests that children in Rawls'. theory are 
participants in the original position "to the extent-that they are capable". 
(32) If this point can be established, an argument can be developed along 
these lines: since capable children are members in the original position, 
they also contribute to the choosing of the two principles of justice and 
hence they, like adults, should be subject to the two principles of justice; 
in other words, they are entitled to have all sorts of rights encapsulated in 
the two principles of justice. 
How about children who have not reached "the age of reason" and thus do not 
have the necessary capacities for participating in the choosing of, the 
principles of justice? With regard to this question, Worsfold refers to 
Rawls' position that the criterion for judging whether a person is a member 
of society and hence can be regulated and protected by the two principles of 
justice is the capacity for moral personality (that is, a conception of the 
good and a sense of justice) rather than the realization of that moral 
personality. (33) Thus, from the fact that children have the capacity for 
being moral persons they should receive the full protection of the 
principles of justice. That is to say, children who have not fully reached 
the age of reason should also have rights. 
In addition to the emphasis on the "capacity" rather than the "realization" 
of moral personality as the criterion of being a member of society, 
Worsfold indirectly refers to Rawls' claim that the participants in the 
original position are regarded as "representing family lines with ties of 
108 
sentiment between successive generations" and therefore the participants 
in the original position also have duties and obligations to future 
generations. Given the imposition of duties and obligations towards future 
generations, the two principles of justice that regulate the present 
generation should also regulate the relations between persons at different 
moments of time. This means that not only children but also the generation 
who are to come should have rights. (34) 
Apart from the arguments above, Rawls' paternalism is also invoked by 
Worsfold to support the point that children are protected by Rawls' two 
principles of justice. Rawls' argument runs as follows. The principles of 
justice are worked out from the original position in which the participants 
are rational but under the veil of ignorance. However, after the two 
principles are chosen, the participants in the original position would think 
of a less significant but still important issue. That is, if the veil of 
ignorance is removed and some of them find out that their powers' are 
underdeveloped and hence cannot pursue their own interests (as in the case 
of children), who is going to take care of them? In order to insure against 
this possibility, Rawls maintains that paternalism would be acknowledged 
in the original position with a view to protecting the participants "against 
the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will in society". (35) 
Nevertheless, the argument goes, although paternalism can be acknowledged 
in the original position, its application has some qualifications: In the 
first place, paternalistic intervention should take into account the 
viewpoint of the subjects in question at the time any decision is to be 
made. To be more specific, the agent who makes any paternalistic decision 
for others has to make sure that what he is doing is in the interests of the 
subjects concerned and will be accepted by the subjects when they gain (or, 
regain) their rational powers. Besides, Rawls also suggests that the way of 
persuading the subjects to accept paternalistic decisions should not 
involve dubious measures, such as brainwashing. Secondly, paternalism 
must be justified by "the evident failure or absence of reason and will". 
Thirdly, and , most importantly, paternalism should 
be guided by the two 
principles of justice and the account of primary goods (which are the 
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essential conditions of any kind of life plan). (36) 
The implication of the acknowledgement of paternalism in the original 
position concerning children can then be that children's welfare should be 
properly looked after, children's will should be respected, and any 
paternalistic conduct should be under the guidance of Rawls' two principle 
of justice and the account of primary goods. Given this framework, it is 
possible to reach a conclusion that "Children have rights", grounded on the 
argument that children's liberty and welfare should be properly taken care 
of and respected. S 
On the whole, Worsfold suggests that Rawls'- theory of justice is a 
framework within which the granting of children's rights is practicable and 
their rights can be assured on the grounds that children are also under the 
protection of the two principles of justice. (37) 
After the elucidation of Rawls' theory of justice and Worsfold's Rawislan 
arguments for children's rights, the focus can be put on the critical 
examination of Worsfold's Rawlsian arguments for children's rights. The 
aim of this examination is to reveal that Worsfold's arguments are flawed 
in several places and hence cannot be reckoned as a satisfactory 
justification for children's rights. Apart from this, it will be shown that 
the idea, of children's rights can indeed be incorporated into Rawls' theory, 
but it is Rawls' concepts of considered judgements and justification, not 
the suggestion that children should also be under the protection of the two 
principles of justice, that pave the way for the justification of children's 
rights. 
Actually, there is an alternative to rejecting Worsfold's arguments. That 
is, we can directly challenge Rawls' theory of justice. It can be suggested 
that if Rawls' contract theory of justice cannot hold, Worsfold's Rawlsian 
arguments for children's rights will subsequently be undermined. (38) This 
approach would, however, divert our attention from the issue of children's 
right to Rawls' contract theory of justice or contract theory in general. in 
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order to concentrate on the issue of children's rights, this approach is not 
adopted here. We now turn our attention to Worsfold's Rawlslan 
justification for children's rights. 
First of all, there Is the issue concerning Worsfold's point that children are 
participants in the original position "to the extent that they are capable" 
and hence they can have rights encapsulated in the two principles of 
justice. It should be recalled that "children" in this thesis refers to, a group 
of people characterized by imperfect rationality, need for guidance and 
protection, and material dependence. It is therefore reasonable to say that 
children who can actively participate in the original position are not the 
main. concern of this thesis. The main concern of this thesis is those 
children who have not reached the age of reason and hence cannot actively 
become involved in the original position. Besides, Rawls does not actually 
make a distinction between adults and children. But it seems reasonable to 
suggest that Rawls' distinction between children and adults would be on the 
competence-criterion rather than the age-criterion. This means that 
agents who are capable of participating In the original position should be 
counted as rational adults. In this sense, Worsfold's first argument for 
children's rights (that children, to the extent that they are capable of 
participating In the original position, have rights) is not relevant and just 
wrongly targeted. It is simply an argument for adults' rights. 
Secondly, as to the argument that having the capacity of moral personality 
is a sufficient condition of being a member in the original position and 
hence children should be protected by the two principles of justice, it can 
be said that the criterion is set up without satisfactory foundation. In 
effect, Rawls admits that he does not provide a literal argument (in the 
sense of drawing a conclusion from premises) for his capacity-criterion. 
He says that this position "seems to be the natural completion of justice as 
fairness. " And, this position "accords with the hypothetical nature of the 
original position, and with the idea that as far as possible the choice of 
principles should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies. "(39) Given 
these statements, it seems that Rawls' position concerning the criterion of 
membership is justified in an extraordinary way. (40) Even if this way of 
justification is accepted, it is still possible to ask: is Rawls' concept of 
justice as fairness theoretically sound? Or, can the hypothetical nature of 
the original position stand the test of empirical experience? The 
implication of these questions is that if Rawls' concept of justice as 
fairness or the original position is challenged, the postulate that the 
capacity of moral personality is the criterion of membership of the original 
position will be subsequently challenged. Moreover, it can be argued that as 
Rawls' criterion of capacity can only be valid given the condition that it is 
part of the concept of "justice as fairness", it is therefore not binding for 
those who are not convinced by Rawls' idea of justice as fairness. Leaving 
aside the domain of justice as fairness, the validity of the capacity of 
moral personality as the criterion of membership is thus dubious. But most 
significantly, Worsfold neglects Rawls' point that the reason why the 
capacity of moral persons as the criterion of membership can be accepted 
and justified (in the Rawlsian sense) is that it is coherent or compatible 
with the ideas of children's rights and infants' rlghts. (41) It is hence 
wrong for Worsfold to invoke Rawls' capacity-criterion to justify the idea 
of children's rights. It should be the other way round. Worsfold simply puts 
the cart before the horse. 
The point that the parties in the original position are supposed to have a 
connection with their successive generations and hence the two principles 
of justice can also apply to children and the future generations to come 
indeed provides a most fruitful line by which the Idea of children's rights 
can be developed and advanced. But it is worth enquiring whether Rawls' 
proposition that the parties in the original position are representing family 
lines is a justified adjustment of his device of the original position in 
which the parties are in a state of ignorance. Indeed, Rawls acknowledges 
that this proposition is an'adjustment of the veil of ignorance. (42) And 
this adjustment can also be vindicated by Rawls' notion of reflective 
equilibrium, by which any proposition concerning the concept of justice as 
fairness is subject to modification. (43) But the problem is whether this 
adjustment is consistent with some other basic propositions concerning 
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the original position. In this case, we are in a position to ask whether "the 
family lines" proposition deviates from the proposition that the parties in 
the original position are self-interested. For, the fact that the 
participants are bound to take the interests of their children and future 
generations into account is, by implication, a sort of benevolent 
undertaking which is not really necessary in Rawls' original position. 
Further, for the sake of argument, there is also a possibility that the 
participants may discover, incidentally, that some other participants are 
actually their family members whom they are supposed to represent. And 
this would contradict Rawls' assumption that the participants in the 
original position are mutually-disinterested. Given these suspicions, it 
then can be suggested that Worsfold's justification of children's rights 
along the family lines proposition is based on a paradox in Rawls' theory. 
Its internal validity is dubious. 
How about Rawls' paternalism? It can be reasoned that even though the 
participants in the original position acknowledge paternalism it does not 
automatically constitute a justification for children's rights. Paternalism 
itself does not necessarily justify children's rights. - The language of 
duties, undertaken by adults and the state, is sufficient in taking care of 
children's welfare and liberty. However, it can be reckoned that 
paternalism plus Rawls' account of primary goods can pave the way for the 
idea of children's rights. But it can be argued that it is the account of 
primary goods, rather than paternalism, that may play the pivotal role in 
justifying children's rights. Unfortunately, it seems Worsfold does not 
fully develop this line of argument. Even if this line of argument were fully 
developed by Worsfold, it can still be suggested that as the account of 
primary goods is a-prerequisite for Rawls' theory of justice it can actually 
be treated independently from Rawls' theory of justice proper. It means 
that the justification of children's rights based on the account of primary 
goods will not really be a distinct Rawlsian justification, which should be 
more appropriately based on "justice as fairness". 
Finally, even if Worsfold is successful in arguing that children should be 
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protected by Rawls' two principles of justice and hence can be granted the 
rights embodied in the two principles, it can still be claimed that those 
rights are virtually empty for children. For, the two principles of justice 
are mainly concerned with political, economic and social rights, which are 
not directly relevant to children's lives qua children. So, even though it can 
be justified that children can have those rights, those rights for children 
are at most nominal, and not significantly meaningful. 
At this stage, it has been argued that Worsfold's Rawlsian justification for 
children's rights is not entirely satisfactory and hence falls to provide a 
solid justification for children's rights. It can however be suggested that 
Worsfold's falling may partly be due to his negligence of what Rawls really 
has said about the idea of children's rights. In the following part of this 
section, it will be demonstrated that it is Rawls' concepts of considered 
judgements and justification that constitute the Rawlslan justification of 
children's rights. 
In discussing the criterion of membership to the original position, Rawls 
assumes that it is the capacity of moral personality rather than the 
realization of moral personality that should be the criterion of receiving 
the full protection of the principles of justice. And in explaining why this 
criterion should be accepted, Rawls says: 
Since infants and children are thought to have basic rights (normally 
exercised on their behalf by parents and guardians), this 
interpretation of the requisite conditions seems necessary to match 
our considered judgements. (44) 
From this statement, it seems that the idea of children's rights, or more 
accurately, the idea or children's basic rights, is considered by Rawls as 
one of our considered judgements, Two questions can then be asked. First, 
what are considered judgements? Second, what does It mean to say that 
the idea of children's rights is one of our considered judgements? 
In Rawls' scheme, considered judgements are "those judgements in which 
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our moral capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion. " 
(45) As to the question of how considered judgements can be formed, 
Rawls says that considered judgements are "rendered under conditions 
favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice, and therefore in 
circumstances where the more common excuses and explanations for 
making a mistake do not obtain. "(46) Given Rawls' definition of considered 
judgements and his explanation of how considered judgements can be 
worked out, it then can be understood that the reason why considered 
judgements are to be accepted is that they are judgements that we 
normally make under conditions in which we can fully exercise our moral 
capacities in general and our sense of justice in particular. In other words, 
considered judgements are those judgements that we, as moral persons, 
normally make and accept; sometimes intuitively, sometimes after 
reflection. 
Following these lines, it can be seen that the judgement that children have 
basic rights, as recognized by Rawls as a considered judgement, should be 
counted as a judgement that is sanctioned and accepted by moral persons. 
The implication of this concerning the justification of children's rights is 
then that the justification of children's rights can be achieved by 
identifying the idea of children's rights as one of our considered 
judgements. But, it can he asked, why can a judgement that stands the test 
of our sense of justice be reckoned as a considered judgement and be 
justified? With regard to this question, Rawls' general views about 
political theory or political judgements can provide some inspiration. 
Following Kant(47), Rawls does not think that his stipulations about the 
theory of justice can be proved on theoretical grounds. That is why he 
particularly emphasizes that the aim of justice as fairness, as a political 
conception, is practical not metaphysical. (48) Rawls seems to hold the 
view that the justification of political judgements should not be made by 
theoretical reason; it should rather be made by practical reason. In this 
sense, any political judgement can be regarded as justified as long as the 
political judgement concerned can be accepted and endorsed as a result of 
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deliberation generated by our moral capacities given a specific political 
framework. The reason why the idea of children's rights, as a peripheral 
political judgement, can be counted as justified is exactly on the grounds 
that it can be, or should be, accepted and endorsed in our daily life. 
However, as Rawls does not say much about the issue of children's rights, it 
seems hasty to take the idea of children's rights as a considered judgement 
only because of his single statement. - it would be better to take the 
Judgement that children have rights as an ordinary judgement and see 
whether it can be justified. (Worsfold's attempt is generally based on this 
idea[49J, and it has already been shown that his attempt is unsatisfactory. ) 
Or, even if some people insist that the judgement,. "Children have rights", 
should be taken as a considered judgement, it can still be pointed out that 
even considered judgements need justification in Rawls' theory based on 
Rawls' concept of "reflective equilibrium" (or match theory). (50) Given 
this, another attempt for supporting the idea of children's rights can be 
started from Rawls' concept of justification. 
The idea of justification in political theory, on Rawls' view, should not be 
regarded "simply as valid argument from listed premises, even should these 
premises be true. "(51) What then is a justification in political theory? In 
Rawls' case, justification should start from a common consensus that the 
parties in question recognize as true or acceptable. (52) A consensual 
position is the footing on which a working agreement on the fundamental 
questions can be struck. But, how can this communal consensus be 
achieved? Rawls suggests that it is achieved not through any 
epistemological, metaphysical or a priori argument, but through the 
extraction of fundamental intuitive ideas which are implicit or latent in 
the public culture of a democratic society and which constitute the basis of 
the concept of "justice as fairness". (53) Further, it can be asked, how can a 
justification in a political context be finalized? In this respect, Rawls 
says that "justification is a matter of the mutual support of many 
considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view. "(54) 
Taken together, the justification of a particular judgement can be done 
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through a coherent viewpoint formed by the argument concerned and many 
other related considerations, which include considered judgements. 
Given the understanding of Rawls' concept of justification, it then can be 
suggested that the idea of children's rights can be justified through the 
demonstration that this idea is coherent with the whole device of justice 
as fairness. Several ideas in Rawls' theory are justified in this way. 
Paternalism and the idea that the capacity of moral personality should be 
the criterion of membership in the original position are two distinct 
examples. If the idea of children's rights is only regarded as a judgement 
that is waiting for justification, then Rawls' justification would run 
roughly as follows. First, he would persuade us to accept his concept of 
justice as fairness. After that, he would convince us that the two 
principles of justice are the only viable choice for the democratic 
constitution given the framework of justice as fairness. As long as major 
political, social and economic issues are sorted out, Rawls would then ask 
us to contemplate some special cases, such as children. Children, it can be 
recalled, area group of people who are not properly equipped with the 
necessary means which can make them actively participate in the original 
position. The idea of children's rights would be proffered under this 
condition. It now can be seen that the idea of children's rights is 
independently proposed in relation to the concept of justice as fairness and 
the two principles of justice. Its justification is not dependent upon 
whether there is a logical, or epistemological connection between the idea 
of children's rights and the concept of fairness or the two principles of 
justice; it is rather dependent on whether the idea concerned is compatible, 
or coherent, with considered judgements, say, the two principles of justice. 
But how can moral persons with the sense of justice and a conception of 
the good reject the proposition that children should have rights, given the 
understanding that rights are necessary goods for any moral person to 
pursue in realizing his own life plan? They do not really have reasons to 
refute this proposition. Some of them have their own children, some of 
them would consider the possibility that they might one day lose their 
abilities and hence become childlike, some of them would think that 
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children are extremely important for society as a whole or for their own 
welfare, and some would tend to think that it is not moral to disregard 
other persons' rights owing to the fact that they themselves value the 
importance of rights. So, there is no reason to reject this proposition. 
Given this understanding, we now can conclude that so long as cases 
against the idea of children's rights are not sustainable, the idea of 
children's rights should then be accepted, or justified. 
Given the demonstration above, it can now be understood that the Rawlsian 
justification of children's rights is actually geared to Rawls' concepts of 
considered judgements and justification, not paternalism or any other 
-points put forward by Worsfold. However, two key questions can be asked. 
First, is Rawls' claim that the idea of children's rights is a considered 
judgement sufficient to justify the idea of children's rights? Second, can 
Rawls' concept of justification be taken as a starting point from which the 
argument for children's rights can develop? 
With regard to the first question, it can be pointed out that Rawls actually 
admits that some considered judgements are subject to "certain 
irregularities and distortion despite the fact that they are rendered under 
favorable circumstances. "(55) Besides, it can also be suggested that 
considered judgements, or at least some considered judgements, are 
contingent upon changing situations. To be more specific, it may be asked: 
why is the idea of children's moral rights not a considered judgement in 
Hart's early version of the will theory? This question can lead us to 
assume that considered judgements are not fixed, they are contingent on 
changeable circumstances. If this is the case, it will then be inadequate to 
assume that the idea of children's rights is one of our considered 
Judgements and hence argue that its justification is achieved on the 
grounds that it is a considered judgement. We have to demonstrate what 
are the possible reasons that make the idea of children's rights a 
considered judgement. Failing to do this is to justify the idea of children's 
rights by assertion. 
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As to the second question concerning the Rawlsian justification of 
children's rights developed from his concept of justification, it can be 
suggested that this justification is not a solid justification at all. For, the 
idea of children's rights in this form of justification only plays a 
peripheral role. The basis of this justification is those pre-set considered 
judgements, not the idea of children's rights. Moreover, the idea of 
children's rights justified in this way is actually disposable. A coherent 
moral or political framework can be maintained without the language of 
children's rights. The functions that the idea of children's rights are 
supposed to carry out can also be achieved by the Idea that adults or the 
state have duties towards children. In other words, the idea of children's 
rights is not really a necessary part of a coherent moral or political 
system, and this makes the justification of children's rights a side issue. 
To sum up. Rawls' theory of justice and his comments concerning children 
are one of the sources from which a justification for children's rights can 
be developed. Worsfold's Rawlsian justification for children's rights does 
focus on the status of children and their relationships with adults and the 
state and hence avoids the first weakness that the traditional justification 
of children's rights has. But Worsfold's justification is problematic in 
several places, some self-made and some deriving from problems embedded 
in Rawls' theory. It is shown that Worsfold's justification is actually not 
the Rawlsian justification proper. The Rawlsian - justification for 
children's rights should be more appropriately based on Rawls' suggestion 
that the idea of children's rights is one of our considered judgements; or, 
one step back, the Rawlsian justification of children's rights should start 
from Rawls' assumption that justification, in political contexts, is a 
business of fitting various things together. It is then suggested that the 
Rawisian justifications for children rights are also not entirely successful. 
The Rawlsian justification fails to point out the possible reasons which 
make the idea of children's rights a considered judgement. The 
justification developed from Rawls' concept of justification shifts the 
main focus from the issue of children's rights to some other predetermined 
propositions. On the whole, it is argued in this section that Rawisian 
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justifications for children's rights are not convincing. This implies that a 
satisfactory justification for children's rights is needed. 
3. A JUSTIFICATION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
In the foregoing two sections, the difficulties embedded in the traditional 
justifications and the Rawlsian justifications for children's rights have 
been considered. The traditional justifications for children's rights often 
fall to provide convincing arguments for the major premises from which 
the idea of children's rights can be deduced; and, even if valid arguments 
can be offered in supporting the major premises, the traditional 
justifications may. still incur the criticism that the idea of children's 
rights justified as such is characteristically a syllogistic conclusion and 
fails to inspire the moral sentiments needed for putting the idea into 
practice. As to the Rawlsian justifications for children's rights, it was 
pointed out that Worsfold's justification is not quite in line with Rawls' 
general theory. Further, the Rawisian justification does not spell out the 
reasons why the idea of children's rights should be counted as a considered 
judgement; and even if Rawls' proposition concerning children's rights is 
accepted, his account of "justification" still remains an obstacle to the 
whole enterprise of the justification of children's rights in the sense that 
the issue of children's rights would become a disposable side-issue rather 
than an essential main issue. 
In this section, it is hoped to provide a more satisfactory justification for 
children's rights. The aims of this justification are twofold. One is to 
avoid the difficulties from which the two sorts of justification discussed 
above suffer. The other aim is to cultivate a justification that can be 
understood and accepted without serious difficulty by ordinary people, 
especially parents, on the grounds that the issue of children's rights should 
not be taken only as a theoretical issue but a practical issue that concerns 
our daily life. 
To start, the concept of justification in this section should be explained. 
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Following Rawls, "justification" is not regarded "simply as valid argument 
from listed premises, even should these premises be true. "(56) 
Justification in this section is rather taken as argument (or a set of 
arguments) that reveals the acceptability as well as the necessity of the 
idea or practice concerned. To be more specific, a satisfactory 
justification for children's rights should be required to show two things. 
First of all, it should demonstrate that the idea of children's rights can be 
accepted by rational persons in our modern society. "Rational persons" is 
understood as persons who can take proper actions to protect their own 
interests. Apart from their concern for self-interest, rational persons also 
show concern for other people. Their concern for other people is generally 
based on two reasons. One is that if they do not pay attention to other 
people's interests their own interests would be directly and indirectly 
affected. The other is that they would feel better if people surrounding 
them can also have their interests properly protected; - rational persons are 
persons with the sentiments of justice and benevolence. In other words, 
the former reason is a prudential one, and the latter a moral one. The 
primary characteristic of modern society, to put it simply, is its 
advancement of technology. Under normal circumstances, each member of 
modern society can have his subsistence maintained through the operation 
of the state due to the success of modern technology. This characteristic 
goes hand in hand with the idea that the interests of each member of 
society should be taken seriously, which is either an intuitive idea of 
rational persons or an idea based on the deliberation of rational persons. 
How this idea is put into practice depends upon the different political 
ideologies each nation state holds and to what extent each member's 
interests can actually be protected. Given these qualifications, the first 
step of justifying children's rights is to show that the idea of children's 
rights can be accepted by rational persons - who are self-interested, 
prudent, just and benevolent - under the condition that the interests of 
each member of society can and should be protected. 
Having said this, it should be noted that the notion of justification in the 
justifying of the acceptability of children's rights is actually not far from 
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Rawls' concept that "justification is a matter of the mutual support of 
many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent 
view. "(57) The difference, however, is that the justification that will be 
offered is going to appeal directly to rational persons and see whether the 
idea of children's rights can be incorporated into, or accommodated to, the 
received ideas that rational persons have. The aim is not to demonstrate or 
propose the connections of the idea of children's rights with other 
considered judgements and some basic social principles normally held. The 
Rawlsian justification appears to be too complicated and too intellectual 
for ordinary people and hence fails to meet the need of providing a 
desirable justification of children's rights for ordinary people. 
Nevertheless, the justification of the acceptability of children's rights may 
still not avoid the criticism that the idea of children's rights justified as 
such is only a side issue rather than a main issue. In order to get away 
from this weakness, a satisfactory justification for children's rights 
should in the second stage offer an explanation about why the idea of 
children's rights is necessary or essential in maintaining or cultivating 
satisfactory relationships of children to other parties, mainly parents and 
the state. In short, a satisfactory justification of children's rights should 
fulfil the criteria of "rational acceptability" and "practical necessity". 
The arguments aimed at fulfilling these two criteria will be demonstrated 
as follows. 
It was particularly emphasized in Chapter One that the language of rights 
is a moral or legal device in terms of describing, regulating and cultivating 
human relationships. Following this, to argue that children can and should 
have rights is another way of arguing that the language of rights can and 
should be reciprocally invoked to describe, regulate and cultivate the 
relationships of children to other parties. However, it can be recalled that 
the idea of children's rights was not fashionable in the past, and the 
practice of children's rights is a recent social fact. There was a time in 
which neither the notion of a right nor the idea of children's rights had a 
part to play. It is therefore quite legitimate to enquire why the notion of a 
right can be introduced into our daily life and why the idea of children's 
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rights can be used to prescribe the relationships between children and 
other parties. Or, for those who know little about the historical 
background of the language of rights, it is still legitimate for them to ask 
why the ideas of rights and children's rights can be widely accepted in our 
daily life. There must be some reasons for the acceptance of rights-talk in 
general and children's rights in particular. With a view to concentrating on 
the question of children's rights, the question concerning why the idea of 
rights can be accepted will not be directly tackled. But it should be borne 
in mind that these two questions are closely interwoven. The answer that 
will be offered for the one will also be relevant to the other. 
There are several reasons why the idea and practice of children's rights can 
be accepted by rational persons in modern society. 
First of all, it seems that the introduction of the idea and practice of 
children's rights would not do much harm to modern society. Having said 
this, it should be noted that the idea of children's rights may indeed pose 
potential dangers for some specific human societies. In a relatively 
primitive society, such as Sparta, the introduction of the idea of children's 
rights may have some serious implications for the survival of that society. 
Supposing the idea of children's rights were a received moral and legal 
judgement in Sparta, it can then be reasoned that the killing of unhealthy 
young children" would be condemned as immoral as well as illegal and 
hence would be prohibited. The possible consequences of this received 
judgement would be quite significant for the Spartans. For it can be 
imagined that because of this received judgement Sparta would have to 
allocate part of Its resources to looking after unhealthy children, and 
subsequently unhealthy adults, who can contribute very little to the build- 
up of the Spartan national strength and wealth which are extremely 
important for its survival. Consequently, it may put Sparta In an 
disadvantageous position against its foreign subjects or enemies and 
eventually lead to its demise. This hypothetical case can be used to 
exemplify the point that the idea of children's rights (or human rights) 
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might do harm - "harm" in one particular sense - to society as a whole and 
hence would not be accepted. Nevertheless, it can be contemplated that 
this plight will not occur in our modern society, in which natural 
resources, due to modern technology, are relatively abundant to support 
some "useless" persons without endangering society as a whole. To accept 
the idea of children's rights, therefore, would cost relatively little in 
modern society and would not do much harm to it. 
Secondly, it can be suggested that the acceptance of children's rights 
would not only do little harm to modern society but also promote human 
happiness. As an idea (or ideal), the idea of children's rights Is invented 
with a view to cultivating satisfactory human relationships between 
children and other parties and to providing a minimal safety net for 
children. It is good for children in the first place. For it can provide some 
definitive constraints by which the undertakings of parents, adults and the 
state are regulated, and children's welfare as well as freedoms can 
therefore be discreetly protected. It is also good for parents. For the Idea 
of children's rights and its derivative measures can provide some concrete 
guidance by which parents can proceed. They hence- would feel more 
informed and exempt from indeterminacy and uncertainty in conducting 
their actions towards their children. The possible benefits of this may be 
that they do not have to work out which specific actions they should take. 
The idea of children's rights and its various specifications can tell parents 
what they should do and what they should avoid concerning children's 
welfare or freedoms. But it is not this convenience that would benefit 
parents the most; it is rather that satisfactory relationships between 
children and parents would bring about one of the the most fruitful results 
for parents. That is: the feeling of satisfaction and happiness for parents. 
It can nevertheless be asked: how can it be? Why would parents feel happy 
about the satisfactory parents-children relationships established at the 
expense of their own material advantages? It can be suggested that it is 
because satisfactory parents-children relationships can give expression to 
the assumed natural bond between parents and children so that parents' 
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sense or achievement or self-esteem can be satisf Ied by the actualization 
of this natural bond. Apart from this, Hume's moral theory can be used to 
explain why parents or any rational adults will be inclined to accept the 
idea of children's rights given the condition that this idea is originally 
aimed at beneritting children. 
According to Hume, "the benevolent or softer affections are estimable; and 
wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will of 
mankind. "(58) Hume's point is underpinned by his general position that 
benevolent dispositions with a view to the interests of society should be 
reckoned as the origin of morality. (59) Notably, he says: 
The epithets sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful 
friendly, generous, beneflcient, or their equivalents, are known in 
all languages, and universally express the highest merit, which 
human nature is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities 
are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display 
themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, 
they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank or 
human nature, and make them approach in some measure to the 
divine . (60) 
Based on Hume's account, it can be said that the acceptance of the idea and 
practice of children's rights will be quite in line with our benevolent 
dispositions which are directed to the benefit of others.. To benefit other 
people within our reach can manifest the highest merit" we have and fulfil 
our moral capacity, which in turn can vindicate the value of human beings 
and bring out the greatest satisfaction that rational persons as moral 
agents can have. Following this line, it can be claimed that our benevolent 
dispositions can lead us to accept the idea and practice of children's rights; 
and, conversely, the acceptance of the idea and practice of children's rights 
is the embodiment of our benevolent dispositions In the social context. (6 1) 
In other words, the acceptance and actualization of children's rights may 
not only benefit children but also do good, in the way of self-fulfilment, to 
parents or any rational persons as the benefactors. It maximizes the 
happiness of all agents Involved in the acceptance and fulfilment of 
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children's rights. 
Moreover, some conceivable practical benefits for the benefactors, 
especially parents, can also be delivered by the acceptance and fulfilment 
of children's rights. For example, satisfactory parents-children 
relationships based on the fulfilment of children's rights may pave the way 
for a more secure backing, emotionally and materially, for parents when 
they are senile. This is because their children would feel more obliged to 
provide caring surroundings for their elderly parents in return for the care 
they received when they were young. 
To be sure, the acceptance, and fulfilment of children's rights will 
unavoidably cause inconveniences and extra burdens for parents and related 
adults due to the fact that they have to satisfy all sorts of requirements 
directed from the prescription of children's rights. But, by and large, if the 
gains and the losses of the acceptance and fulfilment of children's rights 
are weighed, it can be reckoned that the gains would exceed the losses. lt 
is especially so given all factors taken into account, such as that the state 
would share the burdens with parents and parents' psychological 
satisfaction would mitigate the troubles that would go with the practice of 
children's rights. 
We can even go further to suggest that the idea and practice of children's 
rights can also benefit, directly and indirectly, the state. To put it simply, 
as the idea and practice of children's rights may lead to satisfactory 
relationships between children and the state, based on established 
reciprocal relationships, the state would then be in a better position to ask 
its would-be citizens to fulfil their duties towards it: Besides, as the 
state has a close relation with the family, the satisfactory parents- 
children relationships based on the fulfilment of children's rights would 
indirectly have a positive impact on the functioning of the state. 
Taken together, if we make a calculation concerning the utility of 
children's rights it would not be difficult to find out that the idea and 
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practice of children's rights may bring about more advantages than 
disadvantages. It follows that the acceptance of children's rights is a more 
reasonable and rational undertaking than the opposite of it. 
However, it can be argued that the above demonstration does not have 
sufficient empirical backing; it does not "prove" that the advantages that 
the idea and practice of children's rights may bring forth will definitely be 
greater than the disadvantages that go with it. And, It is difficult to claim 
that a society equipped with the idea and practice of children's rights is 
generally much better than a society without them. = Moreover, it can be 
argued that the Issue of children's rights, or rights In general, should not be 
contingent upon the calculation of advantages and disadvantages. It should 
be more geared to the concept of justice in its most common form; that is, 
children should have their own due irrespective of the consequences. 
In the face of the first objection above, what can be said is that it is 
indeed difficult for anyone to "prove" that the introduction of children's 
rights would generate more advantages than disadvantages. All that can be 
suggested Is that the idea of children's rights is appealing to our modern 
mind. And it is an idea that rational persons in modern society would be 
happy to live with. It is good not only because. it may bring about more 
advantages than disadvantages but also because if it is not actualized 
children would probably suffer and rational adults (especially, parents) 
would fail to realize their moral capacity and hence would degrade 
themselves as moral agents in the framework of our modern society. With 
regard to the contention that there is no evidence to show that a society 
with children's rights is better than one without them, it can be replied 
that this contention does indeed make sense. But it seems quite possible 
that no rational persons in our modern world would opt for the society 
without the idea and practice of children's rights. It is not only for the 
sake of their own children but also for the fear that that sort of society 
may degrade human beings as moral agents. 
As to the claim that the issue of children's rights should be geared to the 
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concept of justice rather than the calculation of utility, it can be noted 
that the above account concerning the advantages and disadvantages of 
children's rights should not be counted as a commitment to any particular 
form of utilitarianism, though it does employ the reasoning that 
utilitarians normally adopt. It should be regarded as an account committed 
to the general welfare of society as a whole. For it has presupposed that 
rational persons as moral agents would feel insulted if the welfare of 
individuals is not properly protected. In this sense, the account provided 
will not necessarily lead to the weakness from which utilitarianism 
generally suffers; that is, individual rights can be forfeited for the sake of 
the interests of the majority. In other words, the account provided has 
implied the concept of justice in its most common form. 
Up to this point, the argument for the acceptability of the idea and practice 
of children's rights appeals mainly to the notion of good and evil that 
rational persons normally hold. Actually, it is also possible to appeal 
directly to the conceptions of justice that rational persons have. Apart 
from the appeal to the idea that each individual should have his own due 
(the most common form of the conception of justice), we can also appeal to 
the notion of formal justice: treat equals equally, unequals unequally. Or, 
in a more specific form: human beings should be treated equally unless 
there are sufficient reasons for treating them differently. (There are two 
reasons why other substantive conceptions of justice are not resorted to at 
this point. One, it may be too complicated to make clear what our 
substantive conceptions of justice may be; the other, it is hard to reach a 
consensus over which substantive conception of justice we should appeal 
to. ) 
If we accept the assumption that the sense of formal justice is widely 
shared, we then can claim that in respect of basic human rights children 
should have the same basic rights as adults. It is not the main concern here 
to enquire what the contents of basic human rights are. The main concern 
is to suggest that children's rights can be accepted if our judgements are 
based on our sense of formal justice given the condition that adults can 
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have basic human rights on account of their status as human beings. In the 
light of this reasoning we can even go on to claim that the onus of 
justification in the debate over children's rights should be put on the 
shoulders of those people who are against the idea of children's rights. In 
this sense, the judgement that children should have rights is rather a 
, prima Ixe judgement, its validity should firstly be assumed unless 
reasons can be found to revoke it. Certainly, the appeal to the sense of 
formal justice in this case has its weakness; namely, it has presupposed 
that adults can have basic human rights on account of their status as human 
beings. This is an assertion which needs justification itself. However, 
what can be said is that this weakness is tolerable given the condition that 
the idea of adults' human rights is widely accepted and that the appeal to 
our sense of formal justice goes with other arguments for the idea of 
children's rights. 
On the whole, what has been argued is that the idea and practice of 
children's rights can be accepted if the notions of good and justice adopted 
by rational persons in this modern world are appealed to. Further, it can 
also be suggested that our notions of good and justice can be manifested by 
the acceptance of the idea and practice of children's rights; and, the 
acceptance of children's rights can in turn strengthen our notions of good 
and justice. 
Against the demonstration that the idea and practice of children's rights is 
acceptable, an objection can be raised here. It can be argued that although 
rights-talk concerning children can be invoked or accepted in the 
relationships of children to other parties, it is not really necessary to 
introduce the idea and practice of children's rights. For it is possible to 
imagine a social framework in which children's relationships with other 
parties are regulated by the language of-duties rather than the language of 
rights. Or we can go further to imagine a society in which even the 
language of duties can have no place, let alone rights-talk. Aristotle's 
description of an ideal social framework, given some proper modifications, 
can provide an example of the former case; and Hume has provided an 
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example to exemplify the latter case. 
In his own words, Hume says: 
Again; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue 
the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete 
with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost 
tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own 
interest than for that of his fellows; it seems evident, that the use 
of justice would, in this case, be suspended by such an extensive 
benevolence, nor. would the divisions and barriers of property and 
obligation have ever been thought of. (62) 
What is implied in this statement is that the concept of justice, on which 
the concepts of duties and rights are grounded(63), will have no role to play 
in the human relationships manifested by the sentiment of extensive 
benevolence. Having made this statement, Hume admits that "it would, 
perhaps, be difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections 
. "(64) He, nevertheless, suggests : "... but still we may observe, that 
the case of families approaches towards it.... "(65) Based on these 
statements, it-is clear that Hume does not really take family as a social 
organization in which the sentiment of extensive benevolence always 
prevails; he is rather cautious and therefore suggests that family 
approaches this sort of ideal case. But it seems reasonable to assume that 
the languages of duties and rights are not always necessary in some ideal 
human relationships. And this is more likely the case in a family. (66) 
In Aristotle's scheme, father and mother do not stand on equal terms. The 
parents-children relationships are, strictly speaking, father-children 
relationships. For Aristotle assumes that women's deliberative faculty is 
inferior to men's and their limited faculty makes them incapable of 
standing on an equal footing with men in regard to their children. (67) To be 
sure, this is not acceptable in our modern world. There is another point. 
Aristotle explicitly suggests that "there should be a law that no deformed 
child shall live. "(68) This is, of course, repugnant and unacceptable to 
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most people nowadays. However, if we leave these two extraordinary 
points aside, the social framework described by Aristotle, as far as 
children's relationships with other parties are concerned, is largely a 
society regulated by the language of duties. For example, Aristotle 
suggests that the legislators "should" be certain that infants shall enjoy 
"the highest possible state of physical health". And a series of measures is 
recommended by Aristotle to guarantee this even before babies are born. 
Once babies have been born, Aristotle suggests that the state and the 
family should provide a satisfactory environment for children's physical 
development. After that, he goes further to propose the proper contents of 
training (education) that the state and family should offer for children. (69) 
Given Aristotle's description, it is possible to envisage a duties-bound 
social framework in which the idea of children's rights is not necessary. In 
this society, the relationships between children and other parties are 
mainly described and prescribed by the language of duties. On the one hand, 
parents and the state have duties to bring up and educate children. And, 
children's welfare and freedoms can be properly protected by the 
enforcement of the duties of parents and the state. On the other hand, 
children have duties to respect parents and the law enacted by the state; 
besides, they also have duties to be obedient to their parents and the state. 
In short, this society is mainly regulated by the language of duties. Proper 
and satisfactory relationships between children and other parties are 
achievable by fulfilling and enforcing the reciprocal duties of all parties 
involved. 
On the whole, in the light of the cases described above, the point that 
children's rights are essential and necessary in regulating and cultivating 
the relationships of children to other parties can be repudiated as follows. 
In the first place, it can be claimed that it is love, caring, and the 
sentiment of extensive benevolence that count in the ideal relationships 
between children and other parties. Children's welfare and freedoms would 
be properly respected and looked after without the use of the languages of 
rights and duties. Secondly, even if the sort of ideal human relationships 
described above are not always possible there is still no need to invoke the 
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language of rights. For the language of duties can be effective enough in 
regulating and cultivating the possible satisfactory relationships between 
children and other parties. Taken together, it can be said that although the 
idea and practice of children's rights are justified as acceptable, they are 
not really necessary and hence can be disposed of. In other words, the 
fulfilment of the criterion of rational acceptability is inadequate in 
providing a convincing justification for children's rights. 
In the face of these objections, it can be firstly argued that it is true that 
the idea and practice of children's rights are not necessary given ideal 
relationships between children and other parties. But it is-worth -asking: 
can the ideal relationships of children to other parties be always 
maintained? Empirical evidence can, unfortunately, suggest a negative 
answer to this question. It is known that cases of child abuse are in fact 
not uncommon, even where the idea of children's rights is widely accepted 
in theory. Moreover, if parents are required to reflect on their 
relationships with their children, it can be conjectured that they would 
admit that their relationships with their children are not always ideally 
and harmoniously maintained. There can be various reasons for this. But 
under normal conditions, it is partly that parents, as human beings, are not 
always rational and reasonable enough. When they are irrational and 
unreasonable they may alienate themselves from the virtues they normally 
have. It is also doubtful whether the ideal relationships between children 
and the state can always be maintained given the condition that the people 
who run the state are not always rational and reasonable and that the state 
might be too clumsy and too slow to look after children properly. If the 
ideal relationships are possible but not always maintained, it then can be 
suggested that some sort of moral or legal devices are needed either in 
realizing the ideal relationships or remedying the possible unhealthy 
relationships between children and other parties. In modern society, the 
moral or legal devices designed for doing this are often in the form of the 
language of duties and rights. 
Then, many things can be said against the point that the language of duties 
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can actually do anything that rights-talk is supposed to achieve and hence 
rights-talk is not necessary. To start, it is doubtful to suggest that the 
language of duties can do all that the language of rights is supposed to 
achieve. For some rights, as has been suggested in Chapter One, are not 
correlated with duties. So it is possible to think of a situation in which 
parents or the state have already fulfilled their duties but children's rights 
are still not entirely respected. However, it can still be suggested that 
rights uncorrelated with duties must be unimportant and hence can be 
ignored. Against this objection, it can be replied that this contention 
neglects the point that human relationships embodied in the form of 
rights-talk are quite different from human relationships embodied in the 
language of duties even if they are correlated with each other. 
Writers who assume that the language of duties can do the same as the 
language of rights have often presupposed that the languages of duties and 
rights are like two sides of a coin. These two languages have the same 
denotations and refer to the same entitles. Those entities can be known or 
actualized by contemplating or practising one or the other. On the issue of 
children's rights, if we want to describe or work, out satisfactory 
relationships between children and other parties, what we can do is either 
to invoke or practise the language of duties or the language of rights. But 
writers maintaining that the language of rights is not necessary often go 
on to claim that as the notion of rights Is ambiguous in a way that the 
notion of duties is not, so the language of rights becomes redundant. (70) It 
can however be pointed out that this reasoning is unsound. For it can be 
suggested that even if these two languages refer to the same entities - 
namely, human relationships - and hence can be replaced by each other (to 
use David Lyons' example, "A has a right to be paid ten dollars by B" implies 
and is implied by "B has a obligation to pay ten dollars to A"), it does not 
necessarily follow that one or the other is bound to be redundant or 
unnecessary. It is not difficult to find a case where two terms which refer 
to the same entity have different meanings. Gottlob Frege's example of 
"Evening star" and "Morning star", Betrand Russell's of "Scott" and the "the 
author of Waverley", W. V. O. Quine's of "the term 9" and "the number of the 
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planets", Gilbert Ryle's of "the previous Prime Minister" and "the father of 
Randolph Churchill" are all similar cases. They are different ways of 
referring to one entity, but they are different in meaning. (71) Given these 
cases, it can be argued that although the language of rights and duties may 
refer to the same entities, they nevertheless have different connotations, 
different meanings and different characters. 
To put it crudely, the language of duties and rights are different ways of 
describing and actualizing human relationships. When a person claims that 
he has a right not to be ill-treated, he is claiming that "he", the subject, 
should be considered to be put in some kind of-condition or be exempt from 
some kind of condition and other people should have corresponding -duties to 
respect his right. In other words, other people's undertakings are 
dependent upon the consideration of the right-holder's welfare or freedoms. 
In this sense, rights-talk logically precedes duties. (72) There is a 
different tone when a person claims that other people have duties not to 
ill-treat him. To invoke the language of duties in this context is to resort 
to some existing, public, moral or legal rules which have bearings on the 
issue concerned. The intention of invoking the language of duties is to 
remind the duty-bearers that there are established enforceable rules which 
prescribe or proscribe some specific undertakings. In short, the language 
of rights is a kind of first-person perspective, even though some rights 
can, or must, be claimed by some people on behalf of the right-holder; in 
contrast, the language of duties commands a kind of third-person 
perspective. (73) Given this, it can be suggested that even though the 
languages of rights and duties may refer to the same human relationships 
and may aim at the same ends, they are different vehicles for describing 
and actualizing human relationships. If we follow Wittgenstein, we may 
claim that as the language of rights and duties signify different 
perspectives of human relationships, the one cannot be replaced by the 
other and neither of them will be redundant as long as they are still used. 
However, it can be argued that the above account still does not face the 
contention that the language of duties can be so effectively and efficiently 
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employed that we can totally rely on it in describing and cultivating human 
relationships; and although the language of rights is a different vehicle for 
describing and cultivating human relationships, it is practically disposable. 
With regard to this objection, it can be replied that to employ the language 
of duties to describe and prescribe human relationships is only one way of 
doing this. It is not theway; and it is surely not the most effective way. 
It can be reasoned that satisfactory human relationships are mainly 
contingent on whether the interests (welfare and freedom) of the parties 
involved are properly looked after. The question, however, is: how can we 
be sure that the interests of the parties Involved are always properly 
protected? One way of making sure of this is to invoke the language of 
duties and check whether the parties involved fulfil their duties or not. For 
example, in the relationships between children and parents, from checking 
whether parents fulfil their parental duties we can know, even roughly, 
whether the interests of the children concerned are properly looked after. 
We can use the same method to check the relationships between the state 
and children or any other human relationships. But there is a weakness in 
adopting this method to assure satisfactory human relationships. That is, 
this method may be workable in a relatively static and homogeneous 
society In which the members of society share a consensus over the 
concept of interests, either individual or social. In this context, duties- 
bound rules can be assumed to guarantee all essential interests; social and 
individual. But it may not be the case Is a highly heterogeneous and 
pluralistic society, in which people have different, sometimes very deeply 
held, views over the concept of interests; In other words, there is no 
consensus over the concept of individual and social interests. (74) Given 
this context, the established moral, social, legal and political duties-bound 
rules are inevitably unable to cover all the possible interests that members 
of society may wish to have. The question of what the essential interests 
for individuals and society are Is therefore determined, at least partly, by 
each Individual. It follows that if satisfactory human relationships are to 
be maintained they must be partly based on the ground that individuals can 
claim for their interests, generally and specifically. In other words, the 
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language of rights is essential and necessary, due to its first-person 
perspective, in initiating and cultivating satisfactory human relationships. 
If this point is accepted it can then be reasoned that whether ideal human 
relationships are achieved can be better checked by whether the rights of 
the individuals involved are fully respected. 
In short, the necessity of the language of rights is grounded on the fact 
that it is a first-person perspective by which individuals can initiate, 
propose and devise ideal human relationships and by which we can check 
whether ideal human relationships are achieved. 
A point can however be raised here. It can be argued that the preceding 
argument can at most demonstrate the necessity of the language of rights 
in general, but does not justify the necessity of the idea and practice of 
children's rights. For children do not, in a strict sense, know their own 
interests. Even if they know their own interests they will not be able. to 
claim their own interests. Further, even if they can claim their own 
interests, the interests they claim must be so distinct that they can 
actually be protected by the device of the language of duties. In this sense, 
the language of rights is necessary, the idea and practice of children's 
rights is not. 
In the light of the argument for the necessity of the language of- rights, it 
can be suggested that although there may be a consensus about what 
children's interests are in a pluralistic society there may still be different 
ideas about the specific substance of those interests. In Chapter One,. it 
was mentioned that although the idea of the right to life is generally 
accepted the specific content of this right is still uncertain. The example 
of the right to life may therefore be helpful in making clear the point that 
the question of what the specific substance of children's interests is, is 
still open to contest. Besides, it can also be suggested that children's 
interests are also contingent upon changing circumstances. It is in this 
described context that we can claim that the idea of children's rights is 
still needed on the grounds that children's interests might not be covered 
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by the established duties-bound rules; and that to employ the language of 
rights is to assure that children's interests can be properly claimed by 
either children themselves or other parties, principally parents and the 
state. 
Apart from the above argument for the necessity of children's rights, some 
advantages accompanied by invoking the idea of children's rights can also 
be used to reveal the necessity of children's rights in achieving 
satisfactory relationships between children and other parties. To single 
out one of the most important advantages of introducing the idea of 
children's rights, when rights are granted to children ' the moral 
relationships between children and other parties have a qualitative change 
and this change can be very important in the shaping of satisfactory human 
relationships. In the duties-bound social framework, to examine whether 
the presumed ideal relationships between children and other parties are 
maintained is to check whether'the other parties concerned fulfil their 
duties or not. But there are two ways to assess these relationships in 
modern society; namely, to check whether duties owed to children are 
fulfilled or not and to check whether children's rights are protected or 
exercised satisfactorily. The notable point is that to examine whether 
children's rights are properly protected or exercised is to give a distinctive 
moral status to children through the recognition of children's independent 
interests. It is to elevate children from a subordinate place in relation to 
other parties to a place independent from them. And the elevation of 
children's status is a positive step towards the ideal relationships between 
children and other parties. Nevertheless, it can be asked: how can the 
elevation of children's status, via the introduction of children's rights, help 
in cultivating the ideal relationships between children and other parties? 
This question can be answered as follows. 
To grant rights to children can modify other parties' perceptions of 
children. It was suggested that the possible satisfactory relationships 
between children and other parties are not always maintained: how then can 
we remind other parties that they should always carry out their duties so 
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as to strike ideal relationships? Among other means, to grant rights to 
children is the most viable way of undertaking this task. It can be 
suggested that after the granting of rights to children, the presence of 
children in front of other parties would spontaneously remind them of the 
fact that children have rights and that other parties have duties to respect 
children's rights. This is because the presence of children would keep 
conveying the message that children have rights and that their rights 
should be properly protected and exercised, which would make other parties 
reflect on whether they fulfil their duties and whether the interests of 
children are properly looked after. ' This point can be made clearer. if the 
issue of animal rights can be brought in here. It is a received Judgement 
that human beings have duties concerning animals; for example, human 
beings have a duty not to treat animals cruelly. But it is still 
controversial, at least for the time being, to claim that animals have rights 
on the ground of our duties concerning them or on-the ground of their 
dignity. However, let us imagine a hypothetical framework in which the 
campaign for animal rights has successfully advocated the idea of animal 
rights and the public accepts this idea and hence in some way grants an 
independent moral or legal status to animals, just as we have done to 
children nowadays. Now, a comparison can be made between our current 
framework and the hypothetical framework. It can be pointed out that the 
meanings attached to "animals" in the two frameworks would be different. 
In the existing framework, it is hard to say that animals, as the subjects 
we are responsible for, would command our respect for their moral or legal 
status; we might hold some sort of moral attitude towards them, but not 
the attitude of respect. It may be another case, however, in the 
hypothetical framework following the giving of rights to animals. In the 
hypothetical framework, animals are able to command, by the fact that 
they have rights, the respect of human beings. And human beings are 
obliged, either because of legal sanctions or because of their acceptance of 
the idea, to accept the distinctive moral status of animals and hence 
prepare the ground for the reciprocal relationships between animals and 
human beings even though animals cannot use ordinary forms of language. 
On the whole, the implication is that a change in the status and the meaning 
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of an entity will incur a change in relationships between this entity and 
rational human beings, which may lead to satisfactory relationships. 
In the light of the issue of animal rights, it can be claimed that following 
the granting of children's rights, the responsible agents' perception 
towards children will subsequently change and this makes children have a 
full reciprocal relationship with other parties. With this additional 
preventive device, we now have more reasons to believe that other parties 
should be more aware of their duties and be more conscious about 
children's interests. 
To sum up. A desirable justification of children's rights should satisfy the 
criteria of "rational acceptability" and "practical necessity". The 
justification offered satisfies the first criterion by showing that the idea 
and practice of children's rights is beneficial and desirable to modern 
society and hence would be accepted by rational persons who are self- 
Interested, just, and benevolent. The second criterion is satisfied by 
demonstrating that the idea and practice of children's rights is practically 
necessary in a pluralistic society in respect of protecting children's 
. essential interests and cultivating satisfactory relationships between 
children and other parties. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND ITS JUSTIFICATION 
A new justification of children's rights was demonstrated in the previous 
chapter. The justification provided was aimed at showing the acceptability 
and necessity of the idea and practice of children's rights in cultivating 
satisfactory relationships between children and other parties. _ 
This 
justification, however, is at most a justification for children's rights in 
general; it does not amount to justifying some specific children's rights, 
such as children's right to education. For several reasons, the main focus 
of this chapter will be put on the issue or children's right to education. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the idea of children's right to education can 
be counted as a modern invention. Although its origin can be traced to the 
thirteenth century, its acceptance was belatedly confirmed by the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (the United Nations, 1959), in which 
children's right to a free and compulsory elementary education is explicitly 
declared. ( i) Against this background, it is therefore interesting to explore 
the possible arguments that may Justify children's right to education. -- 
The reason for tackling the issue of children's right to education is also a 
practical one. The Introduction of the Idea of children's right to education 
will inevitably have some effects on the lives and the undertakings of 
children, parents and the state. But, to what extent should the lives and 
the undertakings of children, parents and the state be affected? And in 
what forms should the idea of children's right to education be put into 
practice? These are questions still to be examined. 
Apart from the two reasons above, there is a political reason, or a reason 
in relation to emancipation, for looking at this issue. It can be suggested 
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that our daily lives are, either directly or indirectly, guided and influenced 
by the prevailing ideas (ideals or theories) of the individual and society 
upheld in our society (these ideas of the individual and society are here 
understood as ideas concerning how an ideal society, or the ideal society, 
should be construed and what an ideal individual, or the ideal individual, 
should be like in the ideal society espoused). For example, the daily lives 
of Chinese in China are, at least for the time being, in one way or another 
guided and influenced by Marxist visions of the Individual and society. If 
we accept this, several questions can then be asked: what are the ideas of 
the individual and society by which our daily lives are guided and 
regulated? What are the ideas of the individual and society by which our 
lives should be guided and regulated? And, how are those ideas, or how 
should they be, construed? As moral and rational agents, many people 
would have an interest in understanding the ideas that have influence on 
their daily lives. And, arguably, they would not stop at the stage of 
understanding; they would also be interested in formulating or advocating 
new ideas of the individual and society that appeal to them when they are 
not satisfied with the prevailing ideas. But, it can be asked, where can 
they start their attempt to understand the dominant ideas of the individual 
and, society? And, from what point can they put the new ideas of the 
Individual and society into practice? Against these questions, it can be 
suggested that the issue of children's right to education, among others, can 
be taken as a starting point. For education can be reckoned as an 
embodiment of ideas of the individual and society. For example, Dewey's 
child-centred education is an education closely related to his theory of 
democracy; and Emile's education devised by Rousseau is dependent on 
Rousseau's notion of the ideal individual and how society should be 
constructed. (2) Having said this, it should be noted that education is more 
than simply an embodiment of ideas of the individual and society. The 
relevance of education often goes beyond the scope of ideas on the 
individual and society. . It is also an expression of distinct stands on many 
other things, such as the characteristics of knowledge, the constitution of 
the mind, the relationships between knowledge and the mind, and so on. 
However, if we take a view that theories of knowledge and the mind are 
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tightly interwoven with ideas of the individual and society, then it would 
not be unreasonable to put a special emphasis on the latter. 
If the above points are accepted, it follows that to understand the kind of 
education to which children have a right is actually not very different from 
understanding what the dominant ideas of the individual and society are in 
our daily undertakings. And, proposing the education to which children have 
a right is not different from proposing particular ideas of the individual 
and society. To put it in another way, the education to which children have 
a right is a reflection, at least partly, of ideas of the individual and 
society. And, on the other hand, if we have a new set of ideas of the 
individual and society and we want to put them into practice, we can also 
start devising the education to which children should have a right and 
persuade other people to accept it. What should be noted, however, is that 
education is not just a reflection of ideas of the individual and society; it 
is also a test by which the ideas of the individual and society concerned 
can be scrutinized and modified. So, more accurately described, the 
relation of education to ideas of the individual and society is like this: 
education can be devised or shaped according to ideas of. the individual and 
society; ideas of the individual and society can be scrutinized and modified 
through the practice of education devised according to theories. To put it 
technically, there is a dialectical relation between education and ideas of 
the individual and society. In the light of the points made above, it then 
can be claimed that to inquire what sort of education children have a right 
to is an enterprise involving ideas of the individual and society; to justify 
children's right to a specific education is an enterprise supporting specific 
ideas of the individual and society and the reciprocal relation between 
them. 
A few words should be given concerning the aims of this chapter. Briefly, 
two aims will be advanced. In the first place, it is hoped to clarify what 
the word "education" stands for in the issue of children's right to education. 
This will be seen not only as a task of linguistic clarification but also a 
task concerning the construction of what education ought to be. As has 
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been suggested above, tackling the issue of children's right to education 
can be regarded as either an attempt at understanding the dominant ideas 
of the individual and society that influence us, or an attempt at advocating 
or constructing some specific ideas of the individual and society. In this 
chapter, the emphasis will particularly be put on the task of constructing a 
specific education that embodies specific ideas of the individual and 
society. The characteristic of this task is therefore political not just 
linguistic. The second aim of this chapter is to provide a justification for 
children's right to the specific education delineated in the first section. 
Again, it will be seen that the justification offered is not just a 
justification for a specific education that children should have, it is also a 
justification for specific ideas concerning the individual and society. 
1. THE FORM OF EDUCATION TO WHICH CHILDREN HAVE A RIGHT 
There is a need to clarify what the word "education" refers to in the 
discussion of children's right to education. This clarification will aim at 
providing a specific concept of education. Five reasons are offered here to 
explain the reason why we need to clarify the word "education" and why a 
substantive concept of education is necessary in this thesis. 
First, it is worth reiterating that one of the reasons for tackling the issue 
of children's right to education is in relation to emancipation and autonomy. 
This chapter is undertaken partly to understand what are the dominant 
ideas of the individual and society influencing us; and, moreover, to 
advocate some specific ideas of the individual and society. Given this 
direction, the concept of education involved in this chapter cannot be a 
general concept of education such as when education is referred to as "a 
family of processes" aimed at "the development of desirable qualities" In 
children (3) or when education stands for institutionalized activities 
conducted with the view to equipping children to fit into the society in 
which they live. "Education" in this general sense would not help us to 
understand the dominant ideas of the individual and society prevailing in 
our modern society. It also cannot be taken as an instrument to advocate 
151 
some specific ideas of the individual and society, for the first general 
concept of education mentioned does not tell us what are the desirable 
qualities concerned and their relations to the ideas of the individual and 
society. The second general concept of education mentioned is too simple 
to inform us what society is under consideration and hence falls to satisfy 
our interest in emancipation. The stated aims of the chapter can only be 
achieved under the condition that the education involved is indicated 
concretely. 
Secondly, the need for spelling out a specific concept of education is 
related to the future development of this thesis. In the latter part of this 
chapter it will be argued that children should have a right to education 
mainly on the grounds that education is an essential good for children. And 
in Chapter Five it will be argued that children should be compelled to 
receive education primarily for the reason that compulsory education is an 
essential good both for children and other parties, such as parents, adults 
without children, the state and society as a whole. It can be suggested'that 
unless a specific concept of education is offered there is no hope to 
explicate satisfactorily why education is such an essential good that the 
justification of children's right to education and compulsory education can 
be based on it. A general concept of education cannot help us to answer the 
questions: "To what extent is education an essential good? " "In which 
respect is education an essential good? " "What sorts of good can education 
deliver to all parties concerned? " "What specific roles does education as 
an essential good play in society and in the life of the individual? " These 
are substantive questions: they cannot be answered on the basis of a 
general concept of education. 
The third reason for trying to make clear to what the word "education" 
refers is based on the observation that the word "education" is ascribed to 
different things by different writers when the issue of children's right to 
education is being tackled. For example, in Gregory's work, he firstly 
refers to "education" as "educational opportunity". For Gregory, "laying 
claim to the right to education, is partially to demand that someone lays on 
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opportunities, such that persons can by taking advantage of these 
opportunities educate themselves. "(4) But if it is asked "What are 
educational opportunities for? " Gregory would then reply that educational 
opportunities are aimed at equipping children with "basic skills and putting 
them in the position to further develop those skills, if they wish. "(S) 
The term "education" refers to something else, however, when the same 
issue is taken up by Melden. In Heiden's scheme, the word "education" 
should first and foremost refer to "moral education", for "failing the 
achievement of which there is the failure to achieve moral agency 
itself. "(6) In addition, children's right to education should also be 
recognized as children's right to "an understanding of their cultural and 
political heritage along with those skills necessary for their effective 
participation in the society into which they are born. "(7) 
Apart from Gregory and Melden, Bandman, Olafson and Wringe also introduce 
different notions of "education". For Bandman, "education" is straight- 
forwardly attached to "schooling". He maintains that "The right to an 
education implies that everyone has to go to school" on the grounds that 
"[T)o get to be free one has to do some things first. "(8) By contrast, Wringe 
is not so straightforward as Bandman. In his discussion of children's right 
to education as a welfare right, he firstly tries to avoid "any independent 
analysis of the concept of education". (9) Nevertheless, he still reveals 
what "education" really stands for in his subsequent discussion. It is that 
children should have a right to "the provision of education to the required 
level" so that they can be protected from material deprivation. What is 
more, children's right to education also implies that children should have a 
right to education which provides sufficient experience and knowledge for 
them so that they can participate in "the political life of a democracy". (10) 
As to Olafson, he explicitly points out that "education" in the term "the 
right to education" refers to "the acquiring of certain forms of competence 
through instruction or other appropriate forms of assistance. " What then is 
the specific content of competence? Olafson claims that it means "trained 
capacity or the ability to carry on some activity or perform some function 
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more or less on one's own.... "(11) 
From the above, it seems that although the writers mentioned are talking 
about the same issue, they are, to some extent, moving in different 
directions owing to the fact that they have different notions of education 
in mind. In order to provide a specific framework for discussion and to 
avoid entanglements that the general term "education" may produce, it is 
therefore necessary to clarify what education stands for in this thesis and 
delineate the scope and the content of "education" concerned here. 
The fourth reason is that if the education concerned in the discussion of 
children's right to education is only a general concept of education then 
this discussion would not satisfy people in a pluralistic society who have 
different ideas about education. It is of course reasonable to suggest that 
education can stand for either a family of institutionalized processes 
conducted for the purpose of developing worthwhile knowledge and 
understanding, and of cultivating desirable qualities in children(12) or 
institutionalized activities conducted with a view to equipping children to 
fit into the society in which they live. This suggestion is indeed 
significant in the sense that not all children in the past had a right to 
education of this sort. Thus it is quite legitimate to argue for, or against, 
the view that all children should have a right to have access to education 
as such. This suggestion is, however, not entirely satisfactory on the 
grounds that the two general concepts of education do not carry enough 
evaluative recommendations. The first general concept does not enumerate 
what worthwhile knowledge (understanding) and desirable qualities are. 
The second general concept of education fails to state the extent to which 
children should be fitted into society. Moreover, although the second 
general concept of education seems to be a general concept adaptable to all 
human societies - presumably, only anarchists and Nietzscheans would 
oppose this concept - it is not concrete enough for people living in a 
pluralistic society in which people have different views and understandings 
concerning what society is, and, consequently, different ideas about 
education. 
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Given this account, it can be presumed that writers who tackle the issue of 
children's right to education in a pluralistic society would not be satisfied 
with a general concept of education. They would go further to explicate a 
specific concept of education. This presumption can actually stand in the 
light of R. S. Peters' enterprise in justifying "liberal education". In Peters' 
essay The Justification of Education, he is quite clear on the point that a 
general concept of education will not carry significant evaluative 
suggestions essential to his undertakings. In his own words, he says: 
There is a general concept of 'education' which covers almost any 
process of learning, -rearing, or bringing up. Nowadays, when we speak 
of education in this general way, we usually mean going to school, to 
an institution devoted to learning. In this sense of 'education' almost 
any quality of mind can be deemed a product of it - compassion and 
perseverance included. To say that such qualities of mind are the 
product of education is to say that they are learned. Education, In 
this sense, can be accorded any kind of instrumental value and so is 
not of any significance for its valuative suggestions. (13) 
After making this statement, Peters goes on to point out that the education 
relevant to his justification Is "the specific concept of 'education' which 
emerged in the nineteenth century as a contrast to training. "(14) 
The same attitude is also reflected in Peters' later writing, notably, 
Democratic Values and Educational Alms. In this - essay,. 
he sketches out 
painstakingly the aims of education in a democratic society and the content 
of education corresponding to the educational aims. Both at the beginning 
and at the end of this essay Peters recognizes that "education", to some 
extent, is a contestable concept. (15) To be more specific, he argues that 
there are some essential elements shared by all educational activities. As 
such, education has its uncontestable aspects. However, there are also 
some contestable elements in educational activities. Education, for Peters, 
is similar to "morality" and "democracy", it marks out features of life that 
are deemed desirable, but there is no one standard usage that can be taken 
as a model of correctness. So different groups compete endlessly for their 
particular interpretations. "(16) Between the uncontestable aspects and the 
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contestable aspects of education, it is the latter that most arouses Peters' 
interest in his undertakinqs. He emphasizes that "education is a 
teleological type of concept in that it indicates processes of learning 
directed towards some end(I 7), " and makes it clear that what he tries to 
advocate is a liberal education - rather than any other form of education - 
aimed at helping children to encounter human conditions In a democratic 
society. (18) 
The reason why Peters insists on spelling out a specific concept of 
education in the two essays mentioned can be seen clearly in Dearden's 
statement made in the discussion of Peters' contribution to the 
development of philosophy of education. He says: 
If we pursue a general analysis of the concept of education, therefore, 
it is doubtful whether much of substance of education will emerge 
beyond a reference to learning which satisfies the requirement of 
developing understanding, that being very much a matter of degree. 
This is unsurprising if we reflect that concepts are relative to 
interests, for who would have an interest in such a general concept? 
Education, whether general or specific, is a practical field. The 
important issues relate not to a perfectly general concept of 
education but to different and typically competing conceptions of it. 
There is a close parallel with morality here. What is common to 
Nietzsche and Kant, or to the Mundugumor and the Muslims, is likely to 
be of much less interest at the level of commitment than their 
differences. ( 19) 
In the light of Peters' enterprise and Dearden's statement, it should be 
clearer why a specific concept of education should be offered here. Plainly, 
it is not of much interest "at the level of commitment" to understand or to 
advocate a general concept of education. What should be of concern are the 
contestable aspects of education. It is in this context that a specific 
concept of education will be offered here. 
The final reason, which is related to the preceding two reasons, for 
offering a specific concept of education is based on the fact that the word 
"education" can be used, in the words of Walsh, "on a scale that runs from 
the very open (nominal, general) to the very loaded (substantive, 
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specific). "(20) Thus, the subject-matter of the statement "Children have a 
right to education" (or, "Children do not have a right to education") would 
not be clear enough unless what "education" stands for is made explicit. 
However, even if the statement can be made clear by delineating the 
meaning of the word "education", there can still be other problems. For 
example, if we follow Warnock and take "education", in its purely normative 
sense, as "something which happens to a child and changes him for the 
better"(21), then the statement "Children have a right to education" can 
hardly need any justification. For it would be quite self-evident to say 
that children have a right to the thing which changes them far the better. 
This, however, says very little about the whole issue of children's right to 
education. 
A totally different case can also be made to suggest that the term 
"education" should be used substantively and specifically in the discussion 
of the issue of children's right to education. While discussing the issue of 
"political education", Oakeshott uses the term "education" in its widest and 
rather descriptive sense. In his view, political education "begins In the 
enjoyment of a tradition, in the observation and imitation of the behaviour 
of our elders, and there is little or nothing in the world which comes before 
us as we open our eyes which does not contribute to it. "(22) Given this, 
political education becomes an activity that not only children from good 
family backgrounds can have, but also children -from the most 
disadvantageous surroundings. (23) In other words, "political education" in 
Oakeshott's usage is a sort of "socialization". Although Oakeshott does not 
address the issue of education in general In the discussion of political 
education, it is however possible to take his "political education" as an 
essential part of education in general and hence assume that ". education" 
contains an element of socialization. If this is accepted, then the 
statement "Children have a right to education" would not make significant 
sense either. For having education in this descriptive sense is a matter of 
necessity; no matter whether we want to have education or not we are 
bound to have "education" in this very general sense. In this context there 
is therefore no point in arguing, or rejecting, the idea that children have a 
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right to education. 
The question left, however, is: to what extent should the term "education" 
be specified? It can be suggested that although some definitions of 
education contain normative as well as descriptive aspects, they are 
nevertheless not helpful in terms of providing a plausible discussion 
framework. For instance, education can be defined as "the systematic 
promotion of Interest-based learning" or "the systematic initiation into the 
best that has been taught". (24) It seems these two definitions are better 
than Warnock's and Oakeshott's In the sense that they have normative as 
well as descriptive aspects. But the problem still remains; namely, they 
fall to specify any details concerning "systematic promotion", "systematic 
initiation", "interest-based learning", and "the best that has been thought 
and taught". This failure can make us confused about what we are driving 
at in the discussion of children's right to education. 
In order to have a clear framework for discussion concerning children's 
right to education, it is necessary to make the connotations as well as 
denotations of "education" as concrete as possible. Peters' early notion of 
education, among others, is helpful in this respect. Peters' idea entails 
three aspects (criteria). He firstly claims that the word "education" has 
normative implications. "Education", in his own words, "implies the 
transmission of what is worth-while to those who become committed to 
it. "(25) If that were the only criterion. of "education", then the definition 
would be as unhelpful as Warnock's. Fortunately, Peters does not stop at 
that. He gives two more aspects of education. They are, that 'education' 
must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive 
perspective, which are not inert", and that 'education' at least rules out 
some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness 
and voluntariness on the part of the learner. "(26) Up to this point, Peters 
has spelt out the normative, the descriptive, and the procedural aspects of 
"education". Most notably, however, apart from the three aspects 
mentioned, Peters also outlines the content of education. Embracing the 
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idea of liberal education (in its various senses), he recommends several 
subjects that should be included in the curriculum. They are: language; the 
basic skills of reading and writing; science; history; mathematics; 
religious and aesthetic awareness; and moral, prudential and technical 
forms of thought and action (the last five subjects are named by Peters as 
bodies of knowledge, or forms of thought or awareness). (27) 
In the light of Peters' notion of education, it can be suggested that the 
word "education" can be made clear only if its normative, descriptive, and 
procedural aspects are illustrated in a concrete way. Or, to put it in 
another way, the aims of education (the normative aspect), the content of 
education (the descriptive aspect), and how "education" should be conducted 
(the procedural aspect) should be clearly specified. The question, however, 
remains: on what ground, and by what approach, can we decide on the aims, 
the content and the procedure for the education, concerned here? A 
tentative answer to this question will now be offered. 
It will be recalled that "education" is being regarded as an embodiment of 
ideas of the individual and society. One of the implications of this is that 
education can actually be devised according to the ideas of the individual 
and society that appeal to us. Following this line of thinking, the starting 
point of clarifying what "education" refers to is then to find out what are 
the ideas of the individual and society that appeal to us most. The most 
appropriate way of doing this is to canvass, firstly, various sorts of ideas 
of the individual and society, and then decide which ideas suit us most. (28) 
However, as we are confined by space, this approach cannot be adopted 
here. The plausible way is to start from reflecting on the society in which 
we live and then to ponder the basic and distinct characteristics of our 
society - which inevitably incorporate the dominant ideas of the individual 
and society. Once we can grasp the basic and distinct characteristics of 
our society we then can go on to postulate what sort of education we need, 
which should be indicated in terms of aims, content and procedure. (29) 
If a single term can be used to describe the basic characteristics of our 
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modern society, then this term must be "liberal democracy". In detail, the 
basic characteristics of a liberal democracy, manifested by a complex of 
institutions and people's daily undertakings, can be described as follows: 
D. Individual freedoms, no matter what they are, are highly, if not 
absolutely, esteemed. 
2>. Each member of a liberal democracy is supposed to have independent 
moral and legal status; and his status is publicly recognized and 
protected by the law, the state, or society as a whole. In this sense, al l 
members of a liberal democracy are supposed to be equal. 
3>. A liberal democratic society is a society -which tolerates 
different 
judgements concerning what is a good life. Hence individuals in a 
liberal democracy can pursue and experiment with the desirable good 
life they have in mind as long as their pursuit and experiments do not 
encroach upon the law which is enacted through a democratic procedure. 
4>. Although members of a liberal democracy can have different notions 
about what is a good life, some sorts of life-style are especially 
favoured (for example, the life-styles of politicians, businessmen, 
academics, and so on). In this respect, a liberal democratic society is a 
society in which each member can have equal opportunity to pursue 
those positions leading to some favoured life-styles. 
5>. A liberal democracy Involves widespread participation of all members 
of society. As to the extent and the form of participation, they vary 
according to different circumstances. But generally speaking, political 
participation is often taken in the form of a representative system 
rather than a direct participatory system. 
6>. All human societies are based on some sort of cooperation. A liberal 
democratic society is no exception in this respect. However, a society 
characterized by liberal democracy is often a society marked by the 
division of labour. Cooperation in a liberal democratic society is 
effected In a rather complicated form of labour division. (30) 
Taking the six characteristics mentioned together, it can be suggested that 
a liberal democratic society is "a fair system of cooperation between free 
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and equal persons". (31) What should be emphasized here, however, is that 
the six characteristics are both social facts and ideas, practised and 
upheld in a liberal democratic society; but whether they are practised to 
everyone's satisfaction, or whether the substantive content of these ideas 
is recognized without contention, is still uncertain. 
Enlightened by the six characteristics of liberal democracy, we then can 
have some ideas about what an ideal person in a liberal democratic society 
can be. Generally, an ideal person has the following features: 
I>. An ideal person is a person who understands that the society in which 
he lives is a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. 
By this understanding, he not only is willing to be part of this society 
but also strives for the maintenance as well as the actualization of this 
society. 
2>. An ideal person knows how the liberal democracy in which he lives is 
actually constructed and operated. He is also aware of the relationships 
between himself and the liberal democracy. 
3>. In order to actualize the liberal democratic society, an ideal person 
values the importance of individual, freedom and equality. He not only 
values his own freedom and equal status in relation to other parties but 
also respects other people's freedom and equal status in relation to him. 
Most importantly, he is able to exercise his individual freedom and 
maintain his equal status in relation to other parties. 
4>. An ideal person is rationally capable of arranging, pursuing; and revising 
his life plan on his own. In the process of arranging and pursuing his 
life plan he can exempt himself from external interference or internal 
irrational forces within himself. In other words, an ideal person should 
be autonomous. Moreover, he also respects other people's right in 
arranging, pursuing and revising their own life plans. 
5>. As a liberal democracy requires members' participation, either directly 
or indirectly, an ideal person is then a person who is able to participate 
in political, economic and social activities. 
6>. An ideal person can take up some specific occupations, for in a society 
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characterized by labour division members who are unable to take up a 
specific occupation may put themselves in a vulnerable position - in 
terms of exercising individual freedoms and maintaining their equal 
status - and weaken the structure of society as a whole. 
A question can nevertheless be raised here. That is, how can children fit 
into a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons if they 
are not fully rational and in need of guidance and protection, as defined in 
Chapter Two? The assumption underlying this question is that the above 
description about liberal democracy and what an ideal person can be like is 
only relevant to a society constituted by able and rational adults (citizens); 
it is not relevant at all to children who are unable to participate in normal 
political, economic and social activities. In response to this question, it 
can be answered that the fact that children are not fully rational and in 
need of guidance and protection does not necessarily imply that children 
cannot be regarded as free and equal persons. They can still be regarded as 
free and equal, yet their equal and free status is maintained in a special 
way. 
To regard children as equal and free persons is not to assume that children 
can have the same sorts of freedom and equality as rational adults. There 
are various sorts of freedom and equality; some are associated with 
rationality or reason, some are not. Generally, - according to Berlin, there 
are two concepts of liberty (in this thesis, the words "liberty" and 
"freedom" are used interchangeably; Berlin also refers these two words to 
the same thing); one is the negative sense of liberty , the other is the 
positive sense of liberty. The negative sense of liberty refers to the area 
"within which the subject ... Is or should be 
left to do or be what he is able 
to do or be, without interference by others. " This is the liberty in the 
sense of "freedom from". The positive sense of liberty refers to the 
capacity by which the subject can decide on his own, not contingent upon 
external interference or internal irrational forces. This is liberty in the 
sense of "freedom to"(32), or liberty in the sense of autonomy. What can be 
said about Berlin's scheme is that the name of negative freedom actually 
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covers two categories of freedom. They can be named as freedom based on 
rules and freedom detached from rules. Political freedoms are an eminent 
example of the former, for they are contingent upon some sorts of rules. 
Children do not have a freedom to vote in general or local elections on the 
grounds that the related law does not grant this freedom to children. "A's 
freedom to scratch his hair in classroom" is an example of freedom 
detached from rules; for there is no rule, at least normally, on regulating 
whether or not a pupil can scratch his hair in classroom. Personal 
undertakings that are not regulated by law are freedoms detached from 
rules. (33) In the light of the analysis made above, it can be suggested that 
even though children are not free in the sense that they lack the positive 
sense of liberty (autonomy), they nevertheless can be counted as free in the 
sense that they have "freedom detached from rules" or, on some occasions, 
"freedom based on rules". It can be argued that in a complex modern society 
no one is absolutely free (in the negative sense) due to the fact that 
everyone has to cooperate to some degree with other members, so 
individual freedom is relative rather than absolute. (34) Based on this, we 
can suggest that due to the need of labour division and the fact that every 
member of society has to live together with others, each member's freedom 
(in the negative sense) hence is only different in degree, not kind. Then, 
from this, it can be inferred that since children must play a role or gain a 
place in any existing society, their presence, which goes with the fact that 
they have rights, in itself forms a kind of perimeter that will protect 
children from adults or the state's arbitrary interference. In this negative 
sense, children will be left a place in which they can exercise their 
personal freedoms. (35) 
Similarly, there are also different forms of equality. It is obviously 
inappropriate to claim that children should be, or can be, equal as adults in 
participating in all sorts of political, economic and social activities. It is, 
however, not inappropriate to claim that children can be regarded as equal 
in relation to adults and the state in the sense that they have a morally and 
legally independent status, which is constructed by the languages of rights 
and duties. Their moral status is no different from the moral status of any 
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other members of society. The moral unit of a liberal democratic society 
is the human individual irrespective of his/her social status, sex, age, 
state of mind, and so on. This is also the case concerning children's legal 
status. 
After the understanding that children can also have their freedom, although 
limited, and minimum equality in relation to other parties, it also should be 
noted that children have potentials, and it is also desirable that they 
should have all sorts of freedom and enjoy a full equal status in relation to 
other parties. Following Locke, it can be claimed that children äre not born 
in the full state of equality and freedom but they are born to it. (36) 
Apart from the points made above, it should also be noted that children can 
cooperate with other members of society. Green's theory can shed some 
light on this point. For Green, "all rights depend on that capacity in the 
individual for being determined by a conception of well-being, as an object 
at once for himself and for others, which constitutes personality in the 
moral sense. "(37) In plain words, "rights" In Green's view are contingent 
upon the moral capacity of the individual, which is relevant to the well- 
being of society. Following this line, it can be reasoned, that beings 
without this moral capacity do not have rights. And it is also Green's 
position that animals do not have rights. (38) But how about human beings 
who are "helpless idiots and lunatics"? It may seem they also lack this 
moral capacity and hence should not have rights, which include the right to 
life - the most basic right. Green, however, does not accept this reasoning. 
He argues that even these persons still can have a right to life; for they 
still can have a "social function", "a passive function as the object of 
affectionate ministrations arising out of family instincts and memories; 
and that the right to life protected corresponds to this passive social 
function. "(39) The inspiration we can have from Green's standpoint is that 
although children cannot positively cooperate with adults in undertaking 
political, economic and social activities, they can still have their social 
functions to play. They can have passive social functions in the sense that 
they can be "the object of affectionate ministrations arising out of family 
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instincts and memories. " But apart from that, from a long-term viewpoint 
children can also have positive social functions. How can a human society 
survive without children? A human society without children is a society 
without a future. (40) It can be suggested that the existence of children is 
a necessary condition for the survival of human society. From this angle, 
the social function children play is essential and positive. The fact that 
children can have social functions to play allows us to conclude that 
children can actually have cooperative relationships with other parties of 
society. They are an essential link in society as a whole. In this sense, it 
can also be claimed that children are also a participating class in a fair 
system of cooperation. 
Given the points argued above, it can be claimed that children can actually 
fit into the fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. 
Even though they are not as equal, free and capable as adults, they still can 
have a role to play in that system. We now turn to the question of what is 
the -education that children should have a right to in a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal persons. What is on the agenda is that 
if there is to be an education within a fair system of cooperation between 
free and equal persons, what form should its aims, content and procedure 
take? The answer to this question can be given as follows. 
I>. The specific role that "education" has to play is to cultivate would-be 
citizens with the view to maintaining, pursuing, and actualizing the society 
as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. In order to 
achieve this aim, children should be equipped with necessary knowledge, 
skills, and virtues so that they can understand the constitution of their 
society and become part of this society. To be more specific, the aims of 
education are: children should be equipped with necessary skills, 
knowledge, and virtues so that they can take up specific occupations and 
cooperate with other members of society; children should appreciate and 
pursue the value of freedom and equality, not only for themselves but also 
for other people; children should understand how a liberal democratic 
society is constructed and operated and their relationship with this liberal 
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democracy; children should be capable of planning, pursuing, and 
experimenting with their own life plans in the awareness that other people 
also have rights to pursue their own life plans; and finally, children should 
be capable of participating in political, social and economic activities. 
2>. With the aims delineated above, the contents of education can be 
devised as follows: 
2.1>. As children, especially those who are very young, can only cooperate 
with adults and the state in a rather limited way, the most urgent task for 
society is then to make children capable enough so that they can cooperate 
with other members in a more extensive way. This urgent need for making 
children capable is probably based on society's natural tendency for 
securing its continuing existence. This, however, is not the main concern 
here. In terms of providing the cooperating abilities for the would-be 
adults, the primary object is to make children capable of communicating 
with other members of society. In a less developed society, the 
communicating abilities might not be important at all, but in a highly 
developed society, these abilities become very essential. Because in a 
modern developed society people tend to use written and numerical 
symbols, apart from oral language, to communicate with each other. Based 
on this understanding, literacy and numeracy should be part of children's 
education in a highly developed society. 
Except for the communicating abilities, the requirement of cooperating 
with each other in a positive way also implies that children should be 
educated in a way that will enable them to take up specific jobs by which a 
social system of cooperation is possible. It suggests that children should 
be equipped with some knowledge and skills, which are reckoned as 
necessary for taking up these specific jobs. In other words, a vocational 
education should be included in the curriculum of children's education. 
What then are the knowledge and skills that constitute a vocational 
education? The answer is: it depends on each Individual society, but no 
matter what the knowledge and skills are they should be broad enough to 
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become the foundation on which the educatee can establish necessarily 
particular skills required by a given occupation. In other words, the 
vocational education required is a general education. In line with Dewey's 
position, two reasons can be found to support the view that vocational 
education should be put in the form of general education. (41) Firstly, no 
one in a liberal democratic society is born for a particular kind of work. 
Every one is entitled to pursue his own life plan, which normally goes with 
a specific occupation. Further, as has been mentioned, each member of a 
liberal democracy should have equal opportunity to pursue some favoured 
life-styles. It is partly for these reasons that children in a liberal 
democracy should be given a broad and general education so that they can be 
equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills on which they are able to 
pursue any desirable life plans. Secondly, in a modern society characterized 
by highly sophisticated labour division and constantly changing social 
conditions, it is not appropriate to transmit specialized particular 
knowledge and skills for certain jobs. For it is possible that those 
knowledge and skills transmitted to pupils may be obsolete by the time the 
pupils leave their schools. It follows that the task of vocational education 
is to provide general knowledge and skills that may have vocational 
bearings on specific jobs. Generally, the vocational education -should 
include the most prominent forms of knowledge and skills cherished in 
society, such as mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences, and skills 
that are relevant to industry. 
2.2>. There are some other things that- should be taken into the content of 
education from the viewpoint that children should enjoy the same equality 
and freedom as adults when they grow up. As has been noted, children's 
freedom is not as wide as adults' and although they are morally and legally 
independent from adults and therefore enjoy an equal status in relation to 
other parties, they are actually not equal to adults in terms of 
participating in political, economic or social activities. But one day they 
will grow up and they will also have the same political, social and 
economic freedoms as adults; and they will be interested in enjoying their 
full freedom and pursuing their autonomy. What is more, they will also 
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enjoy an equal position in relation to other parties in terms of 
participating In various activities. In a system organized by free and equal 
persons, children therefore should have opportunities to enjoy freedom and 
equality in their full sense. Literacy and numeracy and a general education 
in the light of a vocational view have partly contributed to this. But it is 
not enough. Political education and liberal education for autonomy 
should be added on the list. 
Political education in a liberal democracy is mainly concerned with the 
knowledge of how a liberal democracy is constructed and operated as well 
as the necessary attitudes required for the operation of the liberal 
democracy. Apart from that, the knowledge concerning the relationship of 
the individual to major institutions and the state should also be included. It 
involves the knowledge concerning the possible freedoms or activities each 
individual can have, or participate in, at different stages and under 
different circumstances. Moreover, following Pat White, it can be 
suggested that political education should also cover a liberal education 
constituted by different forms of knowledge. For political issues involve 
different kinds of consideration which correspond, to different forms of 
knowledge; so, if children can get acquainted with different forms of 
knowledge they can also get acquainted with different kinds of 
consideration employed in political issues. And an enlightened citizen is 
only possible if he is equipped with different forms of knowledge. (42) - 
What are, then, these forms of knowledge? Generally speaking, they are the 
forms of knowledge which constitute' the vocational education and the 
liberal education for autonomy. For this reason, there is no need to dwell 
on this point at this moment. Apart from those indicated in the discussion 
of vocational education, some others will also be delineated in the 
following discussion. 
With a view to cultivating children's capacity to pursue autonomy, a 
"liberal education as an education for autonomy" should be provided for 
children. (43) How can a liberal education for autonomy be developed? 
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In order to make children capable of arriving at decisions on their own, it 
is necessary to provide sufficient knowledge or information for them so 
that their decisions or choices can be exempt from arbitrariness, external 
manipulation and internal irrational forces. But it can be objected that 
while an informed capacity may help people avoid the arbitrariness of 
choice, it is not necessarily helpful in avoiding external manipulation and 
internal irrationality. For it is quite possible to imagine a society in which 
all existing forms of knowledge and information are, intentionally or 
unintentionally, formulated and regulated by a specific social class, so that 
an informed choice or decision in this framework is still inevitably biased 
in the sense of favouring the specific social class or being distorted by 
that class. What can be said against this contention is that, we must start 
from what is known, mustn't we? (44) It is true that this contention is 
rightly put, but it is hoped that through the operation of all kinds of 
activities in the framework of a fair system of cooperation this subtle 
external manipulation will eventually be purged away. But it can still be 
asked: how? It then can only be answered that if members of society really 
take the values of freedom and equality seriously, they will not be happy 
with the fact that the existing forms of knowledge are biased to a specific 
social class. Ideally, they would try to free themselves, and other people 
from this bias. And it is through continuously engaging in self-criticism 
and self-reflection that the bias can possibly be eradicated. 
However, it can also be suggested that there is a fundamental dilemma 
embedded in the practice of liberal education. That is, depending upon an 
organized and predetermined educational content is by implication relying 
upon others rather than one's own experience. In other words, it is 
impossible to "cultivate" or "teach" a child to be autonomous. (45) In. the 
face of this objection, it can be argued that this dilemma is actually an 
illusion. It is quite clear that education cannot proceed in a social vacuum. 
A specific social context in which the existing forms of knowledge or 
information appear is a necessary perimeter where the pursuit of autonomy 
takes place. It is similar to the pursuit of health where we have to rely on 
external environment, for instance, we have to take food from without. To 
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have food itself is clearly not a hindrance to the pursuit of health; on the 
contrary, it is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition of the quest 
for health. Along the same lines, it can be suggested that learning from 
others is not a hindrance to autonomy; on the contrary, it is a necessary, 
not sufficient, condition, for autonomy. Without the provision of the 
existing forms of knowledge, autonomy is impossible. In this light, learning 
from others is logically and practically prior to the pursuit of autonomy, 
just as having food must be prior to the pursuit of health. Learning from 
others and autonomy are not located on the same level, hence there is no 
dilemma in terms of choosing one rather than the other. (46) 
How can an informed capacity combat irrational forces internal to the 
agent himself? It can be suggested that the better we know ourselves - 
our motives, Impulses, consciousness, sub-consciousness, purposes, 
possible reactions toward external environment and so on - and how we are 
influenced by nature and other persons, the greater is the possibility that 
we can bring our action and thought under our control. (47) 
Now, back to the Issue of the content of education. The arguments 
demonstrated are trying to show that in so far as children's autonomy is 
concerned it is essential to provide sufficient knowledge and information 
for children so that they can be capable of making informed choices 
concerning their own life-plans. This position, however, echoes the 
suggestion of a general education in the light of vocational requirements 
and a political education, both of which contain the 'provision of different 
forms of knowledge. What then is the content of education that can be 
supposed to develop children's autonomy? O'Hear's illustration of liberal 
education can be very helpful here. The specific content of liberal 
education, in O'Hear 's view, can be devised on the model of the content of 
university education. Along this line, he suggests the following subjects 
that should be included in a liberal education: knowledge of the physical 
world (natural sciences, mathematics), knowledge about human 
society (history, geography, anthropology and other social and 
behavioral sciences), the study of literature and the arts (or a 
170 
foreign language, useful if not essential), knowledge about 
religion. (48) It should be noted here that O'Hear's list with regard to 
liberal education is by no mean comprehensive, but concerning the practical 
limitations in a given educational context, such as time and resources, 
O'Hear's suggestion can be reckoned as sensible. 
2.3>. What has been argued is that if children have a right to education in 
the framework of a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons then children should have a right to literacy, numeracy, -ä political 
education, a vocational education and a liberal education (the content of the 
latter three are overlapping). But it seems that the content of education 
above is still not well composed, for the emphasis is being put on 
knowledge and skills that should be provided by adults and the state. There 
are other aspects that should also be stressed. That is, children should 
have opportunities to apply the knowledge and skills included in the content 
of -education on the grounds that these knowledge and skills are mainly 
devised for the maintenance and actualization of the fair system of 
cooperation and hence they should be manifested in practical activities. 
Furthermore, as children will eventually play a positive role in the system 
of cooperation when they grow up, they, should also have opportunity to 
understand" and "learn" those virtues that are essential in sustaining and 
actualizing the fair system of cooperation. (49) 
What then should be the best activities in which children can practice their 
knowledge and skills learned from their tutors and cultivate their virtues? 
Two kinds of activities can be relevant here. Concerning the activities in 
which children can exercise their knowledge and skills in relation to the 
necessity of communication and specific jobs they will probably take, one 
of the sensible provisions is to let children have some sort of industrial 
experience. As to where these activities should take place and what is 
the specific content of industrial experience, a flexible scheme can be 
devised according to real circumstances. It might be in a school-run 
canteen or a private company and so on. The idea of providing a place where 
communicating ability and all sorts of knowledge and skills can be 
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performed is not only to prepare children for their future life but also to 
test the water so that children and adults concerned can know whether or 
not children are able to cope with real situations. 
With regard to activities useful for developing children's virtues, the best 
choice, arguably, is sport, especially those sports that need team-work, 
such as basketball, rugby or baseball and so on. The reason for singling out 
sport as the best activity for shaping virtues is that sport in the form of 
team-work is a miniature of a fair system of cooperation. What is more, 
because it aiways involves two teams it can therefore provide an. 
opportunity for children to reflect on their position In regard to their 
teammates and their rivals. It also can let them be aware that sometimes 
they have to compete with other people over some limited resources. It can 
be assumed that the virtues needed for playing, say, rugby are not 
significantly different from the virtues needed , for maintaining or 
actualizing a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. 
These virtues are, among others, respect for the rules, justice, prudence, 
commitment, courage, tolerance, persistence, and so on. It is of course not 
the case that children can definitively pick up these virtues, but the idea is 
to provide proper occasions where these virtues are needed and hence can 
be experienced by children. To be sure, sport is not the only way that these 
virtues can be learned; any cooperative form of activity will do. But as far 
as the development of the mind and body are concerned, sport probably is 
the best. 
3>. How then about educational procedures? It can be suggested that the 
procedures of education should be compatible with the framework of a fair 
system of cooperation between free and equal persons. Children's status of 
equality and freedom should be respected. Or, to use Peters' idea, 
procedures which lack "wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the 
learner" should be ruled out. Two specific points, however, should be made 
here. Firstly, the negative freedom and the equal status that children enjoy 
should be respected. The procedures of education, no matter what they are, 
should not encroach upon children's freedom and equal status. Punishment 
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Is allowable if and only if it is used compatibly with the freedom and equal 
status of children. Secondly, as to whether one specific educational 
procedure is compatible with the framework of a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal persons, it should be decided by 
responsible adults in their capacity as free and equal persons with the 
view that children's education is aimed at cultivating free and equal 
persons. 
In sum, education in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons is aimed at equipping children with necessary -capacities, 
knowledge, skills, experiences and virtues so that the fair system can be 
substantiated and. the ideals of liberty and equality can be actualized. 
Following this, the content of education to which children have a right is: 
literacy, numeracy, general education with a view to vocational 
requirements, political education, liberal education for autonomy, 
industrial experience, and team sports. And the educational procedures 
should be compatible with the judgement that children have the status of 
freedom and equality. 
After explaining what the word "education" refers to, it is the issue of 
whether children have a right to such an education that we shall turn to. 
2. A JUSTIFICATION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
After the clarification of what "education" stands for in the issue of 
children's right to education, it is time to ask the critical question: Do 
children have a right to the education mentioned? And, if they have, on 
what grounds? In this section it will be argued that children should have a 
right to the education specified in the last section, and a justification will 
be offered. 
Actually, the former question has two versions. As has been mentioned in 
Chapter One, the word "rights" in this thesis is mainly referred to two 
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categories of rights; one is "claim-rights of freedom", the other "welfare- 
rights". These two categories of rights are located in different contexts 
and have different correlatives. Generally, "A has a claim-right of freedom 
to X" means that A has no duty not to do (have) X If he wants to do (have) X 
and other parties are under obligation not to interfere with A's exercise 
(possession) of X. By contrast, "A has a welfare-right to X" Implies that 
other parties have corresponding duties to A in terms of providing X to A; 
and If A is not given what he has a right to have, he (or other people on his 
behalf) can complain or-claim against the responsible parties and the 
responsible parties can be censured for the neglect of their duties. _Given this understanding, the question "Do children have a right to education? "- 
can have two different versions. It can be regarded either as the question 
"Do children have a claim-right of freedom to education? " or the question 
"Do children have a welfare-right to education? " If the question is being 
asked with the view that children's right to education is a welfare-right, 
then the reason for giving either a positive or a negative answer will be 
quite different from the reason that would be given in response to the same 
question but with the view that children's right to education is a claim- 
right of freedom. To elaborate this point. No matter whether the 
statement "Children have a claim-right of freedom to education" Is 
accepted or rejected, the central issue on the agenda is the issue of liberty 
or freedom. The issues concerned are: why may or may not children have 
liberty or freedom to acquire education? And, what will be the 
consequences of children's having (or not having) a claim-right of freedom 
to education? However, the central focus of this question would be shifted 
if the statement "Children have a welfare-right to education" is made. In 
this perspective, no matter whether the statement is accepted or rejected, 
the issues concerned are: what is the moral or social context in which 
children are located so that other parties have, or have not, obligation to 
provide education for children? And, is education an essential good? 
If the analysis above is accepted it follows that the task of justifying 
children's right to education involves two separate parts. One is to justify 
children's claim-right of freedom to education, the other is to argue for 
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children's welfare-right to education. A question, however, can arise here. 
That is: between children's claim-right of freedom to education and 
welfare-right to education, which right should be given a more prominent 
place in the general issue of the justification of children's right to 
education? In fact, it can be quite legitimate to claim that children's right 
to education can at the same time be a welfare-right as well as a claim- 
right of freedom. Children's right to education as a welfare-right does not 
necessarily contradict the fact that children's right to education can also 
be a claim-right of freedom. In other words, children can have a right to 
pursue education without external'interference and at the same time they 
can claim that a certain kind of education should be provided by the duty- 
bearers, whoever they are. However, even though children's right to 
education can be either a welfare-right or a claim-right of freedom, it is 
still necessary to establish priority between the two versions of children's 
right to education in terms of their importance to children and the internal 
relationship between them. And if this order can be made, it then can be 
decided where the weight should be put. (50) 
It will be argued here that between children's welfare-right to education 
and claim-right of freedom to education, the former is more relevant to 
children's lives and practically prior to the latter, so the issue of the 
justification of children's right to education should be focused on the 
justification of children's welfare-right to education. There is one main 
reason for making this claim. As far as children are concerned, the claim 
right of freedom to education is not particularly essential to children's 
lives. The right to pursue education without external interference does 
make much sense under the condition that the right-holder is capable of 
pursuing education on his own and able to protect himself from external 
interference. In this respect, many children, if not all, would have no idea 
about what education is; they therefore would have no intention to pursue 
education at all in the first place. Even though some children may have a 
strong intention to be educated, they, nevertheless, are not able to pursue 
the education they want. As a result, they would be left in a state of 
confusion. Mill's statement can especially make this point clear. He says: 
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The uncultivated cannot be judges of cultivation. Those who most 
need to be wiser and better usually desire it least, and, if they 
desired it, would be incapable of finding their way to lt by their own 
lights. (51) 
From this angle, children's claim-right of freedom to education is rather 
like an ideal. This ideal is very important in terms of setting up a goal to 
which children can aspire. But how children can achieve this goal is partly 
dependent upon how capable they are. Thus this can lead to the suggestion 
that in order to substantiate children's claim-right of freedom to education 
it is essential to equip children at the beginning with some necessary 
means, such as the education described in the last section. And this is also 
the reason why children's welfare-right to education should be put in the 
first place. 
Given the reason above, the emphasis in this section should then be put on 
the justification of children's welfare-right to education. The justification 
of children's welfare-right to education involves different elements from 
the justification of children's claim-right of freedom to education. As 
children's welfare-right to education requires the provision of education 
for children, a justification for this right should firstly demonstrate the 
practical necessity of this right. And it is on the ground of practical 
necessity that other parties, namely, parents, adults and the state, should 
accept their obligations to fulfil children's right to education. The 
acceptability of children's welfare-right can actually be shown by 
justifying the practical necessity of children's right to education. 
To put it specifically, a satisfactory justification for the necessity of 
children's right to education consists in two stages. The first stage is to 
explain why the education concerned is such an essential good for children 
that without it children would suffer seriously and permanently; it should 
also explain the reason why the education is an essential good for society 
as a whole (society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons) so that by failing to provide the education for children the society 
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In question would not be sustained satisfactorily and would in turn 
endanger the welfare of all members of society. As the first stage of 
Justification can only demonstrate the practical necessity of children's 
right to education, it does not specify exactly who should be under the 
obligation for children's education. The second stage of justification hence 
should make clear why children's parents, adults without children and the 
state should jointly have obligations towards children's right to education. 
The first stage of the justification is meant to address those people who 
have reservations on the recognition that the education in question is an 
essential good - no matter whether it is a good for children or society. The 
critics might argue that children, or at least some children, and society as 
a whole would not suffer at all even if children do not have that kind of 
education. The second stage of justification is especially directed to those 
people, such as Nozick, who seem to hold the idea that the state's function 
should at most be like a night-watchman's and thus the state should be free 
from the obligation of providing education for children. (52) 
To start with the claim that education is an essential good for children 
themselves and for society as a whole. It should be. recalled that the 
society concerned is a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons and that an ideal person is a person who is able to realize the ideas 
upheld in society for himself and also for society as a whole. Apart from 
this, it should also be recognized that children have potential to become 
ideal persons; but as children, they have limited rationality and are in need 
of protection and guidance. The question now is: how can children's 
potential be realized so that the ideas of the individual and society can be 
actualized? The simple answer offered here is: through education. 
Education, as defined in the last section, is an instrument for equipping 
children with the necessary means so that they can become free, equal, 
capable of cooperating with other people and participating in social as well 
as political activities. Against the background of the specification of an 
ideal person under the specific framework outlined, and the claim that 
education is a means to the actualization of the ideas of the individual and 
society, we then can proceed with our arguments. 
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Persons without the communicating ability or the ability required for 
taking up a specific job, or without virtues to undertake a specific job, are 
doomed to be at the mercy of other people. And it would be very hard for 
them to maintain the full status of freedom and equality even if they 
wanted to. They would at most play a negative role in society. To be sure, 
they can still have all sorts of freedom (freedoms based on rules and 
freedoms detached from rules) and can have an equal status in terms of 
participating in all sorts of social or political activities when they reach 
the age of majority. But the essential opportunity for being autonomous 
persons would be deprived if they do not have those necessary abilities. 
For the scope they can exercise in devising, revising and pursuing their life 
plans would be severely constrained by their lncapacities. They would 
hence retain a semi-independent status. As a result, the value of being 
free and equal persons would be undermined. This is the reason why 
literacy, numeracy and a vocational education can be taken as essential for 
children. 
However, literacy, numeracy and vocational education are not enough. Many 
people can take specific jobs and have good communicating abilities, and 
hence can gain a solid ground on which they can participate in various kinds 
of activities and pursue their life plans. But if they do not have political 
knowledge and the understanding that they can, and should, play a positive 
role in political activities - which have an all-embracing impact upon their 
lives - they would be easily manipulated by other people or institutions. 
They would be like machinery driven by, and subordinated to, other people 
and institutions. And if they do not know the possible ways of thinking 
involved in political consideration and judgements, they would easily be 
misled by other people or institutions. In short, without a political 
education they are unable to maintain their independent status. Their 
political judgements would be subjected to the domination of others. It is 
on these accounts that political education is necessary for children. 
Given the provision of vocational education and political education - both 
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of which contain different forms of knowledge - it may seem that there is 
no need to include a liberal education for autonomy in the education 
concerned. For the contents of these three educational activities overlap, 
and the overlapping areas are exactly in the different forms of knowledge; 
in other words, a liberal education for autonomy has already been covered 
by political and vocational education and hence there is no necessity to 
provide a liberal education for autonomy for children. In response to this 
contention, it can be said that even though the content of liberal education 
for autonomy is covered by vocational and political education it is still 
necessary to include it. As the aims of these educational activities are 
different, there are hence different ways of employing different forms of 
knowledge, which in turn have impact on how educational activities should 
be conducted. In order to achieve the aims of education for autonomy it is 
therefore necessary for liberal education for autonomy to play a part. The 
aims of education for autonomy are more directed to the cultivation of 
capacities which can be used to protect children from external interference 
and internal irrational forces. Without a proper education for autonomy 
people would become the slaves of their own irrational selves, other people 
or institutions. They may have their life plans devised, revised or 
actualized; but, literally speaking they are not their own masters. They 
would be more like puppets, their lives are unexamined and hence unworthy. 
It is for this reason that an education for autonomy constitutes an 
essential good for children. -- 
If it is necessary to provide an education which covers literacy, numeracy, 
vocational education, political education and liberal education for 
autonomy, lt is also necessary to provide opportunities for children so that 
they can practise the knowledge and skills they have learned and pick up 
the virtues needed for actualizing the ideas of the individual and society. 
To provide these opportunities is essential for children on the grounds that 
by joining practical activities children would become aware of the 
practical value of knowledge and skills and that some virtues can perhaps 
only be picked up under some arranged settings. 
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On the whole, the reason why the education advocated 1s an essential good 
for children is that if children are not properly equipped with the 
knowledge, skills, and virtues mentioned they would suffer in one way or 
another. Uneducated members of society may permanently play a negative 
role in society and, more seriously, fail to become their own masters. Both 
are regrettable and unacceptable in a fair system of cooperation between 
free and equal persons. 
From another direction, it can be argued that it is for the interest of 
society as a whole that children should have a welfare-right to education. 
The argument can run as follows. The framework of a fair system of 
cooperation is a society which needs substantial support not only from 
each member's commitment but also from supportive devices which can 
either consolidate each member's commitment or embody the ideas upheld 
in this framework. Education, among others, can be counted as one of these 
possible devices. Education is mainly aimed at the continuity of society in 
its ideal form. This point in fact is only an echo of Dewey's position that 
education in its broader sense is the means of the continuity of social 
life. (53) Without the device of education, the framework of a fair system 
of cooperation between free and equal persons probably can survive one or 
two generations, not more. However, under normal conditions, it is quite 
natural for men to preserve the things they value. It is under these 
circumstances that education can be assumed as a "natural social device" 
resulting from the setting up of a fair system of cooperation. There are 
many advantages in maintaining and continuing a social system like the one 
mentioned here. Apart from the actualization of those cherished values, 
which fulfils human beings as moral agents, and a relatively fear-free 
society, to sustain the received social framework is to provide a stable 
environment in which the individual's life plan can be developed. If the 
society as such cannot be maintained, everyone's interests, including those 
of children, would be directly under threat. 
According to the argument above, it can be assumed that without the 
education concerned society as a whole would be undermined; and, due to 
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the fact that children and other members of society fundamentally share 
the same interests with society, they would be subsequently affected by 
the damage that society incurs. Hence it can be suggested that children are 
bound to suffer seriously if they do not receive a proper education. 
If the arguments above are accepted, it can be suggested that as education 
is an essential good for children and for society as a whole, there is then a 
necessity to provide education for children. Without the provision of 
education for children, children and society as a whole would suffer. 
The line of argument developed above would face one main objection. It can 
be claimed that the arguments offered are only a, series of assertions; they 
are not backed up by any positive evidence. For it can be claimed that the 
education specified is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition 
for the cultivation of the ideal person. It is possible to imagine that some 
people can be educated in a different way without receiving the education 
described and can still achieve the status of being free, equal and capable 
of cooperating with other people, John Stuart Mill is a prominent example 
of this. (54) Besides, it is also possible to suppose, or even to prove, that 
some people might receive an education as such yet fall to achieve the 
settled aims. (SS) Following this, it can be further argued that if the 
education specified is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition 
for the cultivation of the Ideal person, the claim that the education 
specified is essential for society as a whole would also collapse. And, the 
strength of the arguments for the claim that the education concerned is so 
essential for children and society that it must be provided for children 
would therefore be undermined. 
In the face of this objection, the response can be given as follows. It is 
true that no theorist is able to confirm a cause-effect law by which a 
claim can be made that the education specified is the necessary or the 
sufficient condition for the cultivation of the ideal person. It is also 
impossible to prove positivistically the claim that children would be 
seriously and permanently harmed if the education concerned is not 
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provided. However, it should be noted that the positivistic contention can 
be invoked to oppose not only the education advocated here but also all 
possible forms of education in terms of achieving their aims. Actually, no 
specific form of education can stand the test of positivistic contention. 
Does it mean that all forms of education are advocated or practised 
without sound foundation? It seems not. 
Human conditions are too complicated to allow us to justify 
positivistically the claim that education (any specific forms of education) 
is an essential good for every child under a specific social framework or 
for society as a whole. And it is rather a good thing for us to fall to 
justify this claim positivistically; to justify this claim positivistically is 
to locate human beings at the same level as material objects which are 
subject to physical laws, rather than to regard human beings as moral 
agents who can exercise their minds independently from physical laws in 
devising their life plans and making decisions. But it is worthwhile asking: 
if the claim that the education advocated is an essential good for children 
and for society as a whole cannot be justified positivistically, what is the 
foundation of its justification? In other words, what is the ground of its 
appealing strength? 
It can be suggested that the arguments proffered in justifying the claim 
that the education advocated is*an essential good for children and for 
society as a whole are basically moral or political arguments. The line of 
argument is offered to appeal to rational agents who are just and 
benevolent, and who uphold the idea that freedom and equality are desirable 
and essential for any member of society. So, for these rational agents, 
without the education devised for equipping children with necessary 
capacities for actualizing their potentials as moral agents, children and 
society as a whole would suffer, or more seriously, would be degraded. in 
this sense, the line of argument offered is founded on moral sentiments or 
intuitions, which are embodied in the society as a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal persons, shared by all rational agents 
in society. It follows that the arguments offered are not empirically 
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vacuous, even though they are not to be verified positivistically. 
Apart from the point made above, we can follow Hampshire and suggest 
that the line of argument is characteristically different from any 
scientific statements in the sense that it does not purport to be as 
accurate as a scientific statement and hence it would not be falsified by 
some clear and exceptional negative instances, as a scientific statement 
would be. (56) Moreover, lt can be suggested that the line of argument is 
intended to prescribe a way of life or to recommend a form of social action. 
Its justification or truth, as suggested by Mill, is not dependent upon the 
correspondence between the general claim and social actions that are 
subservient to the general claim. (57). 
In short, the foundation of the claim that the education advocated is an 
essential good for children as well as for society as a whole is grounded on 
the fact that it is appealing to rational beings who uphold the ideas of 
freedom and equality rather than on any positivistic evidence. And this 
claim should be taken as a moral or political recommendation; It is used to 
dictate which particular acts we should take. 
After explaining why the education advocated is an essential good for both 
children and society , we then can go on to explain why parents, 
the state 
and those adults without children should provide education for children. As 
has been mentioned, children's welfare-right to education has implied that 
children's education has to be provided. But the question "Who is going to 
provide this education and on what basis? " has not yet been tackled. It will 
be suggested here that parents and the state carry the main responsibility 
for children's education, and they are jointly responsible for it. This 
position can be viewed as against Mill's stance that parents have the main 
responsibility and that the state can only interfere under the condition that 
parents fail to fulfil their obligation. (58) It will also be argued that apart 
from parents and the state, adults without children should also be 
responsible for children's education. 
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First of all, a logical argument can be used to support the claim that to 
provide education for children is an obligation shared by parents, adults 
without children, and the state. The central thrust of this argument is that 
failing to provide education for children is fundamentally incompatible 
with the basic social framework in question and the ideas of the individual 
embraced by members of society. For the sake of avoiding self- 
contradiction and self-defeat, parents, adults without children and the 
state would impose on themselves an obligation in respect of children's 
education. This argument runs roughly as follows. A person (or an 
institution) either upholding the value of autonomy, liberty and equality or. 
emphasizing the importance of cooperation and participation would not be 
pleased to see any person in his society not equipped with the ability of 
actualizing the values he embraces; if he were, he would be self-defeating. 
So, it can be suggested that for the sake of consistency, if not any other 
honourable reasons, parents et al, would impose on themselves an 
obligation in terms of helping other members of society to achieve the 
same status as they have reached or valued. 
Apart from the argument offered above, there can be other arguments for 
justifying the claim that parents, the state and adults without children 
have obligations to provide education for children. We can start from the 
claim that parents have an obligation to satisfy children's need of 
education. 
The most common argument for parents' obligation towards their children's 
education is, as has been argued by Mill, that it 1s parents who bring their 
children into the world so that parents have a "sacred duty" to their 
children in offering an education fitting them to perform their part well in 
life towards others and towards themselves. (59) In the terms of Olafson, it 
is a generational duty of parents. (60) This argument contains two points. 
First, children's coming into existence is due to the actions of their 
parents. From this, it can be assumed that as children are an extension of 
their parents thus parents have a natural responsibility for their 
children. (61) Second, children are not like "things"; they are also "persons", 
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or at least "potential persons", and are entitled to achieve the status 
valued in society. However, as they are not competent to achieve the ideal 
status themselves, not only food but also instruction and training should 
then be provided. (62) 
Actually, the first point can only play a subsidiary role in this argument; 
for the fact that parents bring their children into existence does not 
directly lead to the idea that parents should be responsible for their 
children. In Hobbes' state of nature, for example, parents (or one of the 
parents) are free to dispose of their children: there is no responsibility 
whatsoever for parents to bring their children up. (63) Further it can be 
pointed out that baby-killing has not been uncommon in many human 
societies. The implication of this is that parental duties are not nature- 
bounded; they are rather contingent upon social contexts. However, it is 
quite plausible, from a psychological viewpoint, to argue that since most 
parents have affection for their children it would be natural for them to 
impose some sort of duty, like the duty of commitment, on themselves. (64) 
Nevertheless, this psychological argument would not meet the objection 
that the presumed innate affection of parents towards their children is by 
no means a purely psychological mechanism. It is rather partly conditioned 
by some sort of social, cultural or moral construction and hence the 
presumed self-imposing duty is unavoidably socially, culturally or morally 
oriented rather than a purely psychological derivation. From this angle, the 
main focus of arguing that parents have an obligation to their children 
should be on explaining the sort of context under which parents must 
undertake their obligation towards their children. In other words, the 
essential point is to reveal the basic principles - no matter whether moral, 
social, political or even divine principles = that direct parents' 
undertakings with regard to their children, In this respect, Locke's, Mill's 
and Green's theories can shed some light on the issue. 
In Locke's scheme, it is under the law of nature, which is derived from 
God's will, that parents should have obligation for their children's 
education. Admittedly, Locke recognizes that children are not born in a full 
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state of equality, freedom and rationality; but they are born to achieve it. 
For it is God's will that everyone has an equal right to his natural freedom. 
But how can children strive for the freedom and equality that God implants 
in rational beings in the state of nature? Locke's answer Is., to make 
children capable of using their reason; only equipped with reason can 
children understand and accept the law of nature and hence can gain their 
natural freedom and happiness. Then, how can children become rational 
beings? Locke's suggestion is: by "age and education" children can have 
reason. (65) But, as far as education is concerned, who is under obligation 
to provide education for children? Locke suggests that parents are, by the 
law of nature, "under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the 
children they had begotten. " It should be noted here that Locke does not say 
that only parents have this obligation towards their children; what he says 
is : "God hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, 
and hath placed in them suitable inclination of tenderness and concern to 
temper his power, to apply it as His wisdom designed it, to the children's 
good as long as they should need to be under it. "(66) To sum up. According 
to Locke, natural parents' obligation to provide education for their children 
is based on the law of nature, which prescribes an equal right to natural 
freedom and equality for all rational beings. Given this, parents' 
obligations are grounded on children's right to freedom and equality. 
Parents are at most and at best God's agents with regard to their children. 
In Mill's political and moral theory, the two basic principles are the 
principle of liberty and the principle of development. As has been 
mentioned in Chapter Two it is the principle of development that applies to 
children. To put it simply, in order to fulfil the principle of development, 
namely the principle that children are entitled to develop individuality, 
parents and the state are under an obligation to provide education for 
children due to the fact that education in Mill's theory is mainly a device 
for developing individuality and that children are incapable of developing 
their individuality on their own. The main implication of Mill's theory here 
is that it is partly under the imposition of the principle of development 
that parents have a "sacred duty" to provide education for their 
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children. (67) 
In Green's theory, the idea of the common good of community plays a 
central role. "The common good of community" Is not only the source for 
the authority of the state but also the strength by which the individual's 
right to free life can be exercised or actualized. But how can the common 
good of community be recognized and pursued? Green assumes that the 
common good of community can only be recognized and pursued by the 
individual with moral capacity. But how can moral capacity be acquired and 
developed? So far as children are concerned, Green's suggestion is: through 
education. Yet, who is going to take this responsibility for children's 
education? Based on different reasons Green designates two responsible 
agents, one is the parents and the other is the state. As far as parents' 
obligation to children's education is concerned, Green regards it as a pure 
moral duty, not the fact that parents brought their children into existence. 
But if is is asked: On what is parents' moral duty founded? Green would 
then answer that it is based on the individual's right to free life. (68) 
Locke, Mill and Green are invoked here to illustrate the point that parents' 
obligation to provide education for their children is not mainly based on the 
physical fact that children are begotten by them but on some basic 
principles rooted in a specific framework which directly or indirectly 
implies children's right to education. In the light of Locke's, -Mill's and 
Green's theories, it can be suggested that in the framework of a fair 
system of cooperation between free and equal persons children are also 
entitled to achieve the full status of equality and freedom. However, given 
the naturally imperfect condition of children, they themselves cannot 
achieve this ideal status on their own, therefore the onus of providing the 
necessary means (that is, the education) must rest with some other people 
who are capable. In this context, as parents are the first-hand responsible 
agents for children, they should normally be under an obligation, in 
practical terms, to provide an education for their children. 
Given the line of perspective outlined above, it can be inferred further that 
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it is not only parents who should have an obligation towards their children; 
adults who do not have children and most of all the state also have an 
obligation to provide education for children. There are two reasons for this 
suggestion; one is practical, the other is moral. From a pragmatic 
viewpoint, few parents can provide the education required for their 
children on their own. Only a group of parents is capable of doing this. But 
the problem arises here. Supposing twenty groups of parents are able to 
make educational provision required for their children, it can be imagined 
that the quality of the education would be various. If this happens, then the 
basic conviction that society is a fair system of cooperation between free 
and equal persons would be shaken under the circumstances that some 
children would be better equipped than others, and this would put some 
children in a disadvantaged position. In other words, because of the 
different quality of educational provision, some children are doomed to be 
poorly-equipped compared to others and therefore are more vulnerable than 
others in terms of making informed decisions and pursuing the good, life 
they would set up for themselves. Conceivably, these children would be 
easily subject to manipulation and control. The remedy for this possible 
flaw is that the state and other adults should take part- In the educational 
activities from the beginning. Their task is to try to ensure that. children 
can be given an equal position on which they can assert their freedom, 
develop their potentialities, and actualize their life plans. 
Besides this consideration, we can also invoke Aristotle's idea to support 
the view that the state and adults without children have obligations 
towards children's education. Aristotle argues that the state is more 
efficient in providing and implementing education for children. From a very 
pragmatic viewpoint, Aristotle observes that " it is far from easy to obtain 
a right training in goodness from youth upwards, unless one has been 
brought up under right law. " This indicates, according to Aristotle, several 
things. Firstly, Aristotle is not optimistic at all about human nature. 
People may know something about goodness, they may also know that to 
lead a hard and sober life is to strive for a happy life. But to live such a 
life is not attractive for most people. That is why the state should step in 
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to help people to have a good life. Secondly, Aristotle observes that 
ordinary people are vulnerable in relation to the state, so the state is 
especially in an advantageous position to engage or inspire its citizens to 
pursue education for the sake of perfecting its citizens' virtues; If the 
citizens fail to be obedient, the state is bound to inflict chastisement and 
penalties on them. However, if the state falls to fulfil its obligation, who 
should take up this obligation? Aristotle then says it is the plain duty of 
private citizens to undertake this obligation. Notably, it is not only 
parents but also other citizens who should take up this duty based on their 
general obligation to civic society. (69) 
From a moral point of view, as Locke, Mill and Green have shown, the 
guiding principles or ideas of a society should be upheld by every member 
of that society and each established institution should be under the 
guidance of the same principles or ideas. Hence, adults without children 
and the state are also under the imposition of the guiding principles or 
ideas in the affairs of education. That is why Mill suggests that if parents 
fail to fulfil their obligation towards their children the state should 
automatically take up the obligation to children. However, it can be 
suggested that as the basic principles or ideas have a binding force over 
every member and institution in society, say, Locke's principle of equal 
right to liberty or Mill's principle of individual development, or Green's 
principle of the right to free life, it is unconvincing to claim that some 
specific groups, such as parents, are entirely responsible for actualizing 
these principles. These fundamental principles are equally binding for all 
members of society and institutions. What is possible is that, in terms of 
practice, parents are initially much better placed to handle their children's 
education. However, it should be borne in mind that parents, other adults 
and the state share jointly the same responsibility; the question of who 
should be the main responsible agents for children's education is decided on 
the kind of social framework in question. 
After the justification of children's right to education, it is the issue of 
whether the education advocated can be enforced compulsorily in relation 
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to children to which we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PATERNALISM, CHILDREN'S OBLIGATION TO RECEIVE 
EDUCATION AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
It was argued in the last chapter that children should have a welfare-right 
to education on the grounds that the education advocated is an essential 
good for children as well as society as a whole. Apart from that, it was 
argued that parents, adults without children and the state should have joint 
obligations to provide the education advocated for children. If the 
arguments offered for these claims are sound, it follows that parents, 
adults without children and the state can be compelled to make educational 
provision for children if they fail to fulfil their obligations towards 
children voluntarily. What was not discussed In Chapter Four Is, however, 
the issue of whether children have an obligation to receive education, given 
the understanding that society as a whole would be undermined if children 
are not properly educated; and, whether children can be compelled to 
receive education regardless of their wishes on the grounds of their 
obligation to receive education. Besides this, the issue of whether children 
can be compelled to receive the education advocated for the reason that It 
is In the interest of children was also not tackled in the preceding chapter. 
Taking these two issues together, what was omitted from the last chapter 
is the issue concerning whether the education advocated should be made 
compulsory for children in a liberal democratic society. 
In this chapter, the focus will be on the issue of compulsory education. 
Generally speaking, compulsory education is not only a constraint against 
children but also a restriction for the responsible agents for children's 
education. But if we accept the arguments offered in the last chapter we 
then should accept that it is justifiable to compel the responsible agents 
to provide education for children and this compulsion should be accepted by 
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the responsible agents either on political or moral grounds. As such, we 
therefore can leave compulsory education as a restraint to the liberties of 
parents, adults without children and the state aside and concentrate on the 
issue whether compulsory education can be justified as a restriction on 
children's liberties. 
It should firstly be indicated why compulsory education as a restriction on 
children's liberties can be taken as a significant issue and attract much 
attention. As has been mentioned in Chapter Four, one of the basic features 
of liberal democratic societies is that the value of individual freedom Is 
highly accorded: Given this context, a , or/ma facie contradiction 
between 
compulsory education as a restraint on children's liberty and the esteem of 
individual freedom in a liberal democracy can then easily be detected. For 
this reason alone the issue of compulsory education deserves our scrutiny. 
Some other reasons can also be found. Most obviously, it is only children 
who are to attend educational activities compulsorily for a period of time 
(normally, ten or more years in Western societies). Adults' liberty of 
course is also constrained because of the device of compulsory education in 
the sense that they can be compelled to make educational provision for 
children. But under the condition that adults' obligation towards children's 
education is consciously self-imposed and that adults do not have to be 
confined to educational activities for a period of time, children's 
involuntary, or voluntary but not self-conscious, confinement to 
educational activities therefore seems rather unfair. But how can 
compulsory education still have a place in liberal democratic societies? It 
is partly because of this question that the issue of compulsory education 
needs our consideration. Moreover, the fact that the issue of compulsory 
education can be a test case for various contentions concerning the 
relationship between individual freedom and autonomy has also invited 
writers' concern over this issue. For some writers, such as Illich, 
individual freedom is an indispensable means for achieving personal 
autonomy. (l) Following this view, compulsory education as a restriction on 
children's liberty can only be a stumbling block to the development of 
children's autonomy; compulsory education therefore is unjustifiable. For 
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some writers, notably W. V. Humboldt and J. S. Mill, individual freedom is, as 
far as children are concerned, not necessarily the means for the 
development of personal autonomy; on the contrary, for the sake of 
developing autonomy individual freedom can and should be curtailed. 
According to this view, compulsory education cannot be a hindrance to the 
development of autonomy; It is rather a necessary means for achieving 
personal autonomy. The question of whether or not compulsory education 
can be justified is therefore directly related to the issue concerning the 
relationship between individual freedom and personal autonomy, which Is 
important with regard to the cultivation of the ideal person in liberal 
democratic societies. 
After specifying the reasons why the issue of compulsory education can 
generate much argument, it is necessary to go further to elucidate several 
points before we can go on to tackle the question of, whether compulsory 
education can be justified. Firstly, we have to make clear whether the 
"compulsory education" considered here can be identified with "compulsory 
schooling". Secondly, lt is desirable to show the difference between the 
"compulsory education" under current consideration and. "compulsory state 
education" as well.. as any specific form of compulsory education currently 
adopted by any liberal democratic societies. Thirdly, a few words should 
be offered concerning compulsory education as an abstract idea and 
compulsory education as a specific form of practical measure. - Finally, we 
have to clarify the notion of compulsory education and its bearings on the 
justification of compulsory education. The discussion framework of the 
justification of compulsory education can only be fixed after the 
clarification of these four points. 
Compulsory education is sometimes identified with compulsory schooling. 
But it is not necessarily so. In fact, it is not very difficult to make a 
distinction between education and schooling. Marcus Aurelius saw their 
difference clearly. He said: "To my great-grandfather I owed the advice to 
dispense with the education of the schools and have good masters at home 
instead - and to realize that no expense should be grudged for this 
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purpose. "(2) A point made by John Stuart Mill can also be helpful in 
establishing the difference between education and schooling. For Mill, 
compulsory education is justifiable (as to why it can be justified, will be 
discussed later on). However, the most plausible way to implement 
compulsory education is through a system of public examinations allied to 
schooling. (3) Clearly, Mill does not simply equate education with schooling. 
Apart from the two classical cases, two recent cases can also be invoked 
to differentiate education and schooling. Illich, for example, strongly 
attacks schooling and suggests that schooling should be replaced by 
educational webs or networks. (4) The second case can be found in the 1980 
Education (Scotland) Act, Section 30. It states: "It should be the duty of 
the parent of every child of school age . 
to provide efficient education for 
him suitable to his age, ability and aptitude either by causing him to attend 
a public school regularly or by other means. " Apparently, among others, 
schooling is only one form of educational provision. Education for children 
does not necessarily proceed in school. 
However, the distinction between education and schooling is not so clear- 
cut as these statements may suggest. The content of education in question 
is rather complicated. It is unlikely that parents themselves could provide 
their children with an education that can be reckoned as satisfactory 
without going through some form of institution. It can be proposed that 
various forms of knowledge, virtues (especially public virtues), industrial 
experience and the abilities to participate in social and political activities 
can only be effectively picked up through some institutions or one single 
institution. It is of course not necessary to hold children's learning 
activities only in one place. They can be dispersed in different 
institutions. For example, in order to get industrial experience children can 
go to factories run by non-educationalists. But it seems clumsy to do so. 
For the sake of convenience, it would be better to set up a place in which 
all kinds of learning activities can take place. And this place is commonly 
named a "school". 
To recognize the difficulty in making a clear-cut distinction between 
202 
education and schooling in the present context is to admit that the issue of 
the justification for compulsory education is also, in most cases and for 
most practical purposes, the issue of the justification for compulsory 
schooling. 
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that the issue of compulsory 
education (schooling) should not be equated with the issue of compulsory 
state education (schooling), although these two issues are related. To put 
it simply, "compulsory education" and "compulsory state education" are two 
things. The idea of compulsory education only prescribes that children can 
and should be compelled to attend educational institutions. It does not 
specify that the educational institutions concerned must be state-run 
institutions. By contrast, the idea of compulsory state education implies 
that children can and should be compelled to participate in educational 
activities, and the educational activities concerned must be those run by 
the state rather than by any other private institutions, churches or 
individuals. Given the difference between these two, we can therefore 
follow in Mill's footsteps and support compulsory education without 
necessarily endorsing compulsory state education, (5) In. this chapter, it is 
only intended to tackle the issue of compulsory education. The question of 
whether compulsory state education can be justified can only be raised and 
answered after the justification of compulsory education. 
Apart from the possible entanglement between compulsory education and 
compulsory state education, it should also be pointed out that the issue of 
the justification of compulsory education concerned here should not be 
taken as the issue of the justification of any specific form of compulsory 
education currently adopted in liberal democratic societies, like Britain. 
(6) The education outlined in Chapter Four shares similarities with many 
examples of currently adopted school education. But it also differs from 
them. Hence arguments that can be used to justify, the compulsory 
education advocated do not necessarily justify any specific form of 
compulsory education currently adopted by liberal democratic societies, 
and vice versa. 
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It is also necessary to clarify the difference between the two senses of 
compulsory education, namely, compulsory education as an abstract idea 
and compulsory education as a specific educational measure. Compulsory 
education as an abstract idea only implies the notion that children can and 
should be compelled to participate in educational activities; It does not 
specify the substance of educational activities, for example, the duration 
and the actual content of educational activities. Compulsory education as a 
concrete educational measure not only indicates that children can and 
should be compelled to receive education but also covers some specific 
measures concerning educational activities. Given the distinction of these 
two, it can then be suggested that the justification of compulsory 
education as an abstract idea does not amount to the justification of 
compulsory education as a concrete educational measure. (7) For the sake 
of convenience, the term "compulsory education" hereafter refers to both 
idea and specific measure if it is not specified otherwise. The current 
discussion of compulsory education is concerned with not only whether 
compulsory education as an abstract idea can be justified but also whether 
compulsory education as a concrete educational measure for all children 
advocated in the last chapter can be justified. The specific questions 
concerning when compulsory education should start and how long 
compulsory education should endure are not under consideration in this 
chapter. 
We now turn to the notion of compulsory education. The notion of 
compulsory education is generally associated with the idea that children 
can and should be compelled to receive education by using moral and legal 
sanctions. Or, to put it more briefly, children have no say over the matter 
of their education. This notion is, however, too simple to inform us that 
given the absence of sovereignty over their own education some children 
(or most children in some societies) actually are not unwilling, or are even 
willing, to participate in educational activities. In the terms of Katz, 
these children "voluntarily accept the standard built into the law and 
follow the law as they would a social rule of custom that they accept. "(8) 
For these children, the device of compulsory education is actually 
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redundant. Its compulsory element does not affect these children's lives in 
any sense. The device of compulsory education is only significant under the 
circumstances in which children not only have no option in the matter of 
their education but have no intention of participating in educational 
activities. Given this context, the children concerned can be coerced by the 
law to participate in educational activities. 
The reason for specifying the exact role that compulsory education plays is 
to point out the fact that the device of compulsory education in many cases 
does not do facto restrict children's liberty since it does not go against 
children's desire or intention. ' This point is particularly important if we 
endorse Mill's account that liberty consists in doing what one deslres. (9) 
However, the idea of liberty is not logically associated with desire- 
satisfaction; it can also refer to the context in which the children 
concerned can have genuine alternatives open to them. (10) Conceivably, the 
fact that the device of compulsory education do jure compels children to 
go to educational institutions does interfere with their liberty to 
participate in other activities during a specific period of time. Given the 
analysis above, the notion of compulsory education concerned here refers to 
the fact that the device of compulsory education de jure limits children's 
liberty of choice so that they can have no real say over their own education 
irrespective of their intention or desire. 
After fixing the discussion framework of this chapter we now can go on to 
consider whether compulsory education, as an abstract idea and a concrete 
educational measure, can be justified or not. 
1. A JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
In the following sections, it will firstly be shown, briefly, why compulsion 
can coexist with liberty and why compulsory measures can have a place in 
liberal democratic societies. Only after this exposition can we go on to 
tackle the issue of whether compulsory education can be justified. 
Secondly, it will be argued that paternalistic arguments - that is, 
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arguments which start from the view that it is for the good (or welfare, or 
interests) of children that the responsible agents for children's education 
can compel children to participate in educational activities - can justify 
compulsory education. But the justification of compulsory education as 
specific measures advocated in the last chapter should not be solely based 
on paternalistic arguments. They need to be supplemented by the argument 
that children have an obligation to receive education. Thirdly, it will be 
elaborated that compulsory education, as an abstract idea as well as the 
concrete educational measures advocated in Chapter Four, can be justified 
from the stance that it is because of the children's obligation: to receive 
education that the responsible agents for children's education can compel 
or coerce children to participate in educational activities without paying 
attention to their wishes or intention. Finally, it will be demonstrated 
from a wider perspective that compulsory education can fit into liberal 
democratic societies, and the justification of compulsory education is 
based on the compatibility between compulsory education and society as a 
fair system of cooperation. 
What should be added Is that Mill's viewpoints disclosed In his work Qf1 
Liberty will frequently be borrowed to develop or support the positions 
held here. The reason for taking Mill's viewpoints to develop our arguments 
is that his On Liberty is still the magnum opus as far as discussions of 
compulsory education In the liberal tradition are concerned. (1 I) In Mill's 
monumental work On Liberty. he whole-heartedly advocates the idea of 
compulsory education. (12) The main argument he employs in justifying 
compulsory education for children Is a liberal paternalistic argument. 
Apart from that, Mill's principle of liberty can shed light on the reasoning 
why compulsory education can be legitimately imposed on children, 
although he explicitly declares that the principle of liberty does not apply 
to children at all. Underlying Mill's liberal paternalism and the principle of 
liberty Is his presumption, or observation, that different human activities 
can be guided by different principles, but different principles, even though 
they may clash with one other, should be subordinated under one single 
supreme principle - the principle of general utility. So far as compulsory 
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education is concerned, this assumption may not compel as much attention 
as his two main arguments concerning compulsory education, but it plays a 
pivotal role in Mill's discussions of liberty and compulsory education in 
general. Given this understanding, Mill's liberal paternalism, the principle 
of liberty, and the presumption underlying these two doctrines will be the 
reference framework to which we can turn in the attempt to develop the 
positions upheld In this chapter. 
I. I Compulsion, Liberty and Liberal Democratic Societies 
The reason why compulsory education needs justification is the 
presumption that liberty (in all its forms) in liberal democratic societies 
is always taken as a good. Compulsion or coercion, by contrast, always 
constitutes, in the terms of Feinberg, "a definitive loss". (13) Following 
this, it is policies or measures Involved with compulsion or coercion that 
need justification, rather than their lack. However lt should be noted. that 
the presumption in favour of liberty often conceals the fact that 
compulsion (or coercion, or restraint, or constraint) and liberty are, in 
many cases, two sides of a coin and hence are both' needed in liberal 
democratic societies. (14) Bentham's statement makes this point quite 
clear. He says: 
As against the coercion applicable by individuals to individuals, no 
liberty can be given to one man but in proportion as it is taken away 
fron another. All coercive laws, therefore, and in particular all 
laws creative of liberty, are as far as they go abrogative of 
I iberty. (15) 
Bentham was not the only writer who perceived the delicate relations 
between liberty and compulsion. 
, 
Kant also made a point very similar to 
Bentharn's. In explaining that "right" (justice) implies the title or authority 
to compel, Kant remarks that the conception of right (justice) may be 
viewed as consisting immediately in the possibility of a universal 
reciprocal compulsion, in harmony with the freedom of all. "(16) 
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Apart from Bentham and Kant, Austin advocates the idea that "laws" should 
be viewed as "orders backed by threats". In this sense, "laws" are actually 
reckoned by Austin as forms of coercion. What is implied in this view is 
that "coercion" or "compulsion" is always needed for a human society in 
which laws are used as regulatory instruments. (17) 
Mill's ideas expressed in On Liberty can also be employed to support the 
view that compulsion and coercion are a necessary part of liberal 
democratic societies. In On Liberty although Mill repeatedly emphasizes 
the importance of liberty for both society as well as the individual, and 
despite his rhetorical statement that "a11 restraint, qua restraint, is an 
evil"(18), Mill does not fail to see that compulsion, interference or 
restraint are necessities for human life. He makes it quite clear in saying 
that "All that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the 
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of 
conduct, therefore, must be imposed---by law in the first place, and by 
opinion on many things. .. . "(19) Given this, it should be understood that 
Mill's On Liberty is actually not an attack on compulsion, interference or 
restraint, but a work aimed at delimiting the boundary of these things. 
From this, it can be: suggested that if compulsion is essential in making 
life valuable in human societies in general, it can also be valuable and 
acceptable in liberal democratic societies. 
Taking these four writers' views together, it can be claimed that it is for 
the sake of liberty that we need compulsory measures in liberal 
democracies. Following this, it can be suggested that the issue concerning 
compulsion or coercion is not whether compulsory measures should have a 
place in liberal democratic societies but where, when and how 
compulsory measures should be applied. 
1.2 Paternalistic Arguments, and Compulsory Education 
Paternalistic arguments are frequently used to justify compulsory 
education for children, Traces of this line of argument can be found in 
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Locke's Two Treatises of Government (20) But Its most explicit exposition 
is offered by Mill. And this kind of argument is still followed by some 
recent writers, notably, John White, Amy Gutmann and Graham Haydon. (21) 
Paternalistic arguments for children's compulsory education are based on 
various forms of paternalism. (22) Paternalism, according to Gerald 
Dworkin, is "the doctrine that claims the interference with a person's 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, 
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being 
coerced. "(23) In short, paternalism - sanctions the legitimacy of 
interference with a person's liberty for his own good without paying 
attention to his intention or desires. 
A valid paternalistic justification for practical measures has to fulfil at 
least three requirements. First, it has to show that the states of mind of 
the persons under paternalistic interventions are encumbered or impaired. 
Specifically, paternalistic interventions are justifiable given the condition 
that the persons concerned are hampered - due to ignorance, or emotional 
stress, or compulsion, or undue influence, or non-rationality - in making 
action-related decisions which may cause harm to themselves. (24) -Having 
said this, it should be added here that paternalistic interventions are also 
justifiable in some special cases in which the persons concerned do not 
suffer from impaired states of mind but the prohibited actions are 
unreasonably risky. (25) Legislation enforcing occupants of automobiles to 
wear safety belts is an example of this. This sort of paternalistic 
intervention is based on a strong form of paternalism. It is a departure 
from Mill's position concerning paternalism; but it has become part of daily 
practice. (26) 
Secondly, there should be a consensus over what is "the welfare, good, 
happiness, needs, interests or values" of the persons on whom paternalistic 
measures are imposed. And "the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests 
or values" at stake should not be petty; they should constitute an essential 
good. This is important because in liberal democratic societies people have 
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different ideas about what is a good life; and this reflects the possibility 
that people may also have different ideas about the constituent elements of 
a good life. A valid paternalistic justification should therefore clearly 
demonstrate that the good for which paternalistic measures are imposed 
must be one that is normally recognized as an essential element for any 
form of good life. But it may be asked: Is it possible to reach consensus 
over what an essential good is in a liberal pluralistic society? It then can 
be answered that the consensus is achievable by appealing to people who 
are rational, self-interested, just and benevolent under the condition that 
society is a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. 
Thirdly, paternalistic measures should be the measures that can 
effectively promote the good or avoid the harm concerned. If they cannot 
effectively achieve the desired aim then they should not be imposed at all. 
It should be emphasized here that no paternalistic measure can absolutely 
deliver the good or avoid the harm concerned. Human conditions are too 
complicated to allow us to guarantee that paternalistic measures can 
absolutely achieve their designated aims. Rather, the sensible requirement 
is that they should effectively achieve their designated aims in most cases. 
A practical case can illuminate this point. The wearing of safety belts is a 
paternalistic measure imposed on drivers for the sake of drivers' safety. 
Under normal circumstances, the wearing of safety belts protects drivers 
from injuries when car accidents happen. However, the wearing of safety 
belts, in some special cases, may delay drivers' escape from their cars 
when their cars catch fire and hence endanger their lives. But how can the 
wearing of safety belts still be reckoned justified? It can only be reasoned 
that it is because this paternalistic measure can effectively, in most 
cases, achieve its desired -aim. Apart from the requirement of the 
effectiveness of paternalistic measures, if some non-paternalistic 
measures can be found to achieve the desired aims then, other things being 
equal, paternalistic measures should be avoided. (27) 
In the light of these three general requirements, we then can go further to 
see whether compulsory education can be justified on the grounds of 
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paternalism. It can be suggested that if a paternalistic argument is to 
justify compulsory education for children it has to show that the 
implementation of compulsory education fulfils the three requirements 
mentioned. To put it specifically: 
1>. Children opon whom compulsory education is imposed are persons whose 
states of mind are encumbered or impaired. There should be reasons to 
assume that children do not have clear ideas about what is good for 
themselves and they are unable to make rational choices, and that children 
may do harm to themselves or fail to promote their own good if they are 
allowed to make decisions over whether they should participate in 
educational activities. 
2>. The education concerned should be an essential good for children; and 
this must be accepted by members of society. 
3>. Compulsory education should be able to achieve effectively the desired 
aim. The question, however, is: what is the desired aim of compulsory 
education? It can be aimed at equipping children with necessary 
capacities, knowledge, skills, experiences and virtues so that they may 
become "ideal" persons. Or, it can be aimed at cultivating (or realizing) 
"Ideal" persons. The difference between these two aims is that the former 
aim is modest in the sense that it is about offering some specific measures 
by which children will be better equipped to become "ideal" persons. 
Whether children can actually become the ideal persons is dependent upon 
various conditions and an adequate education is only one of them. This aim 
of compulsory education, therefore, is to make sure that children can have 
necessary capacities, knowledge, skills, experiences and virtues needed for 
their development as "ideal" persons. The scenario is different, however, if 
compulsory education is directly aimed at cultivating children to become 
"ideal" persons. In this context, compulsory education is regarded as the 
sole determinant factor for the realization of "ideal" persons. It will be 
shown later if we adopt the former aim then compulsory education, as a 
specific form of education advocated in Chapter Four, is justifiable. 
However, if the latter aim is adopted then we can only justify compulsory 
education as an abstract idea. Apart from the requirement of the 
211 
effectiveness of compulsory education, it should be added that compulsory 
education can only be justified given the condition that there should be no 
other non-compulsory measures which can replace compulsory education 
for achieving the desired aim. 
Given the analysis above, Mill's paternalism, as a typical paternalistic 
argument for compulsory education, can now be examined. This examination 
can be split into two parts. The first part is to reveal how Mill justifies 
compulsory education paternalistically; the second part is to check 
whether Mill's paternalistic argument for compulsory education can meet 
the three requirements mentioned. 
Children, in Mill's view, are like savages in an uncivilized society. They are 
persons "below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood"(28), which is the age of 21. But this is not the main point. 
The main point is that children need to be looked after by adults. (29) The 
reason why children need to be looked after by adults is that children are 
not mature in their facultles. (30) And this observation probably leads Mill 
to think that children do not know what they really desire(31); children are 
not capable of knowing their own well-being(32); children are incapable of 
acting by rational consideration of distant motives(33); children are least 
fitted to judge for themselves(34); and children are incapable of being 
improved by free and equal discussion. (35) On the whole, - children, 
according to Mill, are not able to lead their own lives, they are not 
autonomous. They need help, even though they do not know this. 
Mill's position concerning whether compulsory education is an essential 
good for children deserves attention here. Generally, Mill supports 
Humboldt's position that "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and 
transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his 
powers to a complete and consistent whole. "(36) Given this, it can be 
suggested that the criterion of the individual's happiness, interests or 
welfare is whether the individual can achieve the highest and most 
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harmonious development of his powers. However, things do not stop there. 
Mill is also aware of the fact that a member of a civilized society must be 
a social being. So, the individual's happiness is not entirely dependent upon 
his own development; there is something else. A rational being, or a person 
who is on the way to pursuing the end of man, must consider other people's 
happiness. For his happiness is closely related to other people's happiness. 
In other words, the attainment of the happiness of the individual is not 
only through his own development but also through the realization of the 
greatest amount of happiness of all other people. (37) 
The question now is, how can children develop from persons who are not 
capable of pursuing their own happiness to persons who can pursue their 
own happiness and conduct their life plans and take account of other 
people's desire for happiness? Is this transition a natural and spontaneous 
one, and hence can lt happen without external help or interference? For 
Mill, the answer to the latter question is a negative one. True, Mill in some 
places suggests that human nature is like a tree, "which requires to grow 
and develop on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces 
which make it a living thing. "(38) But this analogy should not bring us to 
think that each individual can develop his inner forces without any help, or 
protection from without. Actually, the picture Mill has in mind is not a 
healthy tree on fertile soil in a fine environment. Rather, children are 
trees which need cultivation and care. There are two points for supporting 
this view. ' Firstly, as has been mentioned, children (small trees) are 
incapable of improving themselves; If they were left alone, they would not 
be fit to perform their part well as members of society, whether towards 
themselves or other people. Secondly, Mill is not as romantic as it may 
seem on the question of human nature. Although he suggests that "desires 
and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and 
restraint"(39), he is also aware that human desires and impulses, as part of 
the inward forces of human beings, can either be directed to bad uses or 
good uses. (40) In order to avert the bad uses of human desires and 
impulses, which might lead to self-destruction or pose a threat to society 
as a whole, Mill claims that human faculties need cultivation at childhood. 
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In his view, the development of individuality can only be possible after the 
cultivation of various kinds of human faculties. How then? Mill's answer 
is., through compulsory education. Through the use of law and discipline 
over children, children's desires and impulses can then be cultivated; 
without these, children would never lead a rational life. (41) 
So far, it does not matter whether we are entirely happy with Mill's 
account concerning children as heteronomous agents and compulsory 
education as an essential good for children's welfare. What matters is 
that Mill does give proper consideration to these . two 
issues. We now can 
turn to what Mill says concerning whether compulsory education can 
achieve the desired aim and whether there are non-compulsory measures 
which could replace compulsory education. 
We can first consider whether there are any non-compulsory measures 
which can achieve the same aim that compulsory education is supposed to 
realize in Mill's scheme. It seems Mill does not directly tackle this 
question. But considering the account Mill gives regarding human nature, of 
which desires and impulses are part, and the fact that desires and impulses 
can be misused if they are allowed to develop freely, it seems there would 
be no other alternative to compulsory measures which can lead human 
desires and impulses along desirable tracks. If this inference is correct 
we then can suggest that it would be impossible, in Mill's view, to 
substitute non-compulsory measures for compulsory education in terms of 
cultivating children's individuality and public virtues. What should also be 
noted here is that Mill not only advocates compulsory education but 
suggests that compulsory measures are a necessary means in pedagogical 
practice. - For he says: "Much must be done and much must be learnt by 
children for which rigid discipline and known liability to punishment are 
indispensable as means. "(42) 
The question now is: if compulsory education is the only vehicle for the 
desired aim, can it actually achieve the desired aim? However, before this 
question can be answered we need to know what the desired aim of 
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compulsory education Is in Mill's mind. Is it aimed at equipping children 
with necessary means so that they may develop their Individuality or 
Independence? Or, is it directly aimed at cultivating Individuality or 
Independence? From the statements made In On Liberty. it seems that Mill 
is quite modest in defining the desired aim of compulsory education. For 
example, when Mill argues that the state should be responsible for its 
citizens' education, he says: "Is it not almost a self-evident axiom that the 
State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of 
every human being who is born its citizen? "(43) Following this, he 
complains: "It still remains unrecognized that to bring a child into 
existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for 
its body, but instruction and training for Its mind is a moral crime. ... "(44) 
Elsewhere, Mill suggests that public examinations and schooling are two 
ideal measures for the implementation of compulsory education. He 
remarks: "Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a 
gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal 
acquisition and, what is more, retention of a certain minimum of general 
knowledge virtually compulsory, "(45) Mill in these places does not 
explicitly spell out the desired aim of compulsory education, but it would 
be reasonable to suggest that the aim of education in his mind is to equip 
children with "a certain minimum of general knowledge" "up to a certain 
standard" so that they may develop their Individuality and rationally 
conduct their life plans. 
We now turn to the question of whether Mill's device of compulsory 
education can achieve its desired aim. It can be argued that given Mill's 
modest view of the role of compulsory education there Is no reason why 
this aim cannot be achieved. However, Mill does not provide any empirical 
evidence to support this claim. He, therefore, cannot claim empirically 
that his device of compulsory education can effectively achieve its desired 
aim. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it is rather Mill's personal 
conviction - taking relevant social conditions, his own personal 
experiences and his assumptions about human nature into account - that 
leads hire to believe that his scheme can effectively achieve its desired 
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aim. He says: 
But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons 
qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same 
persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on 
the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded 
by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to 
those unable to defray the expense. (46) 
This statement seems to suggest that Mili's device of compulsory education 
can achieve Its aim If good teachers and adequate financial backing äre 
available. 
To sum up. Mill's argument for compulsory education is a paternalistic 
argument with a liberal basis. That is, in order to equip children, as non- 
rational and heteronomous beings, with necessary means so that they can 
develop -their rationality as well as autonomy and hence can lead an 
independent or rational life, it is essential for children to be compelled to 
receive education at the expense of their personal freedom. 
After the exposition of Mill's paternalistic argument for compulsory 
education, we now can question whether his paternalistic argument can 
fulfil the three requirements mentioned above. It is quite obvious that 
taking persons under the age of 21 as children is not accepted nowadays. 
But It seems quite reasonable to adapt Mill's normative standard of 
childhood and suggest that persons who fall into Mill's description can be 
treated paternalistically, in one way or another. Moreover, although It is 
extremely difficult to draw a clear-cut line between childhood and 
adulthood we can hardly deny that all adult human beings have to pass 
through the stage of childhood. And before they reach adulthood, no matter 
how it is defined, they must have had a period of time in which they had no 
clear idea about what was essential good for them, and consequently they 
were unable to make rational choices. For people under this stage 
paternalistic measures are not unjustifiable. Thus it is reasonable to 
suggest that Mill's normative account of childhood can fulfil the first 
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requirement of a valid paternalistic justification. However, the 
proposition, "Paternalistic measures are applicable to children", should not 
lead us to jump to the conclusion that compulsory education can be imposed 
on children. Whether compulsory education can be imposed on people In the 
stage of childhood is rather dependent upon whether compulsory education 
is an essential good for children, whether compulsory education is 
necessary, and whether the education concerned can effectively achieve the 
desired aim. 
According to Mill's conception of education, education is a necessary means 
for the development of individuality or independence. Added to Mill's idea 
of education, his account of human nature provides ground for claiming that 
compulsion is necessary for educating children. If we are convinced by 
these two points we then should also accept that compulsory education is 
necessary and it is an essential good for children as well as society as a 
whole. So, there is no difficulty about suggesting that Mill's paternalistic 
argument for compulsory education can fulfil the second requirement and 
part of the third requirement mentioned above. 
The key points are, however, whether Mill's device of compulsory education 
is the only option for achieving the desired aim and whether the compulsory 
education concerned can effectively realize its aim. It should be mentioned 
here that Mill does not empirically demonstrate that his device of 
compulsory education is. either a sufficient condition or a necessary 
condition for the realization of the desired aim, even though the desired 
aim is relatively modest. We may therefore suspect whether Mill's device 
of compulsory education is the only option in achieving the desired aim. 
This suspicion can be deepened by the example set by Mill himself, namely, 
he himself was home-educated and did not pass through public 
examinations and schooling. With regard to this contention, it can be 
suggested that Mill does not intend to argue that his device of compulsory 
education is the only option for realizing the desired aim. It is rather the 
case that as far as a universal education for all children is concerned, 
compulsory education consisting of public examinations and schooling is 
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the most sensible and effective way of realizing the desired aim. There are 
of course other forms of compulsory education which can also achieve the 
desired aim, but they may not be as effective as Mill's device of compulsory 
education. 
If the view offered above is correct, Mill's paternalistic argument for his 
specific form of compulsory education would not be invalidated by the fact 
that his device is'not the only means for achieving the desired aim he has 
in mind. The same line of argument can also be used to tackle the question 
of whether compulsory education as perceived by Mill can effectively 
accomplish its aim. As far as the question whether compulsory- education 
should be universally imposed is concerned, Mill would claim that the 
compulsory education he outlines would be the most effective way of 
achieving the desired aim. But it may be asked: what is the basis of this 
claim made on behalf of Mill? This question can be answered as follows. 
Firstly, the desired aim of compulsory education is not set unreasonably 
high; children can be properly equipped with the capacities and knowledge 
concerned if financial backing and good teachers are available. Secondly, 
children, under normal circumstances, will have no problem in acquiring the 
knowledge or capacities needed for the development of individuality if 
education is properly conducted. (47) Taking these two reasons together, it 
can be concluded that Mill's device of compulsory education can effectively 
achieve its desired aim owing to the fact that the level of-knowledge and 
capacities needed for developing individuality or independence is not too 
high for normal children to achieve, and that it is within the capacity of a 
civilized society to offer an education such as the one Mill proposes. 
Admittedly, Mill's paternalistic argument concerning the requirement of 
the effectiveness of compulsory education is not entirely satisfactory. His 
device of compulsory education cannot be shown to be as effective as the 
case of the wearing of safety belts. And it can only be suggested that it is 
merely Mill's conviction, albeit not completely unfounded, that his proposal 
of compulsory education can effectively achieve the desired aim. In 
support of Mill, it can be replied firstly that no large-scale educational 
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practice can be proved to be as effective as the case of the wearing of 
safety belts. It is especially so given the condition that the educational 
practice had not been put to the test at that time. It thus would not be 
awkward for Mill to refer to his own experiences as well as practical 
deliberations, taking practical factors into consideration, and suggest that 
his device of compulsory education would effectively achieve its aim. 
Secondly, it can also be suggested that the statement, "Compulsory 
education can effectively achieve its designated aim", for Mill is more like 
a rule of conduct by which human action is supposed to be governed rather 
than a firm prediction.. Viewed from this angle, even if Mill's proposal of 
compulsory education does not achieve the aim it only means that the 
practical measures are not yet properly conducted. The practical measures 
concerned can always be improved to achieve the designated aim., In this 
sense, the failure of any practical measures for achieving the designated 
aims would not invalidate the rule of conduct in question. (48) 
After the examination of Mill's paternalistic argument for compulsory 
education it now can be concluded that his argument can generally fulfil 
the three requirements of a valid paternalistic justification and hence can 
be regarded as a valid justification for compulsory education. 
We are now in a better position to decide whether paternalism can be 
adopted in liberal democracies to justify compulsory education. It will be 
argued here that members of liberal democratic societies would justify 
compulsory education, as an idea as. well as the specific form of practical 
measure specified, in Chapter Four, paternalistically. But before they 
invoke paternalism to justify compulsory education they would try to 
confirm that the education under consideration is an essential good. 
Moreover, they would be aware that paternalism cannot be solely relied on 
to justify compulsory education as a specific educational measure. The 
position held here is a rejoinder to Kleinig's general idea that compulsory 
education (schooling) cannot be justified paternalistically. (49) 
It should be firstly reiterated that children under consideration in this 
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thesis are, persons who have only limited rationality. Thus members of 
liberal democracies will acknowledge without great difficulty that 
paternalistic measures can apply to children in one way or another. 
Further, it should be explained why members of a liberal democracy would 
try to assure that the education under consideration is an essential good. It 
has been indicated that members of liberal democracies have different 
ideas about what is a good life. It is on this ground that people in liberal 
democracies can have and pursue their own life plans as long as they 
observe the rule of law. Following this, it can be argued that the different 
ideas people have concerning what is a good life may reflect the possibility 
that members of liberal democracies may also have different ideas about 
what are the constituent elements of any specific form of good life. In 
Rawls' liberal democratic framework, for example, although people have 
different conceptions of the good, the constituent elements of different 
conceptions of the good (in the terms of Rawls, primary goods) are, 
however, fixed. (50) But Rawls may neglect the possibility that people in 
liberal democratic societies may even have different ideas about what are 
the constituent elements of any specific form of good , 
life. For example, 
health, one of the natural primary goods, is not, necessarily an essential 
good for some religious cults in a liberal democratic society. If health as 
an essential good can be questioned, so can education. It is therefore not 
surprising that education, on the one hand, can be reckoned as an essential 
element of any form of good life by some liberal writers, such as Gutmann; 
and, on the other hand, "adequate education" is' not recognized as an 
essential element for any form of good life by Rawls. (51) Moreover, 
members of liberal democracies would be aware that "education" is totally 
missed out in the American Constitution which is considered as one of the 
most important documents concerning basic human rights. All this may 
lead members of liberal democracies to doubt whether education is an 
essential good. It is always possible to imagine that education would not 
be taken as an essential good by some members of society. This possibility 
would then make members of liberal societies have second thoughts on 
whether it is legitimate to compel a person to pursue his own good given 
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the condition that the person compelled, or other fellow members, may not 
think the good for which compulsion is imposed is an essential good at all. 
It is in this context that members of liberal democracies should try to 
explain and justify their conviction that education is an essential good for 
all children in a liberal democracy. For they should always envisage the 
possibility that compulsory education is not regarded as an essential good 
by some of their fellow members. 
It should, however, be recalled that if the arguments provided in Chapter 
Four are convincing then the possibility described above is very remote for 
people who are rational, just and benevolent in a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons. That is, education in general or the 
specific education advocated would generally be accepted by members of 
liberal democracies - as rational, just and benevolent people - as an 
essential good. Moreover, it can be suggested that very young children do 
not have clear ideas about what is an essential good for them, especially 
whether education is an essential good for them or for their future life. 
The question of whether education is an essential good should therefore be 
settled by adult members of society who are rational, just and benevolent. 
In other words, that education is an essential good should be quite certain 
in liberal democracies. And this confirmation is an important step for 
justifying compulsory education paternalistically. 
If it is the case that children are not capable of making important 
decisions for themselves and that education in general as well as the 
education advocated in this thesis is an essential good for children, it can 
then be reasoned that children should not be given the opportunity to decide 
whether they should receive education. After the establishment of the 
necessity of compulsory education we then can go on to enquire whether 
the compulsory education advocated in this thesis can achieve its 
designated aim. As has been mentioned earlier, the desired aim of 
compulsory education can be considered at two levels. In the context of 
this thesis, it can be suggested that the compulsory education specified In 
Chapter Four can be aimed at the realization of "ideal" persons, namely, 
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persons who are autonomous and able to to cooperate with other members 
of society in social, economic and political activities. Or, compulsory 
education can be aimed at equipping children with necessary means 
(capacities, knowledge, skills, experiences, and virtues) so that they may 
become "ideal" persons in a liberal democratic society. (The precise 
distinction of these two aims was made on p. 211. ). It can be suggested 
here that if compulsory education is aimed at the realization of "ideal" 
persons then paternalistic arguments can at most justify compulsory 
education as an abstract idea. For, in so far as current societies are 
concerned, there is no specific form of universal compulsory education that 
can actually realize the ideal person held in societies, no matter how the 
ideal person is defined. Besides, it has also been mentioned in Chapter Four 
that the compulsory education advocated is neither a sufficient condition 
nor a necessary condition for the realization of the ideal person. This, 
however, should not lead to the conclusion that paternalism cannot justify 
compulsory education as a abstract idea: The fact that the compulsory 
education advocated (or any specific form of compulsory education) cannot 
achieve the realization of the ideal person only implies either that the 
practical measures advocated are not satisfactorily conducted or that 
there are other forms of compulsory education which can be used to 
accomplish the desired aims. Failing to prove that a specific form of 
compulsory education is unable to realize its designated aim does not mean 
compulsory education simnlic/ter cannot be justified paternalistically, 
The story is different, however, if the compulsory education concerned is 
aimed at the more modest aim, namely, equipping children with relevant 
capacities, knowledge, skills, experiences and virtues so that they may 
become the ideal persons. If this is the aim that compulsory education is 
designed to achieve, then there should be no significant reason why the 
compulsory education advocated in this thesis cannot effectively achieve 
its aim given the condition that education can be sufficiently funded and 
properly conducted. More specifically, it can be argued , in line with Mill's 
ideas, that considering children are capable of acquiring the necessary 
capacities, knowledge, skills, experiences and virtues needed for their 
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development as "ideal" persons, and that modern affluent society is able to 
offer a setting in which the education advocated can be competently 
conducted, it would be reasonable to reach the conclusion that the 
education advocated in this thesis can, and should, effectively achieve its 
desired aim. 
If the reasoning offered above can be reckoned as satisfactory, it then can 
be claimed that paternalism can be invoked in liberal democracies to 
justify compulsory education, either as a abstract idea or a specific 
educational measure. But it should be noted that a paternalistic 
justification for compulsory education could be undermined in the 
following context. That is, if children do not actually benefit from 
compulsory education we then should consider whether it is legitimate to 
compel the children concerned paternalistically. However, the question is: 
how can we know whether children actually benefit from compulsory 
education? Theoretically speaking, children ought to benefit from 
compulsory education in one way or another. But it may not be the case in 
educational practice. A plausible but crude way to judge whether children 
can actually benefit from education is to see whether children want to 
participate in educational activities. If some children consistently and 
vehemently oppose participating in educational activities we then can 
consider that the educational activities concerned are not a good for them. 
In this case, the educational activities concerned might be a good, for them 
from a long-term viewpoint. But as far as children's short-term interests 
are concerned, the educational activities concerned cannot be a good for 
children. Following this, lt can be claimed that if children consistently and 
vehemently oppose educational activities to the extent that compelling 
them to receive education will consequently affect their long-term 
interests, then there is no point in arguing that it is for the good of 
children that compulsory education should be implemented. Does it mean 
that these special children can exempt from compulsory education? The 
answer should be a negative one, for there are other arguments that can be 
used to justify compulsory education for these special children. 
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On the whole, the above demonstration Is designed to show that members of 
liberal democracies would adopt paternalism to justify compulsory 
education for children. But they would also be aware that paternalism 
cannot justify compulsory education for those children who are strongly 
opposed to participating in educational activities and due to their strong 
opposition they would be unable to gain any benefit from education. It 
implies that paternalism is not a comprehensive justification for 
children's compulsory education. With a view to providing a comprehensive 
account for the implementation of compulsory education, we must now turn 
to another argument. (52) 
1.3 Children's Obligation and Compulsory Education 
The central issue of this section is whether children in liberal democratic 
societies have an obligation to receive the education advocated in the last 
chapter; and if they have, whether their obligation can be a ground on which 
they can be compelled to receive that education. It will be argued that 
children in liberal democracies do have an obligation to receive the 
education advocated, and their obligation provides the reason by which they 
can be compelled to receive the education. In arguing for the position 
upheld, Mill's On Liberty will be first invoked. 
As has been mentioned, Mill's principle of liberty does not apply to children 
in his scheme. But it is still possible to get some inspiration from this 
principle on the issue of compulsory education for children. Mill's 
paternalistic argument starts from the conviction that compulsory 
education is in the interests of children. His principle of liberty may pave 
the way for the argument that compulsory education is a device of harm- 
prevention and hence justifiable. In other words, it is in the interests of 
other people that children should have an obligation to receive education 
and that education for children should be compulsorily implemented. 
According to the principle of liberty: ' 
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... the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number 1s self-protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. (53) 
Following this statement, Mill specifies some examples of the interference 
this principle would sanction. The most obvious case is acts that are 
hurtful to others: they should always pima face be prohibited. (54) And 
not only that, It can be supposed, as suggested by Lyons, that Mill would 
accept the view that interference with liberty is also justifiable in 
relation to conduct that may cause harm to others, for example, reckless 
driving. (55) 
In addition to the two categories of conduct above, Mill also proposes that 
"there are also many positive acts for the benefit of others" which 
members of society can be compelled to perform. (56) Two categories of 
positive acts are singled out by Mill. They are: good samaritan acts" and 
cooperation acts. (57) Good samaritan acts are "acts of individual 
beneficence", such as "saving a fellow creature's life, or interposing to 
protect the defenseless against f, 11-usage". Mill gives two examples of 
cooperation acts. One is "to give evidence in a court of justice"; the other 
is "to bear... a fair share in the common defence or in any other joint work 
necessary to the interest of society .... "(58) 
Considering the reasons that may be employed to interfere with a person's 
liberty, it is problematic to assume that failing to receive education would 
directly cause harm to others, like bodily assault; or failing to receive 
education may pose a direct threat to others' Interests, like reckless 
driving. It is therefore not appropriate to propose that compulsory 
education can be justified on the grounds that failing to receive education 
Is harmful, or a direct threat, to other people. It is also evident that 
failing to receive education is by no means like failing to give a hand to a 
drowning person, hence it would be unacceptable to advocate compulsory 
education on the grounds that receiving education is a samaritan act. 
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Generally, the plausible argument for compulsory education advocated here 
In the light of Mill's views, however, can be developed in two directions. 
First, it can be argued that although failing to receive education would 
neither directly harm other people nor pose a direct threat to other people's 
interests, it nevertheless would pose an Indirect threat to other people's 
Interests, especially long-term Interests. Thus it can be suggested that 
children's obligation to receive education is based on the prevention of 
harm. Secondly, following Mill's cooperation argument, it can be suggested 
that as children are also members of liberal democratic society they then 
should have some obligation to bear a fair share In the responsibility that 
is necessary to the Interests of society, by which children are protected. 
. 
In practical terms, the fair share that children should bear Is to receive the 
education advocated. 
To base the justification of compulsory education on the grounds that 
falling to receive education is an indirect threat to other people's interests 
would immediately incur one main objection. That is, it can be suggested 
that in a highly dynamic and inter-dependent society many human actions 
pose an indirect threat to other people's interests. For. example, someone 
who fails to keep a promise, or a car-driver who only holds a provisional 
licence may pose an indirect threat to other people's interests. " But it is 
dubious to suggest that conduct which indirectly threatens others' 
interests should always be interfered with; for in that case the individual's 
liberty would then be substantially curtailed and eventually the idea of 
liberty would be empty. 
This objection against the idea that compulsory education can be based on 
harm-prevention, however, ignores the point that although children's 
education may only be related remotely to other people's interests, the 
interests concerned here are essential and far-reaching for other people 
and society as a whole. It can be argued that because of the essential 
interests for other people and society as a whole compulsory education can 
be justifiably imposed on children. The argument can be put in two ways; 
one positively, the other negatively. 
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Just imagine a society with two generations, young adults and children. 
Education can firstly be thought of as an instrument for preserving the 
cherished ideas young adults have and the social systems adults value; 
moreover, education can also be thought of as an instrument that adults are 
obligated to provide for the -sake of children's interests. Apart from these 
two points, education can have another function. That is, education can 
protect adults' self-interest. The reasoning is roughly like this. One day, 
these adults will become old, ill, weak and incapable of supporting 
themselves. They have to have some insurance policy to protect 
themselves when they are old. Education then is one of the best policies 
they can think of. It can be reckoned that the education at issue here Is 
mainly aimed at equipping children with some necessary knowledge, skills, 
virtues, and attitudes so that children can eventually play a full part 
independently and equally in the society as a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons. It is quite plausible to think that If the 
aim of education can be achieved, then the attitude that the newly educated 
people would have towards their older generation - who shape and maintain 
the society as a fair system of cooperation - would be very similar to the 
attitude that the current young adults adopt towards their children. The 
attitude concerned here is: respect for, other people's status as free and 
equal persons, no matter whether these people are children, the elderly, or 
the handicapped. One thing would naturally follow from this attitude. That 
is, the newly educated persons would impose on themselves a duty similar 
to that which the current young adults have imposed on themselves. It is in 
this ' context that the newly educated persons would undertake some 
substantial measures to guarantee the status of the older generation as 
free and equal persons. Thus, for the sake of protecting adults' future 
interests as free and equal persons it is necessary to make education 
compulsory. To put this argument briefly. Although education seems 
remotely related to other people's interests, the interests concerned are 
very essential indeed. In order to guarantee that adults' future interests as 
free and equal persons would not be threatened or undermined, it would 
then be sensible to compel children to receive the education advocated 
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The point that the education advocated is indirectly related to others' 
interests and hence should be made compulsory for children can also be 
demonstrated in a negative way. That is, if compulsory education is not 
implemented, at least some children would not be properly educated. The 
consequence of this is either that the uneducated persons would suffer 
from the deprivation of education or the uneducated persons would 
endanger other people's interests. An uneducated person is a person who 
cannot properly devise his life plan and a person who can be easily 
manipulated by external forces or affected by internal irrational forces. 
And not only that, he can be a person without clear ideas about liberty, 
equality, fairness and the importance of cooperation. To the extent that he 
fails to achieve the, status of being a free and equal person he can easily 
fail to reckon other people as free and equal persons, and hence would 
consciously or unconsciously treat other people as means rather than ends. 
Moreover, as he would not be aware of the importance of cooperation and 
would not be properly equipped to cooperate with other people, some 
interests that must be developed by joint activities would not be possible, 
and some dangers that can only be avoided via joint activities would 
become unavoidable. In short, the point of this argument is that children 
who fail to receive the education advocated cannot take proper actions in 
relation to other people, and therefore other people's interests would 
always be under threat. Based on this, education for children should then 
be compulsorily enacted. 
Taking these points together, it can be suggested that children's obligation 
to receive education is based on the fact that if the education advocated is 
not implemented some members of society and society as a whole would be 
put in danger. But, why compulsory education? It can be replied; it is 
because compulsory education is an insurance device for the interests of 
all members of society and society as a whole. 
Let us now consider the point that compulsory education can be based on 
children's responsibility or obligation towards the society in which they 
live. One of the difficulties of this line of argument is that some writers 
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have suggested only rational beings can have obligations; persons who can 
have a duty must be those who are capable of recognizing their obligation. 
Given this suggestion, children cannot even have obligations in general, let 
alone a particular obligation to receive education. (59) Even it children can 
have obligations or responsibilities towards society or other people it 
must be those imposed by other people or the state without their full- 
awareness or consent. If a person can have obligations without his own 
consent, it can be inferred, then, that it would be quite easy for a tyranny, 
which can conceal itself in various forms, to cultivate some sort of moral 
atmosphere or moral principle encompassed in the language of obligations, 
and based on this moral atmosphere or moral principle the tyranny can then 
legitimately coerce other people to do something against their own will, 
conscience, or interests. 
The argument against these objections is this. The reason why children can 
have obligations and why their obligation to receive education can be 
Imposed by adults or the state is grounded on the reciprocal relationships 
children have with their parents, adults, and the state. In Chapter Three, it 
has been suggested that in society as a fair system of cooperation each 
member is supposed to have a reciprocal relationship with the state and his 
fellow members. This reciprocal relationship mainly consists in two sets 
of language, the language of duties and the language of rights. What 
specific duties or rights adult members have in relation to the state or 
other fellow members is not the main concern here, but it can be suggested 
that as adults can be supposed to be rational they can normally strike 
deals with the state or other members over their rights or duties. Hence 
the basic idea underlying their deals is "consent" or "commitment". It 
implies that if any party is not satisfied with the reciprocal relationships 
he has with other parties, he is able to call off the links with other parties. 
It is, however, another matter with regard to children. Whether children 
should have obligations in general or an obligation to receive education in 
particular is mainly decided by the state and adult members. (60) The 
reasoning that children should have obligations in general and a particular 
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obligation to receive education proceeds as follows. As members of 
society, children should take, in one way or another, some responsibility 
for other fellow members and the state. Why then is a member of a society 
bound to take some specific kind of responsibility for other people, the 
state and society as a whole? The main reason is: in order to maintain the 
existence and continuity of society, no one should be exempted from some 
obligation towards other people and society. To take an analogy. In order 
to keep a game going, all participants of that game should observe the rules 
of the game. In some respects, to maintain a society is like playing a game. 
The maintenance of society is also through the function of rules. Some 
rules are too essential to be encroached; if they are encroached, the person 
who encroaches should be blamed or punished for the sake of society as a 
whole. If this reasoning is accepted, children, as members of society, 
should also be under the governance of these basic rules; children hence 
naturally should have an obligation to observe, these basic rules 
irrespective of their intention. 
Why then should children have a specific obligation-to receive education? 
It can be answered that education is such an essential interest both for 
children themselves and other people. It is principally on the grounds that 
education is concerned with other people's interests that other people can 
legitimately expect, and compel, children to receive education. The idea 
underlying this point is that children's obligation to receive educationis 
not a consequence of a contract or commitment between children and other 
parties. It is rather a consequence of a deliberation undertaken by adults 
and the state. This deliberation is concerned with what children should do, 
taking all possible considerations into account. This deliberation would by 
no means be arbitrary or reckless, hence children's obligation to receive 
education would not be employed as a manipulative or controlling 
instrument. Though it might be perceived as such by children themselves. 
Taking these arguments together, it can be suggested that children, as 
members of liberal democracies, should accept the obligations imposed 
upon them. They have an obligation to prevent harm to other members of 
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society; they also have an obligation to maintain the existence of society 
as a fair system of cooperation. And these two obligations are strong 
enough to persuade members of society to implement education 
compulsorily, not only as an abstract idea but also the specific measures 
advocated in this thesis. But if it is asked, "Why the specific educational 
measures advocated rather than others? " it can only be answered that the 
education advocated here appeals to members of liberal democracies as 
rational, just and benevolent persons. 
1.4 Forms of Activity and Compulsory Education .. 
In the previous discussions, the emphasis was mainly put on the 
relationships of children and other parties, such as parents, the state as 
well as society as a whole. The issue of the justification of compulsory 
education, as an idea and a specific measure, was put in the context of 
human relationships in liberal democratic societies. At this point, a 
different angle of approach will be taken to examine the same issue. The 
argument offered for compulsory education here will start from the view 
that compulsory education is compatible with society as a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal persons. 
Educational activity involved with children is a unique form of activity; 
because of its uniqueness, it needs to be regulated by guiding principles 
which are different from other guiding principles regulating other forms of 
activity. Its uniqueness is mainly manifested by two features. First, 
children stand on a different footing from their counterparts, namely, 
adults and the state. Educational activity is not like other kinds of human 
activity, say, political activity, in -which participants' physical and 
psychological capacities are similar and most people are aware of the role 
they play as well as what the whole activity is about. Secondly, 
educational activity is mainly concerned with long-term interests. These 
long-term interests are not only remote but strange to children. They imply 
that educational activity involved with children, if it is possible, can 
hardly proceed on an entirely voluntary basis. It is the educator who knows 
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the whole picture and understands the alms he is trying to achieve. For the 
educatee, he is rather like the blind. He needs to be guided until he can gain 
his eye-sight. Given the uniqueness of educational activity, one of its 
guiding principles can then be characterized by an element which is 
different from the principle of liberty. This element is: compulsion. The 
argument needs further elaboration in the light of Mill's theory. 
What should be pointed out is that Mill in fact holds a view that the 
principle of general utility is the ultimate principle for all human 
activities. "Utility", in Mill's eye, is the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions". (61) But it does not follow that the principle of general utility 
in the "only" principle that should be abided by. There are other operating 
principles that can also be the criteria for the proceedings of various kinds 
of human activity. In short, the principle of general utility is always the 
ultimate criterion by which human actions are guided., But the principle of 
general utility is not in itself sufficient in some areas of human activity. 
Other general, but secondary, principles are also needed in supplementing 
the principle of general utility. Mill's principle of liberty should be 
reckoned exactly as such a second-order and supplementary principle. This 
point can be supported by the fact that Mill does not put the value of liberty 
ahead of utility. Liberty can actually be sacrificed for the sake of utility. 
In discussing the application of the principle of liberty, Mill is quite clear 
in pointing out that: "In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, 
because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can 
alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does 
justify such interference. " In some cases, such as a competitive situation, 
Mill argues that the individual's pursuit of a legitimate object might cause 
pain or loss to others, but it should not be interfered with, on the grounds 
of the principle of liberty. For, it is "better for the general interest of 
mankind that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of 
consequences. "(62) The message is quite clear; the principle of liberty 
must be subordinated to the principle of general utility. 
Apart from the principle of liberty, there are at least three other second- 
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order principles directly and indirectly singled out by Mill. They are: the 
principle of legitimate paternalism(63), the principle of individual 
development(64), and the doctrine of free trade. (65) In Mill's scheme, as 
far as education is concerned, it is mainly the first two principles that 
regulate educational activity. The principle of legitimate paternalism, as 
described earlier, sanctions the implementation of compulsory education 
for children. The principle of development, given the framework of 
compulsory education, is to ensure that the child in a civilized community 
can not only benefit from the ascertained results of human experience but 
can develop his human faculties so that he can "perform his part well in 
life towards others and towards himself". 
On the whole, in Mill's scheme different guiding principles are needed for 
different human activities. (66) It would be wrong, in Mill's view, to adopt 
the principle of liberty to regulate the undertakings of free trade, for free 
trade as a unique form of human activity should be regulated by the 
doctrine of free trade. It would be also wrong to say that compulsory 
education is unjustifiable for the reason that it is goes against the 
principle of liberty; because educational activity concerning children is a 
unique form of activity, it should be regulated by principles different from 
the principle of liberty which is especially formulated for the social 
interaction between mature individuals and the state. If the principle of 
liberty is adopted in regulating the activity of free trade or educational 
activity concerning children, it would then result in the decrease of human 
happiness, and this is against the principle of general utility. Moreover, 
one point should be emphasized here. Although different principles at face 
value clash with one other, they are all validated by the principle of 
general utility; it is therefore wrong to take a second-order principle as 
the yardstick to nullify another second-order principle, It is rather the 
compatibility between the ultimate first-order principle and second-order 
principles that makes the second-order principles justified. Whether any 
second-order principle can be justified should be assessed by the ultimate 
first-order principle, not another second-order principle. Given' this 
understanding, it can be claimed that compulsory education and its 
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supporting principle "the principle of legitimate paternalism" in MIll's 
theory are justified by the fact that they are aimed at achieving the 
greatest happiness of greatest numbers; whether they can be justified is 
not contingent upon the notion of civil liberty or personal freedom. 
In the light of Mill's theory, it can then be suggested that whether 
compulsory education can be justified depends on whether it can be 
sanctioned by, or is compatible with, the idea that society is a fair system 
of cooperation between free and equal persons and the idea that an ideal 
person'is a person who can rationally devise, revise, and pursue his life 
plan and can cooperate with other members of society. It can be suggested 
that although compulsory education Interferes with children's personal 
freedom, this interference in fact can be sanctioned by the ideas of 
"society" and "ideal person" advocated here. Given the idea that society is a 
fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons, and an ideal 
person is an autonomous person, children's personal liberty need not, and 
should not, be put in the first place. It is rather whether children can have 
opportunities to become autonomous, whether they can develop their 
individuality, whether they can take up a job in the real world, and whether 
they are capable of participating in social and political activity that should 
be the main concern. If these aims can only be achieved at the expense of 
children's personal liberty, why not? Besides, it should be pointed out that 
children' freedom in a system of compulsory education is not totally 
curtailed. Given the framework of compulsory education, children can still 
exercise their choice in various kinds of activity; for example, children can 
still have freedom to choose their extra-curricular activities. 
Following Mill's doctrine, it can be claimed that there are various forms of 
human activity. Each form of activity has its own unique aim, character 
and function. The character and function of educational activity is 
different from, say, political activity or commercial activity. Each form of 
activity reflects, or is manifested by, its own special human relationships 
among participants. This in turn leads to the suggestion that different 
guiding principles should be employed in different forms of activity as long 
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as they are compatible with the ideal structure of society and what the 
ideal person ought to be. Moreover, even though they are different, they 
complement each other. The existence and harmony of society as a whole is 
constituted by the full operation of various forms of activities. Compulsion 
qua compulsion is an interference against a free agent. In political activity 
or an activity only concerning adults, it is prima facie unjustified, but it 
is not the case as far as compulsory education is concerned. In terms of 
cultivating the ideal person and supporting the continuity of society, 
compulsory education is rather a necessary device for achieving the desired 
aim. It is wrong to assume that the personal liberty of children is 
sacrosanct. For the sake of achieving the ideal society and cultivating the 
Ideal person, compulsory education is necessary during childhood. 
2. THE CASE AGAINST COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
The justification for compulsory education illustrated above is partly a 
response to the libertarian doctrine that compulsory education is an 
interference against children's personal freedom and hence unjustifiable. 
Apart from the libertarian argument, some other kinds of argument can be, 
and have been, invoked to oppose compulsory education. In order to 
consolidate the idea that compulsory education is justifiable, it is 
therefore necessary to grapple with those arguments against it. Two 
doctrines against compulsory education will be tackled in turn. One is 
cultural conservatism; the other, the deschooling argument. (67) 
2.1 Cultural Conservatism and Compulsory Education 
One of the notable arguments against compulsory education is based on 
cultural conservatism advocated by Eliot and Bantock. It should be noted 
that Eliot and Bantock actually hold different views on the notion of 
"culture", and hence sketch different pictures of the relationship between 
culture and education. (68) Despite their differences on these key points, 
they nevertheless share a very similar attitude against compulsory 
education. Both of them can be assumed to hold the view that compulsory 
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education as a form of universalized planning for some social or political 
ends is doomed to fail; besides, compulsory education may bring about some 
unexpected misfortune for society as a whole. Apart from that, Eliot also 
suggests that the utility of a non-compulsory education is greater than 
that of a compulsory education. These points need elaboration. 
Although Eliot does not systematically deal with the issue of compulsory 
education, his opposition to it can be derived from his strong antagonistic 
attitude towards "universalized planning". Without doubt, this attitude is 
closely related to his general position about "culture", "education", 
"politics", and "modern political theory". It can be suggested that if culture 
is "a whole way of life" - as Eliot has proposed. - and it cannot be wholly 
conscious, then any universalized plan enacted by deliberate organization 
and aimed at realizing social or political ends will simply not work. For, if 
universalized social or political planning is by implication an undertaking 
by planners to achieve some specific alms through a specific procedure, it 
would naturally ignore, both intentionally and unintentionally, some factors 
that constitute culture. The consequence of this inevitable weakness 
would then make any universalized planning impossible in achieving its 
designated aims. Furthermore, it will often go astray; since universalized 
planning is unable to grasp the whole of the real world Its implementation 
would distort the reality and would coerce people into a rigid mould. Given 
this understanding, it can be concluded that compulsory education as 
advocated in the last section as a form of universalized planning cannot 
avoid the fate Eliot has in mind. In Eliot's own words: "Any education 
system aiming at a complete adjustment between education and society 
will tend both to restrict education to what will lead to success in the 
world, and to restrict success in the world to those persons who have been- 
good pupils of the system. "(69) As far as a universalized basic education is 
concerned, Eliot suggests that ". .. in our 
headlong rush to educate 
everybody, we are lowering our standards, and more and more abandoning 
the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture ... are 
transmitted. "(70) Based on this, it can be supposed that Eliot would 
actually assume that a compulsory education as advocated here would not 
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achieve its aims,; on the contrary, it would only adulterate and degrade 
"culture". (71) 
As a supporter of Eliot, it seems Bantock does not explicitly try to 
demolish the idea of compulsory education. His point is rather that since a 
universalized compulsory education is not successful we should then try to 
devise different kinds of curriculum for children from different 
backgrounds. (72) However, from his view of the general notion of 
"planning", we gain the impression that Bantock is opposed to the 
implementation of compulsory education. In Freedom and Authority in 
Education. Bantock takes issue with Karl Mannheim on the question of 
social planning. "A plan", Bantock suggests, "is always the work of the 
conscious intellect abstracting from the totality of existence certain of 
its characteristics, and seeking on a basis of this abstract conception of 
reality to realize certain ends. These ends can only be achieved by 
imposition of means of varying degrees of incompatibility with the living 
organism. .. . "(73) As far as social planning is concerned, Bantock 
indicates that it involves "a very high degree of abstraction"; most 
seriously, social planning based on a high degree of abstraction with a view 
to realizing certain social ends would always be a catastrophe for the 
higher human values. (74) 
Bantock's position is based on several arguments. Three of them are 
especially notable. Firstly, in his view, the totality of human society is 
too complicated to be understood by any human mind, or any set of human 
minds, and hence any social planning may eventually go wrong. Secondly, as 
a plan. involves "thinking of people in accordance with those abstract 
qualities" rather than people possessing "other vital characteristics", it 
implies the imposition of something dead on the living organism, and 
therefore is bound to fail. Thirdly, Bantock suggests that any plan will 
"bear witness ultimately to just those values that the planners think 
desirable". And, it seems there is no objective criterion by which the 
planner's desirable ideas can be put to test. It implies that any social 
planning might eventually be transformed into some sort of tyranny. (75) 
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Given Bantock's criticisms of social planning, it would be quite reasonable 
to infer that since the compulsory education concerned here is mainly 
reckoned as a social or political instrument - which is directed at 
substantiating and actualizing the idea that society is a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal persons - it should also be the object 
of Bantock's criticism; unless compulsory education is not an instrument of 
social planning, or compulsory education is not that kind of social planning 
that Bantock has in mind. However, judging from the fact that the 
compulsory education advocated here is a social instrument jointly used by 
the state, parents and other adults and directed for all children of certain 
ages, it would be proper to count it as social planning and hence, in 
Bantock's view, it should be avoided. 
Apart from saying that compulsory education as a form of universalized 
social planning is undesirable and unpalatable, Eliot also implies that the 
utility of non-compulsory education is much greater than compulsory 
education. Compulsory education is to provide necessary educational 
provision for children, whether the children concerned want to receive it or 
not. On this, Eliot clearly points out that "facility of education will lead to 
indifference to it; and that the unnatural imposition of education up to the 
years of maturity will lead to hostility towards it. "(76) In other words, 
compulsory education would bring about some side-effects that cannot be 
taken lightly. Apart from the possible side-effects of compulsory 
education, a non-compulsory education may have other advantages. Eliot 
indicates that the desire for education is greater where there are 
difficulties in the way of obtaining it. "(77) Thus, from a long-term point 
of view, a universally compulsory education is less beneficial than a non- 
compulsory education that especially aims at both the pursuit of wisdom 
and the acquisition of high culture. Based on these reasons, Eliot 
concludes: "A high average of general education is perhaps less necessary 
for a civil society than is a respect for learning. "(78) 
OP the arguments grounded on cultural conservatism against compulsory 
education, many things can be said. 
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Eliot and Bantock are right in pointing out respectively that culture is 
something which cannot be fully conscious and that human society is too 
complicated to be fully grasped by any human mind, But it can be argued 
that compulsory education as universalized planning with a view to 
actualizing social or political ends is necessary in regulating a 
complicated society and in enriching the conscious part of culture. 
In Eliot's essay Notes Towards the Definition of-Culture . his main 
interest 
is, as pointed out by Bantock, not concerned with proposing prescriptions 
regarding the preservation and development of culture; his main concern is 
rather to illustrate the desirable conditions under which culture is most 
likely to be developed and preserved. (79) For Eliot, the most desirable 
social condition for the preservation and development of culture is a 
condition under which people belonging to different classes, regions and 
groups can not only preserve their own identity but also communicate with 
each other. But how can diversity and unity be possible at the same time? 
Eliot does not say much about this. What he suggests, at the end of his 
essay, is that "everyone" should pause to examine what the word "culture" 
means to him, and "what it means to him in each particular context before 
using. it. "(80) Eliot optimistically suggests, "Even this modest aspiration 
might, if realized, have consequences in the policy and conduct of our 
'cultural' enterprises. "(81) How, then, can "everyone" have the capacity of 
knowing the meaning of "culture" and what it means to him in each 
particular case before using the word? Eliot says little in his essay on 
this question. Eliot might think that it would be a naturally-developed 
capacity owned by all rational beings, or men of maturity. But it can be 
suggested that a capacity for reflecting on oneself in relation to other 
people, of communicating with other people, and of preserving one's own 
identity are not by any means delivered by "Nature"; it is rather a result of 
"culture". This observation can be supported by the fact that not all adults 
in an existing highly-developed society are capable of reflecting on their 
position in relation to other people and institutions, or of reflecting on the 
meaning of the word "culture" unless they are educated in one way or 
another. For this reason, it can be suggested that it is self-contradictory 
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for Eliot to advocate, on the one hand, that a communicating. and reflecting 
capacity is an essential requirement in maintaining a culturally integrated 
society, and on the other hand, that universalized planning should be 
avoided in society. How can a mind with the capacity of reflecting and 
communicating be possessed by "everyone" in a highly-complicated society 
without some sort of universalized social planning?, 
Against this, it might be argued that a capable mind possessed by every 
member of society can still be possible without universalized compulsory 
education, for it can be achieved through various kinds of unplanned 
voluntary educational activities, which would eventually make everyone 
sufficiently capable. This argument is, however, romantic. It ignores the 
fact that in earlier "unplanned" societies some people, say, peasants, had no 
opportunity whatever to be cultivated as persons with a reflecting capacity 
or with a capacity that can enable them to contemplate the meaning of 
culture. Moreover, what has been suggested is that a person with reflecting 
and communicating capacity is a cultured result, not a natural outcome. 
But how can we have a society in which "everyone" can be aware of the 
meaning of "culture" and hence can contribute to maintaining a dynamic 
development of culture? It seems that Eliot, despite what he says, would 
not have any alternative but a universalized compulsory education. 
The universalized compulsory education advocated here is devised with an 
eye to cultivating children's capacity to communicate with other people, 
and to reflect on their position in relation to other people and institutions. 
The possible result of this, Ideally speaking, is to shape a proper 
environment in which diversity and unity can go hand in hand. Thus, from a 
long term point of view, the utility of a compulsory education is greater 
than the utility of a non-compulsory education. 
With regard to Bantock's objection that social planning should have no place 
in a highly complicated society, it can be pointed out that the notion of 
social planning in Bantock's mind is a rigid one. True, any social planning 
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will be some sort of abstraction from the totality of society and will be 
put in the form of an imposition over members of society. But it does not 
follow that due to the abstraction and imposition, any social planning is 
bound to fail or bound to be undesirable. 
The key point rests on this question: how is social planning constructed and 
regulated? If it is designed and run. by an elite group , it may lead to the 
consequences described by Bantock. But if it emerges through a process of 
deliberation in the framework of a fair system of cooperation between free 
and equal persons, it would not be bound to fail or become an imposition. 
On the contrary, social planning constructed in this ideal way is like a 
vitamin pill extracted from foodstuffs or produced synthetically, which of 
course does not include all nutrient materials but the effect it may have on 
human organisms is generally beneficial and by no means oppressive. 
Moreover, Bantock neglects two points. One is the, possibility that an 
unplanned complicated society is not necessarily better than a planned 
society; the other, that to maintain a complicated unplanned society will 
inevitably involve some sort of invisible planning, even if only of a 
negative sort. The forces which can prevent any sort of social planning in a 
highly complicated society are inevitably and paradoxically planned. These 
two points can also be invoked to attack Eliot. 
But it can still be asked: can universalized compulsory education achieve 
the designated aim? Or, will it not go astray and bring about some 
disasters? Or, will it not fall into the hands of a few and hence become an 
instrument of tyranny? What can be said here is that these questions are 
all empirical ones. It cannot be claimed that the compulsory education 
advocated here can invariably realize the designated aim; or that it . will 
never go astray or become an instrument of tyranny. But what should be 
emphasized is that compulsory education as a notion or an instrument is 
mainly devised to counteract the possible forces which may lead to a 
society in which the ideas of equality and liberty are deliberately devalued 
and the individual is unable to lead an independent life. On this view, even 
though compulsory education might bring about some unexpected results, 
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they cannot be disasters. What is more, as it is derived from the view that 
society is a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons, 
autocratic tyranny is intentionally excluded. Even if compulsory education 
goes astray, it is the strategy of the implementation of compulsory 
education that should be blamed, not the idea. (82) 
2.2 The Deschooling Doctrine and Compulsory Education 
The starting point of the deschoolers' doctrine is dissatisfaction with the 
present form of schooling which implies the use of legal sanctions to 
ensure children's attendance in school for several years so that they can 
receive a prescribed and standardized curriculum. (83) 
For deschoolers, like Illich, Goodman, and Krimerman, the present form of 
schooling characterized by institutional activities , is not just morally 
unjustifiable but can lead to some undesirable consequences that schooling 
is supposed to overcome. Illich's criticisms of the present form of 
schooling can be summarized in three points. First, the school is an 
oppressive and monopolistic instrument in both capitalist and socialist 
societies. Second, the school in today's specialized and consumer-oriented 
society only serves to manipulate people. Third, the school, particularly in 
the Third World, Is serving only the elite and reinforcing the meritocratic 
element in society. (84) In Goodman's view, schooling- only serves for 
policing and for taking up the slack in youth unemployment. " It has no 
correlation with life achievement in any of the professions; and no 
advantages can be gained by schooling in the field of clerical, 
technological, or semi-skilled factory jobs. (85) For Krimerman, the 
present form of schooling Is morally disgraceful; it is simply a form of 
slavery. (86) 
In order to avoid the undesirable consequences resulting from the present 
form of schooling and to search for morally sustainable educational 
alternatives, the three deschoolers respectively provide some 
prescriptions. In Mich's scheme, he advocates a system of educational 
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networks to replace schooling; some specific measures, such as a system 
of educational passport, an edu-credit card, are also recommended. (87) In 
Goodman's plan, education should not take place in school but in various 
places or through activities such as the real city, farm schools, guided 
travel, work camps, and so on. (88) For Krimerman, a facilitating, rather 
than compelling, education is the recipe. In this voluntary education, a 
voucher system will prevail and the occupation of teacher will disappear; 
moreover, educational activities will proceed in apprenticeships, and 
educational facilities will be abundantly provided but on an entirely 
voluntary basis. (89) 
A closer look at the deschoolers' criticisms of the present form of 
schooling suggests that it is not only structural defects and functional 
deficiencies that are blamed for the failures. The "compulsory element" 
involved in the present form of schooling is also a contributing factor that 
leads to the unsuccessful outcomes. Moreover, compulsion constitutes the 
immorality of the present form of schooling. The alternative proposals to 
the present form of schooling therefore are manifested by emphasizing the 
idea of "learner's voluntariness". A further elaboration is needed here. 
Based on the deschoolers' ideas, several reasons against compulsory 
schooling can be given. Firstly, it is suggested that even though children 
are immature, and therefore need help from adults, the help that children 
ought to have should not be put in the form of compulsory education. 
Voluntary educational provision is always more desirable and sensible. 
Secondly, deschoolers assume that nothing can be effectively learned, or 
learned at all, unless education is based on the learner's need, desire, and 
curiosity. For deschoolers, learning is just like picking up the mother- 
tongue; compulsion has no place in the process of learning. On this view, 
compulsory education involving a standardized and prescribed curriculum 
evidently does not meet this requirement at all and can in no way lead to 
"true learning". Thirdly, it is the deschoolers' assumption that freedom 
(more accurately, personal freedom, or negative freedom) Is the 
precondition of cultivating an autonomous and independent person. 
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According to this view, a compulsory education curtailing personal freedom 
is bound to fall in achieving autonomy and independence. More specifically, 
they indicate that children's freedom in exercising full educational choice 
can make them grow into competent choice-makers; and through the 
frequent practice of choice-making, children's independent rational 
judgement will be strengthened. Finally, it is claimed that even for those 
who are not fully rational like children, self-determination still has 
intrinsic moral value. To deny children's opportunity for self-determination 
in deciding whether they should learn or be educated is to deny their 
fundamental good or right. The implementation of compulsory education is 
to treat children as means rather than as ends. 
Given the deschoolers' arguments against compulsory education, some 
rejoinders can be made. 
It is quite true that there is no logical connection between children's 
Immaturity and compulsory education. The connection between the two is 
rather based on the practical consideration that without proper education 
children may endanger their own and other people's interests as well as 
society as a whole. In this respect, compulsory education is like an 
insurance policy. More specifically, the idea of compulsory education is 
similar to the idea of car-insurance. In the latter case, car drivers are 
compelled to have car-insurance. It is not the case that car-drivers will 
Inevitably cause trouble, it is rather the view that some unpredictable 
accidents might happen and hence might cause damages or injuries. By 
parity of reasoning, to compel children to receive education Is only to make 
sure that all members of society as well as society as a whole are properly 
protected. 
Concerning the deschoolers' assumption that learning must be based on the 
learners' desire, curiosity, and so on, it can be suggested that this view of 
learning is quite "romantic". It is a common feature in highly complicated 
modern societies that some knowledge essential to the members of society 
as well as the society as a whole may be so abstract that it has gone 
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beyond the learner's imagination and curiosity. The knowledge concerning 
the relationship between the individual and the state is a case of this. The 
idea and the entity of the state can hardly be easily grasped; but to be 
aware of the existence of this entity and its function, and to establish a 
dialogue relationship with the state is extremely important for the 
maintenance and development of the ideal society concerned here. 
However, knowledge of this kind is so remote for most children that they 
just have little desire or curiosity to pursue it. Given this condition, it 
seems there is no alternative but to implement compulsory education so as 
to make sure that children in society possess proper knowledge. Grounded 
on this case, it can be inferred that some learning is not necessarily based 
on the learner's desire, curiosity, and so on. There are some kinds of 
learning which can only be placed in a compulsory framework. 
With regard to the deschoolers' idea that children's freedom (negative 
freedom) is a precondition of children's autonomy and independence, 
Dearden's view on the relationship between freedom and autonomy can 
provide some inspiration. In Dearden's view, freedoms are indeed a 
necessary condition for autonomy; but he is not sure that freedoms are a 
necessary condition for the development of autonomy. He suggests that 
which conditions are the best conditions for the development of autonomy 
is an empirical question. (90) Following Dearden, it can be argued that the 
deschoolers' claim that children's freedom is necessary for their 
development of autonomy and independence is at best an assertion which 
does not have the backing of empirical evidence. Moreover, It can be asked: 
Is it necessarily a good thing for children to make educational decisions for 
themselves? Kleinig offers a negative answer. He suggests that children 
are generally more vulnerable to exploitation than adults, so it would not 
be a good thing for them to bear the whole weight of a decision concerning 
school attendance. (91) 
As to the deschoolers' claim that compelling children to learn or to receive 
education is to treat them as means rather than as ends, it can be replied 
that this accusation is not well-founded. The whole device of compulsory 
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education is aimed at equipping children with the necessary means so that 
they can become independent and autonomous and play a proper role in 
society. It has also been argued that without receiving a proper education 
children would be put in an extremely disadvantageous position in relation 
to other people and institutions, like the state. From this angle, compulsory 
education is rather aimed at treating children as ends, not as means. 
246 
NOTES: 
1. See, 1. Illich, Deschooling Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973; E. 
Callan, Freedom and Schooling, Journal of Philosoohy of Education. vol. 
17, no. 1,1983, pp. 45-46. 
2. M. Aurelius, Meditations, translated by M. Stanlrorth, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1964, p. 35. 
3. J. S. Mill, On Li berty Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, pp. 177-179. I am 
indebted to Kleinig for pointing this out. See J. Kleinig, Compulsory 
Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education. vol. 15, no. 2,1981, pp. 
192-193. 
4. I. Illich, op. cit. 
5. J. S. Mill, op. cit., pp. 175-177. 
6. The point that the justification of compulsory education is different 
from the justification of any specific form of compulsory education 
currently implemented is made, or Implied, by the following writers: A. 
Aviram, The Justification of Compulsory Education, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education, vol. 20, no. 1,1986, pp. 51-58; E. Callan, op. 
cit., pp. 45-56; G. Graham, Contemporary Social Philosophy, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988, pp. 154-160; J. Kleinig, op. cit. 
7. I owe this point to A. Aviram. See Aviram, op. cit., p. 55. The reason for 
making a distinction between compulsory education as an abstract Idea 
and compulsory education as a specific educational measure can also be 
understood in the light of the distinction between education as a general 
concept and education as a specific concept. See Chapter Four, pp. 151- 
159. 
8. M. S. Katz, Compulsion and the Discourse on Compulsory School 
Attendance, Educational Theory, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 179-185. 
9. J. S. Mill, op. cit., p. 166. 
10. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall, 1973, pp. 5-9. 
11. I borrow Avlram's expression here. Aviram indicates that Mill's On 
Liberty is still "the magnum opus as far as discussions of paternalism 
247 
in the liberal tradition are concerned. " See Aviram, op. cit., p. 52. 
12. J. S. Mill, op. cit., pp. 176-178. 
13. J. Feinberg, op. cit., p. 21. 
14. For the detail of the relations between liberty and coercion, see J. R. 
Pennock, Coercion: An Overview, NOMOS" vol. XIV, pp. 1-15. 
15. It is quoted in Feinberg, op, cit., p. 23. 
16. I. Kant, The Science of Right, translated by W. Hastie, in R. M. Hutchins 
(ed. ), r London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 308. 
17. See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1961, pp. 6,18-25. 
18. J. S. Mill, op. cit., p. 164. 
19. Ibid., pp. 63-64. Another similar expression can be found on p. 141. 
20. Locke does not Intend to justify compulsory education, but his account 
concerning children can be developed as a paternalistic justification for 
children's compulsory education. For further detail, see Two Treatises 
of Government, 
21. See J. White, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum London: Routiedge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973; A. Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education, 
Philosophy of Public Affairs,, vol. 9, no. 4,1980, pp. 3.38-358; G. Haydon, 
The 'Right to Education' and Compulsory Education, Educational 
Philosophy and Theory vol. 9, no. 1,1977, pp. 1-15. It should be noted 
that as the paternalistic arguments developed by Gutmann and Haydon 
are mediated through the language of rights, they deserve special 
attention. Their arguments will be discussed later in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
22. There are various forms of paternalism. Some paternalism 1s founded 
on the concept of consent. However, the standard form of paternalism Is 
based upon the recognition of the practical necessity of welfare or 
interests concerned. But there are also different accounts concerning 
how the interests or welfare should be decided in the standard form of 
paternalism. It Is not intended in this place to go Into the detail of the 
differences among various forms of paternalism. See R. Carter, 
Justifying Paternalism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. VII, no. 1, 
1977, pp. 133-145; G. Dworkin, Paternalism, in R. A. Wasserstrom (ed. ), 
248 
Morality and the Law, California: Wadsworth, 1971, p. 108; Feinberg, op. 
cit., pp. 45-52; P. Gardner, Paternalism and Consent in Education, 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 17, no. 1,1983, pp. 57-72. 
23. G. Dworkin, op. cit., p. 108. 
24. See J. D. Hodson, The Principle of Paternalism, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1,1977, pp. 61-62. 
25. See J. Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in J. Feinberg, Rights, Justice. and 
the Bounds of Liberty, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 
115. 
26. D. Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984, p. 171. 
27. See A. Aviram, op. cit., p. 53; E. Callan, op, cit., pp. 45-56; P. Gardner, 
Liberty and Compulsory Education, In A. P. Griffiths (ed. ), Of Liberty. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 109-129. 
28. J. S. Mill, On Liberty p. 69. 
29. Ibid., p. 69. 
30. Ibid., p. 69. 
31. Ibid., p. 166. 
32. Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
33. Ibid., p. 150. 
34. Ibid., p. 150. 
35. Ibid., p. 69. 
36. Ibid., p. 121. 
37. See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chapter 2, in M. Warnock (ed. ), J. S. Mill: 
Utilitarianism Glasgow: Collins, 1979. 
38. J. S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 123. Also see p. 126. 
39. Ibid., p. 124. 
40. Ibid., p. 124. 
41. J. S. Mill's view is in line with Locke's, see J. Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government. 
42. J. S. Mill, Autobiography, In F. W. Garforth (ed. ), John Stuart Mill on 
Education. New York: Teachers College Press, 1971, p. 83. 
43. J. S. Mi I], Qnlibg-rty, p. 176. 
44. Ibid., p. 176. 
249 
45. Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
46. Ibid., p. 177. 
47.1 owe this point to C. L. Ten, See Ten, Mill on Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980, p. 3. Also see Mill's "Autobiography", chapter 1. 
48. This point is suggested by Mill. See J. S. Mill A System of Logic. 1904, 
London: Longmans, Book V 1, ch. XI I. 
49. See J. Kleinig, Paternalism. Manchester. Manchester University Press, 
1983, pp. 151-152. 
50. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, 
pp, 90-95. 
51. See A. Gutmann, op. cit., pp. 340-342; W. M. Humes, Rights and Choice in 
Education, Parental Choice Project, Glasgow University, 1984, 
unpublished. 
52. I have to thank Mr A. Lockyer and Mr A Duff for helping me to clarify 
the relations between paternalism and the justification of compulsory 
education. Responsibility for errors lies, however, exclusively with the 
author. 
53. J. S. Mill, On Liberty. p. 68. 
54. Ibid., p. 70. For Mill, not all conduct harmful to others should be 
prohibited; some acts hurtful to others would not be prohibited on the 
grounds that "the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, 
greater than those which it would prevent". 
55. See D. Lyons, Liberty and Harm to Others, in W. E. Cooper, K. Nielson and 
S. C. Patten (eds. ), New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarlalism. 
Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979, pp. 2- 
3. 
56. J. S. Mill, On Liberty. p. 70. 
57. These are D. Lyons' terms. 
58. U. S. Mill, Liberty p. 70. 
59. C. H. Whiteley, On Duties, in J. Feinberg (ed. ), Moral Conceits, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 53-59. 
60. Strictly speaking, the role of tradition and convention should also be 
counted as contributing factors. 
61. J. S. Mill, On Liberty p. 70. There are thorny issues concerning the 
250 
characteristic of "utility" and its relations with the principle of liberty 
In Mill's theory. It is not intended to go deeply into these issues here. 
However, it should be noted that the position held here is that the 
principle of liberty in Mill's scheme is subordinate to the principle of 
utility. For the detail, see J. Gray, John Stuart Mill on Liberty, Utility 
and Rights, HOMOS, XXIII, 1981, pp. 80-116; C. L. Ten, Mill's Defence of 
Liberty, in K. Haakonssen (ed. ), Traditions of Liberalism. The Centre of 
Independent Studies, 1988, pp. 145-168. 
62. J. S. Mill, On Liberty, pp. 163-164. 
63. This Is Aviram's term. See Aviram, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
64. J. S. Mill, Liberty pp. 180-181. 
65. Ibid., p. 164. 
66. Actually, Mill sides with Humboldt. See, W. von Humboldt, The Limits of 
State Action. edited and translated by J. W. Burrow, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
67. There are some other arguments against compulsory education. For 
example, it has been argued that compulsory education interferes with 
parents' power or right over their children; or, compulsory education 
may cause considerable hardship to parents for they might lose a 
significant supplement to the family income. But given the present 
framework of modern society, these two arguments can hardly pose a 
serious challenge to the idea of compulsory education. A historical 
analysis of the introduction of compulsory education in England and 
Wales can be helpful in exemplifying these two arguments. See J. S. 
Hurt, Elementary Schooling and the Working Classes 1860-1918, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Some Marxists, like Michael Young, may 
oppose the present form of compulsory education. But, generally 
speaking, Marxist theory of education is a theory of compulsory state 
schooling, so it can be claimed that Marxists in one way or the other 
support the idea of compulsory education. See M. R. Matthews, Tb . 
Marxist Theory of Schooling, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980, p. 175. 
68. To be more specific. For Eliot, culture is "a whole way of life". It 
includes "all the characteristic activities and interests of a people. " It 
cannot be identified with education, politics, and so on. It embraces 
251 
them all. Most importantly, culture in Eliot's views is mysterious and 
"cannot altogether be brought to consciousness; and the culture of which 
we are wholly conscious is never the whole of culture. " Given this 
understanding, if education is aimed at transmitting or preserving 
culture, it can only transmit or preserve part of the culture; and 
education is only one instrument, among others, in doing this. See T. S. 
Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of-Culture , London: 
Faber & Faber, 
1948, pp. 31,107. In comparison with Eliot, Bantock uses the world 
"culture" in a more self-conscious sense. It refers to "those valuable 
aspects of other men's minds, records of which have been left In various 
media, and an understanding of which is transmissible through 
conscious educational processes. " According to this, it can be suggested 
that education in Bantock's usage is an essential instrument for 
preserving and transmitting culture. See G. H. Bantock, Freedom and 
Authority in Education, London: Faber & Faber, 1970, p. 51, note 1. 
69. Eliot, op. cit., p. 101. 
70. Ibid., p. 108. 
71. Ibid., p. 108. 
72. See G. H. Bantock, Towards a Theory of Popular Education, in R. Hooper 
(ed. ), The Curriculum. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1972, pp. 251-264. 
73. G. H. Bantock, Freedom and Authority In Education, p. 31. 
74. Ibid., p. 31. 
75. Ibid., pp. 31-33. 
76. Eliot, op. cit., p. 100. 
77. Ibid., p. 100. 
78. Ibid., p. 100. 
79. See G. H. Bantock, Freedom and Authority in Education. p. 45. 
80. Eliot, op. cit., p. 109. 
81. Ibid., p. 109. 
82. See J. S. Mill, A System of Logic. Book VI, ch. XI I. 
83. L. I. Krimerman, Compulsory Education: A Moral Critique, In K. A. Strike 
& K. Egan (eds. ), Ethics and Educational Policy . London; Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 80. 
84. T. Husen, The School in Question, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
252 
1980, p. 25. 
85, P. Goodman, Freedom and Learning, In R. Hooper, op. cit., pp. 107-108. 
86. L. I. Krimerman, op, cit., p. 80. 
87. See I. Illich, Deschooling Society, 
88. See P. Goodman, Compulsory Miseducation. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1964, p. 117. 
89. L. I. Krimerman, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 
90. R. F Dearden, Autonomy and Education, In Dearden, P. Hirst & R. S. Peters 
(eds. ), 
-Education and 
the Development of Reason, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1972, pp. 450-452. 
91. J. Kleinig, Compulsory Schooling, pp. 200-201. 
253 
CONCLUSION 
CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND 
COMPULSORY EDUCATION' 
It was argued in Chapter Four that children have a right to education 
(education in its specific sense). In Chapter Five, it was suggested that 
children should be compelled to receive the education advocated principally 
on the grounds of paternalism and children's obligation to receive 
education. The focal point of this final chapter will be the relations 
between children's right to education and compulsory education. The reason 
for paying attention to this issue is that children's right to education has 
been used by some writers to justify the imposition of compulsory 
education on children. This is different from the claim made in Chapter 
Five that the foundation of compulsory education should principally be 
grounded on paternalism and children's obligation to receive education. 
Given this background, this chapter is aimed at clarifying the relations of 
children's rights in general, and children's right to education in particular, 
to the justification of compulsory education. Specifically, it will firstly 
present arguments that can be, and have been, used to justify compulsory 
education in terms of children's right to education. Secondly, it will expose 
possible shortcomings and weaknesses of the arguments mentioned. 
Thirdly, based on one of the criticisms of the arguments mentioned, it will 
demonstrate a plausible way of justifying compulsory education from the 
view that children have a right to education. Finally, some remarks will be 
made concerning the implications of the recommended argument on theories 
of rights and the characteristics of rights-talk. 
It is not uncommon for writers to invoke children's right to education to 
* "Compulsory education" can also be understood as "compulsory schooling". 
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justify compulsory education for children. Bandman, for example, suggests 
that "The right to an education implies that everyone has to go to 
school. "(i) Raz proposes that children's right to education can be 
compulsorily enforced not only over the duty-bearer(s) but also over the 
right-holders themselves. For he says: "A right to education grounds a duty 
to provide educational opportunities to each individual, whether he wishes 
it or not. "(2) But why should children's right to education be the justifying 
ground for compulsory education? Is it not a paradox that "someone should 
be compelled to have something because he has a right to it? "(3) Haydon 
admits that this does appear to be paradoxical. But he argues that "If the 
attempted justification is .. -. a fairly standard 
case of a paternalistic 
argument, the appearance of paradox in itself need not be troubling. "(4) To 
be more specific, he suggests: 
if a case can anywhere be made out that a person should be compelled 
to have something because he has a right to it, it will be in Instances 
in which the person has a right to the thing in virtue of its being a 
vital interest or necessity for h1m. (5) 
From Haydon's statements, a clear picture can be obtained. That is: 
children's right to education supported by paternalism Or "a standard case 
of a paternalistic argument") can justify the enforcement of compulsory 
education. 
Gutmann takes a similar line to that or Haydon. (6) Their reasoning can be 
construed as follows: 
1>. Education is "a vital interest or necessity" for children. It Is conducive 
to their future freedoms and welfare. 
2>. Children have a right to education on account of the importance of 
education. 
3>. Since children do not have the necessary capacity to exercise their 
right, or to waive it ("so that this right must be assumed as not waived"), 
hence adults are entitled to exercise the right for children even though they 
may interfere with children's liberty. After all, education is of supreme 
importance to children. 
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4>. As children's right to education is so essential to children this right 
cannot be denied. To deny children's right to education would contradict our 
received moral or political convictions. 
5>. The inalienability or children's right to education implies not only that 
adults cannot deny this right but that children, the right-holders, are not 
entitled to waive or relinquish their own right. The right to education is so 
important that we cannot take the risk of letting children decide whether 
or not to exercise it for themselves. 
6>. Given the above reasoning, children's right to education should be 
regarded as a mandatory right or a compulsory right. As such, it implies 
that children can be compelled to exercise their right and receive 
education. Thus, children's right to education can legitimately be rephrased 
as "children's right to compulsory education", or "children's mandatory right 
to education". 
In addition to Haydon and Gutmann, Golding also holds the view , 
that 
children's right to education is a mandatory right (in Golding's term, 
"welfare right"), by which compulsory education can be justifled. (7) For 
him, the reason why children's right to education is mandatory is not just 
based on the conviction that this right is too essential for children to 
decide whether to exercise it. It is also, as rephrased by Feinberg, that 
children's right to education coincides with children's duty to receive 
education so that "there is no free play for 'discretion-. (S) This argument 
will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
There is another line of argument, indirectly suggested by Joel Feinberg(9), 
that can be used to justify compulsory education from children's right to 
education. In his essay Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to 
Life. Feinberg says: 
A mandatory right, after all, is a kind of duty looked at in a certain 
positive way. ... Every duty trivially entails a 
liberty to do what 
duty requires. When it is vitally important and essentially 
advantageous not only to the community in general but to the moral 
agent himself that his duty be discharged, we are likely to guarantee 
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him, by the imposition of duties of noninterference on others, the 
opportunity to do his duty. Then the liberty trivially entailed by duty 
takes on the appearance of a claim-right against others. If the 
personal and social interest in the successful performance of the 
duty is great enough, opportunity to perform is guaranteed, 
opportunity to fail to perform 1s totally withdrawn, and, at this 
point, enforcible duty, treasured opportunity, and claim-right all 
coalesce into mandatory right. (10) 
Following the line of reasoning suggested by Feinberg, an argument for 
compulsory education can be advanced as follows: 
I). It should firstly be confirmed that children have a welfare-right to 
education and that children's right to education is correlated with the 
duties of parents, adults without children and the state. (Arguments for 
these claims have been offered in Chapter Four). Parents, adults without 
children and the state have obligations concerning children's education. 
2>. The obligations of parents, adults without children and the state in 
relation to children's right to education are essential not only for children 
but also for themselves and society as a whole. This can lead to the claim 
that the agents responsible for children's education should not have 
discretion on the question of whether they should fulfil their duties. 
3>. As the duties concerned are so essential, parents, adults without 
children and the state should be given opportunities (or liberties) to fulfil 
their duties. 
4>. The granted opportunities (or liberties) to fulfil the duties mentioned 
may give rise to the recognition that parents, adults without children and 
the state have claim-rights against others (or against one other). The 
claim-rights they have imply either that other people (or institutions) 
should not interfere with their rights to fulfil their duties or that other 
people (or institutions) should provide some services in helping them to 
fulfil their duties. 
5>. Children have a duty corresponding to the claim-rights or parents, 
adults without children and the state in fulfilling their duties concerning 
children's education, and this duty is a duty to receive education. For if 
children do not have this duty, the responsible agents for children's 
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education may not be able to fulfil their duties concerning education. 
6>. Children should be compelled to receive education, or children should be 
compelled to exercise their right to education, based on the fact that they 
have a duty to receive education. 
If the line of reasoning above is correctly conducted then we can claim that 
the justification of compulsory education can be generated from children's 
right to education. In other words, compulsory education is justified on the 
basis of children's right to education. 
Given the above account, it can be said that there are three lines of 
reasoning for suggesting that children's right to education implies 
compulsory education for the right-holders, that is for children. First, the 
requirement that children should be compelled to receive education is 
justified from the view that the duty-bearers of children's right to 
education have claim-rights against children in enforcing them to receive 
education. Secondly, as children's right to education goes hand in hand with 
children's obligation to receive education this right becomes mandatory, 
which indicates that the right-holders can be forced to exercise their right. 
Thirdly, it is for the sake of children's future freedoms and welfare that 
children's right to education must be enforced. These three lines of 
reasoning sound reasonable, but they are problematic in one way or another. 
The reasoning inspired by Feinberg's statement can be tackled first. 
The argument based on Feinberg's idea can proceed acceptably without 
qualms from stages 1 to 4. It 1s quite reasonable to say that the agents 
responsible for children's education should be granted claim-rights (or 
liberties, or opportunities) to fulfil their duties concerning children's 
education. But the problem is on the question of whether their claim-rights 
to fulfil their duties concerning children's education can extend to insisting 
that they are entitled to children's positive cooperation, namely, receiving 
education. It can be suggested that children should not have an obligation 
to receive education corresponding to the responsible agents' claim-rights 
to fulfil their duties concerning children's education. The fact that the 
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responsible agents have claim-rights to fulfil their duties concerning 
children's education only suggests that the responsible agents are entitled 
to ask help (or forbearance) from others, or from each other, so that they 
can provide a satisfactory education for children. For example, the state is 
entitled to tax its citizens so that there will be revenues for funding 
education; or parents are entitled to ask the state's help in providing 
necessary facilities for children's education. The claim-rights concerned, 
however, should not go so far as to include a claim-right to compel children 
to receive education. The duties of the responsible agents corresponding to 
children's right to education should be duties of providing a satisfactory 
and competent education for children. Children should be compelled to 
receive education but the reason for it should be based on either 
paternalism or children's duty to prevent harm to others, rather than on 
children's duty in relation to the claim-rights of parents, adults without 
children and the state to fulfil their duties concerning children's education. 
A parallel argument can be given here to make the point clearer. 
D. In a modern democratic society, given normal circumstances, people 
who have reached adulthood can, and should, have a right to vote. 
2>. In relation to adults' right to vote the state has a duty to realize adults' 
right to vote, for example, the state is obligated to make some provision so 
that adults can exercise their right to vote. 
3>. The state's duty concerning adults' right to vote is essential for adults, 
society as a whole, and the state itself. As it is so essential, the state 
should be given claim-rights (or liberties, or opportunities) to fulfil its 
duty concerning adults' right to vote. 
4>. The state's claim-rights imply the state's entitlement in enforcing 
adults to vote. Corresponding to the state's right, adults have a duty to 
vote. If this is not the case, the state's duty concerning adults' right to 
vote will not be fulfilled. 
5>. Adults should be compelled to vote on the grounds that they have a duty 
in relation to the state's claim-rights to fulfil its duty concerning adults' 
right to vote. 
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Presumably, the reasoning above is similarly structured to the previous 
argument. But it is easier to spot possible flaws embedded in the present 
case. Notably, the state's claim-rights to fulfil its duty in realizing adults' 
right to vote only imply that the state is entitled to make necessary 
provision so that adults can exercise their right to vote, or that the state 
has the right to tax it citizens so that the state is able to set up and 
maintain the whole voting mechanism, or that the state can ask adults to 
register so that it can conduct general or local election. It is, however, 
dubious to suggest that the state's claim-rights to fulfil its duty 
concerning adults' right to vote should give it the power to compel adults to 
vote. In some democratic societies adults can indeed be compelled to vote 
by the state, and the reason for it, presumably, is based on adults' duty to 
vote. But it can be suggested that adults' duty to vote is grounded on their 
membership of society or their duty to prevent harm, rather than their duty 
correlated with the state's claim-rights to fulfil its duty concerning 
adults' right to vote. 
Against the account given above, it can be contended that the two cases 
mentioned are actually not parallel. The subjects concerned In the latter 
case are adults; In the former case, children. It may be true that adults' 
right to vote does not lead to adults' duty to vote, but there is no reason 
why children's right to education cannot lead to children's duty to receive 
education and, hence, the imposition of compulsory education. This 
contention has a point. It might be the case that the claim-rights of 
parents, adults without children and the state to fulfil their duties 
concerning children's education include the right to compel children to 
receive education. But if we bear the case of adults' right to vote in mind 
then we can see that it is not logically so. The claim-rights of the 
responsible agents concerned do" not necessarily include the right to 
compel children to receive education. This implies that the enforcement of 
compulsory education does not have to, in this context, be justified by the 
fact that children have a welfare-right to education. In response to this 
rejoinder, it can, however, be argued that the fact that the claim-rights 
concerned do not necessarily contain the right to compel children to receive 
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education does not imply that the claim-rights concerned cannot include 
the right to compel children to receive education. Whether the right to 
compel children to receive education is included in the claim-rights 
concerned is contingent upon deliberations of the agents responsible for 
children's education, taking all relevant conditions into consideration. It 
has to be admitted that this point is reasonable. Whether the claim-rights 
concerned should include the right to compel children to receive education 
should be an issue open to contest. It can, nevertheless, be suggested that 
even if parents, adults without children and the state do have claim-rights 
- based on their duties concerning children's right to education - to compel 
children to receive education, this reason for compelling children to 
receive education is fairly weak. The justification of compulsory education 
is better served by arguing that it is on the ground of paternalistic 
consideration and children's obligation to prevent harm to others. Is it not 
awkward to say that compulsory education is justified by the fact that 
children have duty to receive education, which is correlated with the 
responsible agents' claim-rights to fulfil their duties concerning children's 
education? The argument developed from Feinberg's statement may 
constitute a justification for the imposition of compulsory education, but 
it is not a good justification. It is contentious and weak. 
We now turn to the argument suggested by Golding. For Golding - at least as 
interpreted by Feinberg - one of the reasons for- the imposition of 
compulsory education is that children have a mandatory right to receive 
education, and children's mandatory right to education results from the 
coincidence, or combination, of children's right to education and children's 
duty to receive education. Each of them plays an equal part in the shaping 
of children's mandatory right to education. This line of reasoning Is 
problematic in its account of the formation of a mandatory right or 
compulsory right. What we can learn from Feinberg's statement quoted 
above is that the idea of a mandatory (compulsory) right can actually be 
based on duty. Following Feinberg's reasoning, it can be suggested that the 
reason why children have a mandatory (compulsory) right to education is 
because they have a duty to receive education. Children's duty to receive 
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education is so essential to the extent that they must have a claim-right to 
fulfil their duty. And this claim-right and children's duty to receive 
education eventually coalesce into children's mandatory (compulsory) right 
to education. Therefore, strictly speaking, a mandatory (compulsory) right 
in Feinberg's scheme is duties-based. 
The argument developed from Feinberg's statement (pp. 257-258), although 
problematic, can nevertheless be used to indicate another possible source 
of a mandatory (compulsory) right. In that argument, children have a duty 
to receive education, which results from its correlation with the claim- 
rights of other agents. However, other agents' claim-rights correlated with 
children's duty to receive education are generated from their duties 
concerning children's education, which are based on children's right to 
education. Given this account, children's mandatory (compulsory) right to 
education is also a coalescence of children's right to education and 
children's duty to receive education. But the formation of a mandatory 
(compulsory) right in this argument is different from the one in Feinberg's 
scheme. Children's mandatory (compulsory) right to education in this 
context is rights-based. 
Apart from the two possible sources of the formation of a mandatory 
(compulsory) right mentioned above, the reasoning of Gutmann and Haydon 
also suggests a possible source of a mandatory (compulsory) right. To put 
it simply, the formation of children's mandatory (compulsory) right to 
education is simply based on the fact that it is in the interests of children 
that they must exercise their right to education. In this context, the source 
of children's mandatory (compulsory) right is based on paternalistic 
considerations; it is nether duties-based nor rights-based. 
The point being made concerning Golding's account of the formation of 
children's mandatory (compulsory) right to education is that their 
mandatory (compulsory) right to education can be duties-based, rights- 
based, or paternalism-based. It is hardly convincing to argue that the basis 
of children's mandatory (compulsory) right to education is the coincidence, 
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or combination, of children's duty to receive education and children's right 
to education. Children's mandatory (compulsory) right to education can, 
arguably, be formed separately from children's right to education and 
children's duty to receive education, not the coincidence or combination of 
both. The basis of the combination of children's duty to receive education 
and children's right to education is either rights-based or duties-based. 
We now can tackle the paternalism argument suggested by Gutmann and 
Haydon. It will be recalled that this line of argument suggests that the 
imposition of compulsory education can be developed from children's right 
to education which in turn is based on paternalism. - In comparison with the 
arguments suggested by Feinberg and Golding, the reasoning of Gutmann and 
Haydon is much more plausible. But it is not entirely free from problems. 
Specifically, it can be argued that they do not make clear what the 
foundation of paternalism is. Generally, it can be assumed that paternalism 
1s a natural manifestation of human benevolence. (l 1) That is to say, the 
reason why we consider education as an essential good for children is that 
we are sympathetic towards children. We are concerned about their needs 
and well-being because we know if we were put in their position we would 
hope our needs and well-being would also be looked after properly., If this 
account concerning paternalism is sound then the proposition that 
education is an essential good for children can develop into two separate 
but compatible types of claim. First, it can be claimed that since education 
is so essential for children it is then necessary to establish the idea of 
children's right to education, so that we can be sure that children's 
education will be taken seriously and that education will be properly 
provided for them. This claim obviously places the ground of children's 
right to education on the proposition that education is an essential good for 
children. The purpose of this claim, however, is to prescribe that duty- 
bearers of children's right to education have responsibilities to make 
educational provision for children; if they fail to fulfil their duties they 
can be subject to sanctions. In short, this claim demands that children's 
education should be guaranteed. It will be recalled that part two of Chapter 
Four was principally aimed at demonstrating the acceptability and 
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necessity of this claim. 
The proposition that education is an essential good for children, however, 
can develop into another type of claim. It can be claimed that, considering 
the importance of education for children's future freedoms and welfare and 
the fact that children are not capable of deciding whether to receive 
education or not, it is acceptable and sensible, in the interests of children, 
to compel them to receive education as long as the education concerned can 
effectively achieve its aim. In this claim, the justification of compulsory 
education is also based upon the proposition that-education is an essential 
good for children, but the purpose of this claim is rather different from the 
previous one. This claim is aimed at regulating what children should do 
given the consideration that education is essential for them. And, most 
significantly, rights-talk does not have to playa role in this claim. We can 
bypass the ideas of children's right as well as children's right to education 
and argue that compulsory education is acceptable given paternalistic 
considerations. (We can imagine that compulsory education is justifiable on 
the ground of paternalism given a society in which children do not have 
rights. ). It should also be noted that part of Chapter Five has demonstrated 
the plausibility of this type of claim. 
The reason why the proposition, "Education is an essential good for 
children", can develop separately into two types of claim - one of which 
involves rights-talk and the other not - is mainly that these two types of 
claim have different considerations. The first claim is concerned with 
what duty-bearers should do In respect of children's right to education 
which is grounded on the importance of education for children. The second 
claim concerns what children should do given the premise that education 
is an essential good for them. These two types of claim refer to different 
undertakings, and the reasoning involved is also different. In short, what 
has been demonstrated about the argument of Gutmann and Haydon 1s that 
the justification of compulsory education is not necessarily grounded on 
children's right to education or children's rights in general. 
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Responding to this criticism, Gutmann and Haydon might argue that there is 
no significant reason why the two types of claim advanced separately from 
the premise, "Education is an essential good for children", cannot be fused 
into one single line of argument. The line of argument rephrased on pp. 
255-256 has clearly shown both that children should be compelled to 
receive education and that the responsible agents for children's education 
should fulfil their duties towards children can be reasoned from the 
statement, "Children's right to education is inalienable", or "Children's right 
to education should not be denied". And the statement, "Children's right to 
education is inalienable", can in turn be based upon the premise "Education 
is an essential good for children. " 
It seems difficult to arbitrate in the dispute concerning which line of 
reasoning is more persuasive. Both of them have some merits. However, 
instead of taking sides between these two lines of arguments it is possible 
to advance an argument that can synthesize the two. What we can do is to 
modify Gutmann and Haydon's argument in the light of the criticisms of it. 
Most importantly, it can be argued that the foundation of paternalism does 
not have to be benevolence-based, it can be rights-based. It was argued in 
Chapter Three that children should have rights. What goes with this 
recognition is that children should be treated as independent individuals 
and their interests should be considered in their own right with a view to 
maintaining satisfactory relationships between children and other parties, 
such as parents and the state. Given the acceptance of the idea of 
children's rights and its possible implications, the reason why we regard 
education as an essential good for children and earnestly impose it on them, 
therefore, is not because we are driven by our benevolent sentiments but 
because we are constrained to recognize children's rights. It is not 
intended here to exclude the important role benevolence plays in the 
justification of children's rights, and hence its connection with 
paternalism. What should be emphasized is that given the acceptance of 
children's rights the connection between benevolence and paternalistic 
considerations concerning children's education can now be intermediated 
through rights-talk. So if it is asked: why should, or do, we consider 
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education as an essential good for children? We then can answer: it is 
because we accept that children have rights and their rights require us to 
respect them as independent individuals as well as their well-being; and 
because education, in the context of modern world, is essential for children 
for understanding and devising their life-plans, and acquiring necessary 
means to realize those life-plans, so we will naturally reckon education as 
an essential good for children. Generally, this answer is formulated from 
the arguments developed in Chapters Three and Four. 
The proposition "Education is a vital interest or necessity for. children" In 
Gutmann and Haydon's line of reasoning can now be preceded by the 
statement "Children have rights". Given this addition, the paternalistic 
argument for compulsory education, which originally can be developed from 
the idea that education is an essential good for children bypassing rights- 
talk (as shown on p. 264), can now be taken as rights-based. We are now in 
a better position to suggest that the idea of children's right can provide 
solid ground on which a justification of the imposition of compulsory 
education can be advanced. But, how about the idea of children's right to 
education? Is it redundant in the transition from the-idea of children's 
rights to the justification of compulsory education? It seems not. For the 
idea of children's right to education is a natural development from the 
recognition that education is an essential good for children. This is the 
case at least for a -society in which rights-talk is closely, but not 
exclusively, associated with individual interests. It is in this context that 
the idea of children's right to education can have a place in the undertaking 
of justifying compulsory education from the idea of children's rights. 
We now can arrange an argument for compulsory education in terms of 
children's rights as follows: 
1>. Children have rights. Children's rights require other agents to respect 
children as independent individuals like adults. The idea of children's 
rights implies that reciprocally satisfactory relationships between 
children and other agents should be maintained. 
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2>. Education is a vital interest for children. Without proper education, 
children will be harmed. Education is a constituent element of satisfactory 
relations between children and other agents. 
3>. Children have a right to education because education is essential for 
them and for satisfactory relations between children and others. 
4>. In relation to children's right to education, adults and the state have 
obligations to provide education for children. 
5>. Most children are incapable of exercising their right to education, hence 
their right to -education is exercised on their behalf by their 
representatives. It can be imagined that some children are unaware of the 
importance of education and they might demand that they themselves 
should decide whether they should receive education. However, considering 
children's states of mind and the fact that education is too important for 
them to decide whether they should receive it or not, their representatives 
are entitled to exercise their right to education against their desires or 
wishes. 
6>. As children must exercise their right to education, they have no 
alternative but to receive education. 
Roughly, the line of argument above is an argument synthesizing the 
language of rights and the paternalistic justification for compulsory 
education (as demonstrated in Chapter Five). It can be counted as another 
argument, albeit closely related to the paternalistic argument, for the 
enforcement of compulsory education. 
There are some important implications for theories of rights if this line of 
reasoning, a modified version of Gutmann and Haydon's reasoning, is 
accepted. Two points are worth mentioning. 
The first concerns the characteristic of rights-talk. If we accept the 
reasoning that we should compel children to receive education because 
children have a right to education then we should refute the claim that 
rights-talk does not prescribe what the right-holder should do. For some 
writers, rights-talk only regulates the undertaking of the duty-bearer(s), it 
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does not prescribe the undertaking of the right-holder. In other words, for 
those writers, rights-talk is not self-addressed or self-referring. (12) If 
the point that rights-talk is not self-referring is accepted, then the claim, 
"Children should be compelled to receive education", cannot be grounded on 
children's rights or children's right to education. For the claims of 
children's rights and children's right to education only prescribe or 
proscribe what duty-bearers should do or omit; they do not regulate what 
the right-holders should do. However, as we have already accepted the 
argument that children's right to education is a justifying ground for the 
imposition of compulsory education, we have to reject the claim that 
rights-talk is not self-referring. 
The second point concerns theories of rights. It was pointed out in Chapter 
One that there are two traditions interpreting the concept of rights in two 
different ways. One is the option-rights tradition in which the right-holder 
has choice over his own and the duty-bearer's actions. The other is the 
welfare-rights tradition in which the right-holder can have entitlement to 
goods even though he has no control. (13) It should be recalled that the 
initial stance of this thesis was neutral on the contest between these two 
traditions of the theories of rights. (14) However, if we advocate the 
modified version of Gutmann and Haydon's argument then the initial neutral 
stance over the theories of rights can hardly be maintained. For the view 
that children can and should be compelled to receive education to which 
they have a right can only be made and advocated in the welfare-rights 
tradition. Thus, given the fact that we have accepted the view that 
children can have no say over their right to education the option-rights 
tradition should then be rejected. 
268 
NOTES: 
1. B. Bandman, Some Legal, Moral and Intellectual Rights of Children, 
Educational Theory, vol. 27, no. 3,1977, pp. 175-176. 
2. J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights, i , XCII I, 1984, p. 
199. 
3. G. Haydon, The 'Right to Education' and Compulsory Schooling, Educational 
Philosophy and Theory vol. 9, no. 1, p. 1. 
4. Ibid., p. 2. 
5. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
6. See A. Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal 
Argument, Philosophhy and Public Affairs. vol. 9, no. 4,1980, pp. 338- 
358. 
7. See M. P. Golding, Towards a Theory of Human Rights, The Monist. vol. 52, 
1968, pp. 521-549. 
8. See J. Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 
in J. Feinberg, Rights. Justice. and The Bounds or Liberty, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 233. 
9.1 have to thank Mr A. Lockyer for giving me the idea that It Is possible to 
develop Feinberg's position into a justification of compulsory education 
based on children's right to education. 
10. J. Feinberg, op, cit., p. 235. 
11. D. Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984, p. 172. 
12. The point that rights-talk 1s not self-addressed can be supported by 
Miller's and Lamont's statements. Miller suggests: "Plainly, the 
paradigm case of a right being used is where the individual who has the 
right knows that he has It and acts upon it, while other people recognize 
his right and adjust their behaviour accordingly (by performing their 
obligation, not imposing obligations on the right-holder, etc., according 
to the nature of the right). " See D. Miller, Social Justice, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 71. In the discussion of "legal rights", Lamont 
states, "The existence of a right belonging to A involves no legal 
demands upon A. The demands all fall upon B, C, D, E, &c. It A wishes to 
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do something falling within the bounds of his right, then he may do so; 
and B, C, D, and E, &c., are commanded to refrain from interference, or 
perhaps positively to render assistance. " See W. D. Lamont, Principles of 
Moral Judgement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 71. 
13. See Chapter One, pp. 9-10. 
14. See Chapter One, p. 43. 
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